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Past earthquakes have clearly shown the seismic vulnerability of existing bridges. Despite recent 
progress by the structural engineering profession in addressing bridge seismic risks, there are still 
several areas where improvements in bridge evaluation and retrofit practices are needed. The first part 
of this report reviews the common seismic deficiencies of bridges, procedures and criteria for 
seismically evaluating bridges, and the engineering techniques which have been used for retrofitting 
bridge seismic deficiencies. Information on seismic deficiencies, retrofit techniques, and related 
research has been organized by the author in a concise tabular form. The review indicates several 
areas where effective retrofit techniques have been established, and other areas where improved 
procedures or further research are needed. Seismic upgrade measures proposed for Wellingto~ 
Thomdon bridge, including an innovative retrofit of superstructure linkages, illustrate the benefits of 
a capacity-design approach to seismic evaluation and retrofitting. 
The second part of this report describes the laboratory testing and inelastic computer analysis of a 
1936-designed bridge which is typical of many of the older, reinforced-concrete, multi-span bridges 
in New Zealand. The structure has plain-round (undeformed) reinforcing bars and questionable 
anchorage details, shear strength, and column-transverse reinforcing. Despite the suspected seismic 
deficiencies, the testing and analysis of the bridge show that its seismic performance will be good. The 
results indicate that (a) seismic retrofitting is not warranted, (b) code criteria applicable to the design 
of new structures, with deformed reinforcing, can be overly conservative when used for the assessment 
of existing structures, and (c) plain-round reinforcing bars under cyclic seismic forces suffer extensive 
bond deterioration resulting in pinched hysteretic response which, for earthquake inputs with extreme 
pulses, can lead to greater seismic damage. 
The third part of the report reviews procedures which have been used to prioritize bridges for seismic 
upgrading. A new method of managing and prioritizing bridge-upgrade work, developed by the author 
for New Zealands Tasman district, offers several improvements over previously used procedures. The 
new method is based on cost-benefit and earthquake loss-estimation principles. The method outlines 
four levels of seismic evaluation and includes a seismic-vulnerability rating system, a flowchart 
assessment method, and formulas for estimating bridge value and benefit/cost ratios for seismic 
upgrading. The recommended methods have been implemented on a stock of 445 bridges using a 
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As emphasized recently in Kobe, Japan and Northridge, California, damage to bridges can be one of 
the most catastrophic results of strong earthquakes. Past earthquakes have clearly shown that bridges 
can be seismically vulnerable; and the inadequacy of many types of existing bridge structures to resist 
earthquake shaking has been well established. 
Over the last few years there has been substantial progress in addressing the seismic risk posed by 
existing bridges. Since the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, an intensive program of seismic retrofitting 
for California!; highway bridges has been undertaken. Other US states, and other countries, have also 
begun or intensified seismic evaluation and retrofit programs for their bridges. Along with the 
implementation of seismic retrofit measures, numerous research programs have been carried out. The 
research has resulted in greatly improved procedures for evaluating bridges and designing retrofit 
measures. 
Despite the recent progress, there is still room for improvement. Because of the complexities of bridge 
seismic performance and seismic risk, there are still many gaps in our knowledge of, and ability to 
provide, effective seismic-retrofit solutions. The problem is compounded by the wide variety of 
structure types and characteristics, seismicity levels, soil conditions, and available resources for seismic 
upgrading, which are found in different locations or within a single jurisdiction. In some areas further 
research is needed; in other cases sufficient research has been carried out, but engineers in practice 
may not be fully aware of the research results or their implications. For the management and 
prioritization of bridge seismic upgrading, a better overlap of understanding among the disciplines of 
structural engineering, risk analysis, and seismology may be needed. 
Objectives 
The aim of this report is to fill in some of the gaps in knowledge and knowledge-transfer in the 
structural engineering profession regarding the seismic evaluation and retrofitting of bridges. The 
emphasis of this report is on the practical aspects of the problem. It is intended to provide useful 
information to structural-engineering designers as well as researchers. The report includes: 
(i) a comprehensive review of seismic evaluation and retrofit technology, focused on 
practical and specific examples, 
(ii) a detailed study of a prevalent New Zealand bridge type-a concrete structure with plain-
round reinforcing bars, and 
(iii) an improved method for the management and prioritization of bridge seismic upgrading. 
In New Zealand, the upgrading of seismically deficient bridges is lagging behind the progress in other 
earthquake-prone areas such as California and Japan. Fortunately, the research results and 
implementation experience from overseas can be put to use in New Zealand. It is hoped that the 
information contained in this report will help in the task of implementing an effective bridge seismic 
retrofit program here in New Zealand and elsewhere. 
Evolution 
The scope of this study has changed somewhat since its inception. The work began in July 1992 with 
the experimental study of the column-foundation region of a 1936-designed bridge. The study included 
a literature review on bridge seismic retrofitting. 
Originally the issue of bridge-upgrade prioritization was a small part of the work. However, two 
circumstances led to a deeper exploration of this topic, which now constitutes the final third of the 
report. First, the literature review of procedures for bridge-upgrade prioritization revealed both the 
critical importance of the topic and the tremendous room for improvement over previous methods. 
Second, the opportunity came up to conduct a bridge seismic-risk and upgrade-management study for 
the Tasman District, a local authority in New Zealand. 
Another unique opportunity to report on bridge retrofit issues in more detail and from a real-world 
perspective was presented by Beca, Carter, Hollings and Ferner consulting engineers. The author 
worked for BCHF on the design of retrofit concepts for the Thorndon bridge in Wellington, New 
Zealand. The Thorndon project provided several pertinent examples of state-of-the-art seismic 
evaluation and retrofit principles, which are presented in Chapters 4 and 14. 
Organimtion 
This report is divided into three parts. The conclusions of the report are presented within each of the 
three parts-in Chapters 5, 10, and 15. 
Part I of the report covers bridge seismic evaluation and retrofitting in general. Within Part I, Chapter 
2 reviews bridge seismic deficiencies, and procedures and criteria for seismic evaluation; Chapter 3 
reviews seismic-retrofit techniques. The five-page Table 2.1 summarizes much of the infonnation from 
Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 provides some examples in more detail of recommended seismic 
evaluation and retrofit practices, taken from the Thomdon bridge project. 
Part II of the report covers the experimental and analytical studies of a 1936-designed concrete bridge 
with plain-round reinforcement. Chapter 6 reviews previous studies of the bridge, which include an 
initial seismic assessment and tests of the column/crossbeam region of the structure. Chapters 7 and 
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8 discuss the laboratory testing of a second critical portion of the structure, the column/foundation-
beam region. Chapter 9 presents inelastic, dynamic time-history analyses of the bridge which 
complement the experimental studies. 
Part III of the report covers the topic of prioritizing bridges for seismic upgrading and managing 
bridge-seismic retrofitting. Chapter 11 is a comprehensive review of previously proposed procedures 
for bridge-upgrade prioritization. Chapter 12 describes a new method of bridge-upgrade management 
and prioritization which was developed by the author. Chapter 13 presents results from the 
implementation of the new method on a group of 445 bridges in the Tasman district. Chapter 14 






AND RETROFIT TECHNOLOGY 
-
CHAPTER 2 
SEISMIC EVALUATION OF BRIDGES 
This Chapter reviews several aspects of the problem of evaluating a bridge's ability to withstand 
earthquake effects. Section 2.1 reviews the possible seismic deficiencies of bridges, which show the 
clear seismic vulnerability of many common features of existing bridges. Section 2.2 discusses the 
procedures and criteria which have been proposed for the seismic evaluation of bridges, including 
recommendations for improved procedures. 
2.1 Observed Seismic Deficiencies in Bridges 
Past earthquakes have revealed the structural deficiencies of bridges throughout the world. Since 
reviews of earthquake damage to bridges have already been written [Priestley et al 1992a], only a 
summary is given here. Although many existing bridges were designed considering earthquake effects, 
the inadequate seismic design criteria used before the early 1970s makes these bridges vulnerable to 
collapse. Typically, seismic design forces and expected deflections were too low, members critical 
in earthquakes were not designed for ductility and thus could suffer brittle failures, and the concept 
of capacity design (i.e., precluding the failure of brittle elements by providing them with strength 
exceeding that of a ductile yield mechanism) was not used. 
In California, the February 1971 San Fernando earthquake brought about a number of improvements 
in seismic design practice which were implemented over the next decade. Consequently, the California 
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) considers that its seismic design code was not fully developed 
until 1980 [Zelinski pers. comm. 1994], and has carried out an extensive program of evaluation and 
retrofitting for structures built before 1980. 
Several observed deficiencies in bridge structures are discussed below. The deficiencies are presented 
in the sequence that a structural designer might consider them, roughly following the seismic load path 
from the roadway superstructure, through the beams, connections, columns, and foundations and 
abutments, to the supporting soil. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the structural locations of potential seismic deficiencies discussed. Table 2.1 
summarizes the infonnation on seismic deficiencies discussed in this chapter. The left-hand side of 
the table outlines the common bridge seismic deficiencies and the structural engineering research 
associated with them. The right-hand side of the table indicates the possible retrofit solutions, 
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Figure 2.1 Potential regions or seismic deficiencies r or typical reinr orced concrete bridge 
structures. 
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Unseating of Bridge Spans 
The unseating of bridge spans has been a common type of seismic failure in bridges. The bridge 
girders move off their supports at unrestrained movement joints because actual seismic displacements 
exceed the displacements provided for in the design of the girder seats. Even where restrainer 
mechanisms have been provided, they may have inadequate strength to keep the spans from unseating. 
Bridges with support lines skewed to the axis of the bridge have a greater tendency to unseat than right 
angle bridges; skew bridges undergo increased lateral displacements in earthquakes caused by the plan 
rotation of the bridge superstructure [Priestley et al 1992a]. Research on the earthquake response of 
bridge structures with movement joints has been carried out by Maragakis et al [1993), Singh and 
Fenves [1993), and Priestley [pers. comm. 1993). 
Beams and Beam-Column Joints 
This category includes seismic deficiencies which have been identified in outrigger and non-outrigger 
cap beams and beam-column joints, and in two-level bridge structures. 
Outrigger Beams 
Outrigger piers are commonly used in US freeway bridge structures at locations where underpassing 
roadways or other obstacles do not allow columns directly beneath the bridge deck. Seismic 
deficiencies of outrigger beams were revealed in the 1989 Loma Prieta, California earthquake. The 
principal deficiencies of these beams are: (1) inadequate shear capacity, particularly when seismic 
shears are additive to dead load shears, (2) the premature cut-off of top-beam reinforcement to resist 
negative moments, and (3) insufficient anchorage of longitudinal beam reinforcement into the column. 
Outrigger beams in San Francisco's China Basin viaduct and Oakland's Cypress structure had these 
deficiencies for transverse earthquake loading, and were damaged by the Loma Prieta earthquake. 
Outrigger beams are also potentially vulnerable to torsional failure caused by earthquake response in 
the longitudinal direction [Priestley et al 1992a]. Sometimes the superstructure flexural capacity to 
sustain longitudinal-direction column hinging or outrigger torsion is lacking. Also calculations often 
show that the shear-friction capacity of the outrigger-beam to superstructure connection is deficient 
[Zelinski pers. comm. 1994). 
The ninety-degree joints connecting outrigger beams to columns (knee joints) are also prone to 
earthquake damage. The deficiency of these joints is not limited to pre-1970 designs: a 1984-built 
outrigger knee joint for the 1-980 freeway structure in Oakland was damaged by the Loma Prieta 
earthquake. This knee joint lacked sufficient joint shear reinforcement horizontally, where 6.4 mm 
diameter (W5) wire reinforcement at a 100 mm (4-inch) spacing was used, and vertically, where the 
57 mm (#18) column bars were not hooked and were stopped 300 mm (12 inches) below the top of 
the 2.4 m (8 ft) deep joint. In addition to the lack of adequate shear reinforcement, the detailing of 
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the beam and column longitudinal bars with ninety-degree bends at the outside comer of the knee joint 
is problematic. Under cyclic opening and closing moments .in the plane of the knee-joint, the cover 
concrete of the outside comer spalls off, allowing the ninety-degree bends of the longitudinal bars to 
open up so that they can no longer support the compression force of the diagonal strut which is the 
mechanism of joint shear resistance [Priestley et al 1992a]. Research on outrigger beams and knee 
joints has been carried out by Ingham et al (1993) and Thewalt and Stojadinovic (1993). 
Two-Level Bridge Structures 
A similar condition to the outrigger knee joints is found in the lower beam to column joint in the 
double-deck bridge structures found in San Francisco and Oakland, California, which were damaged 
by the Loma Prieta earthquake. These bridges include the 1-880 Cypress structure which collapsed, 
the Embarcadero freeway which was damaged and was subsequently tom down, and the 1-280 freeway 
which was damaged and is being retrofitted. In these T-shaped joints, seismic deficiencies include poor 
anchorage of beam flexural reinforcement into the joint and the lack of adequate shear reinforcement 
[Priestley et al 1992a]. Tests on surviving portions of the Cypress elevated highway structure [Bolio 
et al 1990) and on laboratory specimens [Moehle and Sawyer 1993) provide further infonnation on 
these types of structures. 
Beam-column Joints 
The exterior beam-column joint of a (non-outrigger) multi-column bent is similar to the outrigger knee 
joint. Non-outrigger bents are more common than outrigger bents, but there has been less evidence 
of earthquake damage to joints in non-outrigger piers. The interaction of the elastically responding 
bridge deck girders perpendicular to the bent can provide beneficial lateral confinement to the beam-
column joints. Such confinement is not present in outrigger joints. Nevertheless, in the 1971 San 
Fernando, California earthquake, shear failure occurred in the beam-column joints of several multi-
column bents. 
Inadequate anchorage of column longitudinal reinforcement into beam-column joints is a common 
seismic deficiency. Seib le et al ( 1993) have carried out full-scale tests on joints with 57 mm diameter 
(#18) column longitudinal bars with relatively short anchorages. The actual anchorage capacity may 
be better than the codes imply, because the bond failure mechanism occurs in the bearing of the steel 
deformations on confined concrete rather than the splitting of the concrete assumed in design codes. 
Park et al [ 1993) have improved the anchorage of plain-round (undeformed) bars by welding anchorage 
plates to the ends of the straight bars. To avoid overly conservative assessments of apparently deficient 
joints, mechanisms of joint shear transfer and possible bond failure patterns should be carefully 
investigated [Priestley 1993a, Priestley et al 1992a]. The techniques for such an assessment are as yet 
not well established in the structural design profession. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of bridge seismic deficiencies, recommended retrofit methods, and related research. 
Bridge Seismic Obsened Earthquake Research on Earthquake Recommended Retrofit Research oD Retrofit Examples of Remarb OD Design 
Deficiencies Damage Performance Methods Methods Application of Criteria 
Retrofit Methods 
1 Movement joints, Numerous earthquakes, On Restrainers: High-strength bar restrainers, University of Numerous applications Analysis techniques 
seats, restrainers, particularly 1971 San University of California looped cable restrainers, California Los Angeles in California and else- and design criteria 
bearings Fernando Loa Angeles (18,19) straight-through cable (18,19) where need further devel-
Babaei and Hawkin• [1991] restrainers opment. 
Dynamic analysis of structures 
with movement joints: Steel pipe seat extenders Cypress Viaduct tests Numerous applications Babaei and Hawkin• 
Maragakis et al [1993], of Dec. 1989 [Zelin•ki in California (1991 J present 
Singh and Fenves [1993], 1994] typical details and 
Priestley [pen. comm. cost estimates. 
1993] Concrete or steel bracket - Application• in Japan 
abutment seat extenders and and elsewhere 
stopper devices, steel chain and 
steel plate restrainers 
Base isolation and energy Various research Pioneered in New Inelastic behaviour 
absorbing device• Zealand. Used on of isolators can be 
several bridge retrofit modelled elastically 
projects in New using equivalent 
Zealand and the stiffness and 
United States (68), increased damping -
Used in Italy, Japan Generic specifica-
and Canada [Skinner lion•, needed 
et al 1993] 
Elimination of movement joints - Used in Italy Applicable only to 
by deck slab replacement shorter bridges 
Addition of high-strength slack - Proposed for Applicable to 
restrainers to distribute Thomdon Bridge, bridges with closely-
movement to uveral joints New Zealand spaced movement 
joints 
2 Cap beams 1989 Loma Prieta - Strengthening by concrete or Proof tests at UC China Basin Viaduct, Designed to force 
steel jacketing and pre- Berkeley and UC San San Francisco plastic hinging into 
stressing, retrofit by adding a Diego [Zelinski 1994 J (jacketing) columns 
new link-beam below 
Cored internal prcstressing, Univ. of British Oak St, and Granville At Oak St designed 
Fibre wrapping and prestressing Columbia, with Klohn- St Bridges, British to force hinging into 
Crippen Columbia columns. At 
Assoc.[Kennedy I 995] Granville St 
designed for elastic 
earthquake forces 
Table 2.1 Continued 
Bridge Seismic Obsened Earthquake Research on Earthquake Recommended Retrofit Research on Retrofit Examples or Remarks on Design 
Deficiencies Damage Performance Methods Methods Application or Criteria 
Retrofit Methods 
3 Outrigger beam 1989 Loma Prieta Ingham et al [1993), Thewalt Al for cap beanu, plu1 removal Ingham et al [1993), 1-980 Freeway, De1igned to force 
kneejointl and Stojadinovic (1993 J of exilting knee joint concrete Thewaltand Oakland California hinging into columns 
and rebuilding of joint Stojadinovic [1993) or ductile - torsional 
hinging in capbeam. 
Reduce, capbeam 
cracking in minor 
earthquakes. 
4 Anchorage of col- 1971 San Fernando Seible et al [1993), Addition of new link beam, - Santa Monica Viaduct, De1ign criteria and 
umn longitudinal Priestley [1993a] Pre1tressing of joint region, Loi Angele• (Link retrofit method• 
bars in beam~ol- Clamped lteel confining jacket. beam) need development. 
umnjoints 
Added anchorage end plate• on Park et al [1993] - -
ltraight bars 
5 Column flexural 1971 San Fernando University of California Elliptical (or circular) UC San Diego (15)(26) Numerou1 applications Detailed de1ign cri-
confinement and bar (UC) San Diego (16), lteel jacketing [Yuk Hon Chai et al in California, Used for teria are provided by 
buclcling restraint UC Berkeley (22), 1991), circular columns in Caltrans (1992). Can 
UC Irvine (23), Japan Public Worb Japan. Proposed for be full or panial 
Washington State Research Institute (29) Thorndon Bridge, height. Fibregla11 
University Pullman (29), Uni- New Zealand. Used method need• 
versity of Canterbury (numerous) in British Columbia. material 
Active fibreglau jacketing UC San Diego (27) Trial applications in 
cenifications ,and 
durability 
British Columbia California• for circular assurance,. 
[Kennedy 1995) columns. Used in 
Britilh Columbia for 
aquare columns. 
Reinforced concrete jacketing Rodriguez and Park Applications in Japan -
(61) and British Columbia 
Removal and replacement of University of - -
cover concrete with added Canterbury 
transverse reinforcing 1teel [Dekker and Park 
1992) 
External steel hoop• with University of - For circular columns 
tum~•uclcles Washington, Seattle (1) only. Typically 
Preatress wire jacketing UC San Diego 
more costly than 
- other methods 
Carl>on fibre jacketing Japan Highway Public - -
Corporation (32) 
Table 2.1 Continlled 
Bridge Seismic Obsened Earthquake Research on Earthquake Recommended Retrofit Research on Retrofit Examples of Remarks on Design 
Deficiencies Damage Performance Methods Methods Application of Criteria 
Retrofit Methods 
6 Column lap splices 1971 San Fernando UC San Diego (15) Partial confinement elliptical ( or UC San Diego Numcrou1 applicatiom Intended to improve 
1982 Urakawa-oki Yuk Hon Chai ct al (1991] circular) steel jacketing (with [Yuk Hon Chai ct al in California on ductility capacity, 
1989 Loma Pricta polyethylene cusion) 1991] (only circular rectangular and while keeping 
column tested) circular columns moment capacity 




Elliptical ( or circular) steel Sec item 5 Sec item 5 Sec item 5 
jacketing (Full confinement), 
Active and passive 
fibreglass/epoxy jacketing (Full 
confinement), 
Reinforced concrete jacketing, 
Added transvcnc reinforcing, 
External steel hoops, 
Prcstrcss wire jacketing, 
Carbon fibre j11ckcting 
I 




7 Column Shear I 971 San Fernando, UC San Diego (28), Elliptical (or circular) steel Sec item 5 Sec item 5 See item 5, Jackcll 
Strength I 987 Whittier, Univcnity of Canterbury jacketing (Full confinement), Univ. of British arc typically full 
1989 Loma Prieta (numerous) Passive fibreglass jacketing Columbia with Klohn- height, except for 
Univcnity of British Columbia (Partial confinement), Crippen Assoc. 10mc flared columns 
with Klohn-Crippcn Associates Reinforced concrete jacketing, 
[Kennedy 1995). Added transverse reinforcing, 
External steel lboops, 
Prcstrcss wire jacketing, 
Carbon fibre jaclccting 
8 Pier Walls 1995 Hyogo-kcn Nanbu Haroun et al (1993) (33) Steel Jacketing with through UC Irvine (33) Used in California, Design criteria need 
(Kobe) earthquake bolts [Haroun et al 1993 J with full confinement development. 
Tests in weak direction and partial Caltrans docs not 
confinement jackets retrofit if axial load 
is low and ductility 
demand :S 4.0 
Table l.1 Continued 
Bridge Seismic Obsened Earthquake Research on Earthquake Recommended Retrofit Research on Retrofit Examples of Remarks on Design 
Deficiencies Damage Performance Ml!thods Ml!thods Application of Criteria 
Retrofit Ml!thods 
9 Column to 1971 San Fernando Yan Xiao et al [1993), New foundation topping Yan Xiao et al (1993) Uled in California. Effectivene11 i• 
Foundation Joints Yuk Hon Chai et al [1991) Propoled for limited. Design 
Thorndon Bridge, criteria need 




with perimeter ties 
to bottom 
reinforcing mat. 
Prestressing through foundation - Propoled for Design criteria and 
Thorndon Bridge, research are needed. 
New Zealand 
10 Footings and Pile No failures noted Yan Xiao et al (1993] Foundation l!Nngthening with - Applications in Further study of 
Caps new piles or soil anchon, California, including foundation rocking 
foundation topping and China Basin Viaduct. could reduce the 




11 Abutments Failures due to poor •oil UC Davis (20) Anchor slab, - Applications in Analy1i1 and de1ign 
conditions in Tension tie backs, California and Japan criteria need further 
1990 Costa Rica, Anchor piles development. 
1987 Edgecumbe 
New Zealand, and other 
earthquake• 
Retrofit Ml!thods Addressing Multiple Deficiencies 
ll Two-level bridge 1989 Loma Prieta Bolio et al (1990), Moehle and Substantial rebuild of structure Priestley et al [1992b) 1-280 Freeway, San 
structures Sawyer (1993) with added longitudinal beams Moehle et al [1993) Francisco, California 
13 Columns and cap See items 5, 6, 7 See items 5, 6, 7 Infill structural wall between - Used in Japan, US, Eliminates 
beams in multi• columns and British Columbia. tramverse moments 
column bents Propoled for in cap beams, but 
Thomdon Bridge, can increase loads to 
New Zealand foundations. 
Table 2.1 Continued 
Bridge Seismic Obsened Earthquake Research on Earthquake Recommended Retrofit Research on Retrofit Examples of Remarks on Design 
Deficiencies Damage Performance Methods Methods Application of Criteria 
Retrofit Methods 
14 Column and beam See items 2, 5, 6, 7 See items l, 5, 6, 7 External longi1t11dinal post- - Used in Japan, US, Applicable to 
deficiencies tensioning, cored internal post- and British Columbia elements protected 
tensioning from failure by 
other ductile 
elements 
15 Column or pier wall See items 5, 6, 7, 8 See items 5, 6, 7, 8 Added reinforced concrete - Used in California Cap beam retrofit is 
deficiencies outrigger frame difficult. 
Site-Related Seismic Deficiencies 
16 Pounding of 1989 Loma Prieta Kasai et al (1990], Assessment - - - -
adjacent structures of Auclcland Harbour Bridge, 
New Zealand [KeMedy 1995). 
17 Soil Liquefaction 1990 Costa Rica and Various research Ground improvement methods - Vibro replacement -
other eal1hquakes such as vibro replacement (stone columns) and 
(stone columns), jet grouting, jet grouting proposed 
driven displacement piling for Thomdon Bridge, I 
compaction grouting, and New Zealand, and 
ground containment using used in British 
bored piles, jet grouting, or Columbia. 
concrete walls. 
18 Potential for 1993 Hokkaido-nansei- Various research - - -
landslides, surface oki and other eal1hquakes 
fault rupture and 
tsunami 
Note 
References given in [ J are listed at the end of this report. 
Items not referenced or references with ( ) are taken from Priestley et al [1992a]; the number in () corresponds to the reference listed in that report. 
Colwnns and Pier Walls 
Several deficiencies in bridge columns have been evident in past earthquakes. Columns can have 
inadequate flexural resistance because of: (I) understrength, (2) inadequate ductility capacity, or (3) 
insufficient lap splices or the premature termination of reinforcement. Because of the inadequate 
seismic criteria required by pre-1970 design codes, understrength of columns is common. This 
deficiency is somewhat mitigated, however, by the conservative design practice of assuming a linear 
axial load versus moment interaction, which was customery for bridges designed before the 1970s 
[Priestley et al 1992a]. 
Concrete Confinement and Bar Buckling 
Few existing bridge columns have enough strength to permit them to respond elastically to major 
earthquakes. Thus most columns need to respond inelastically in a ductile manner. It is now well 
known that to ensure ductile performance, a close spacing of transverse tie reinforcing is usually 
required to confine the compressed concrete of the column core in plastic hinge regions. The transverse 
ties are also necessary to prevent the longitudinal bars from buckling. Bridge columns designed before 
the early 1970s typically lack this transverse reinforcement. Dramatic plastic hinge failures occurred 
in bridge columns with low levels of transverse reinforcing in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, in 
the Struve Slough bridge during the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake [Priestley et al 1992a], and in the 
1994 Nortbridge earthquake. 
Lap Splices and CUI-off of Reinforcement 
The lap splices of bridge column reinforcement typically were designed based on gravity loads or 
unrealistically low service-level earthquake forces and often cannot transfer the yield-level forces that 
will occur in the reinforcing steel under severe earthquakes when the splices are located in plastic hinge 
regions. In the Loma Prieta earthquake, columns suffered damage at their bases attributed to lap-splice 
bond failure. Columns of the Shizumai bridge in Japan suffered brittle failure at midheight of the 
column during the magnitude 7 .1 1982 U rahawa-ohi earthquake caused by the premature termination 
of a portion of the flexural reinforcing extending up from the foundation [Priestley et al 1992a]. 
Shear Strength 
Inadequate column shear strength is another common deficiency in existing bridges. Current capacity-
design practices (used in New Zealand since the late 1970's and in California since the early 1990's) 
dictate that the shear strength of a member should exceed its flexural strength, so that only a ductile 
flexural mechanism can occur. This was not the design practice for pre-1970 bridges. Because of 
flexural overstrengths and low design shears, it is not uncommon to find bridge columns with a shear 
strength less than one-third of the flexural strength. This was the case for the 1-5/1-605 separator, a 
major freeway bridge structure which suffered dramatic column shear failures in the 1987 Whittier 
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California earthquake. Similar shear failures occurred in bridge columns during the 1971 San 
Fernando earthquake, the 1994 Northridge earthquake, and the 1995 Hyogo-ken-Nanbu (Kobe) 
Earthquake. In some cases, also evident in the San Fernando tremor, shear failure can occur 
subsequent to flexural plastic hinging. This is a consequence of the reduction in capacity of shear 
mechanisms assigned to concrete (the •y c • term) in plastic hinge regions once flexural degradation 
begins. For most existing bridges it was not recognimd that the concrete in the hinge regions will 
inevitably be damaged and that these regions should be designed more conservatively for shear than 
non-plastic hinge regions [SANZ 1982, Priestley et al 1992a]. 
Research on the seismic behaviour of existing bridge columns is extensive. Recent test programs 
related to retrofitting have been carried out at the San Diego, Berkeley, and Irvine campuses of the 
University of California, and at Washington State University, Pullman [Priestley et al 1992a]. 
Pier Walls 
Pier walls for bridges are another area of potential seismic deficiency. Until the 1995 Kobe, Japan 
earthquake, there seems to have been no reported earthquake damage to the pier walls of bridges. But 
reinforced concrete structural walls in buildings, designed on a similar basis to many bridge pier walls, 
have been damaged in several earthquakes including the 1964 Alaska earthquake and the 1989 Loma 
Prieta earthquake. As with columns, the desired failure mode for pier walls is flexural rather than in 
shear. Park and Paulay (1975) and Paulay and Priestley [1992) describe the undesirable failure modes 
of reinforced concrete structural walls: diagonal tension or compression failure caused by shear, 
sliding shear along construction joints, failure of lap splices or anchorage, buckling of compression 
reinforcement, and, in the case of thin walls, wall instability. It is likely that most pier walls in 
existing bridges have insufficient shear strength compared to their flexural strength about the strong 
axis. However, the shear strength of the walls may exceed the foundation capacity so that foundation 
rocking or pile failure occurs, precluding damage to the wall itself. Research on the seismic behaviour 
of pier walls has been carried out at the University of California, Irvine [Haroun et al 1993, Priestley 
et al 1992a]. 
Pounding of Adjacent Structures 
Structural pounding of bridges can cause damage during earthquakes. In the 1-280 freeway in San 
Francisco, a separate connector roadway structure was built alongside the main freeway columns with 
150 mm (6 inches) of clearance. This separation proved inadequate during the Loma Prieta earthquake 
and both structures suffered pounding damage. In many past earthquakes, building structures have 
provided evidence of the disastrous effects of pounding. In the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, 
pounding of adjacent buildings caused brittle column failures leading to severe damage or collapse of 
several multi-story reinforced concrete frame structures [Aguilar et al 1989). Recent analytical 
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research has shown that pounding impact forces can be up to ten times the magnitude of typical seismic 
forces (SEAONC 1991, Kasai et al 1990). 
Foundations and Abutments 
Bridge foundations are another area of potential seismic deficiency. Currently hundreds of bridges in 
California are having their footings and pile caps strengthened to resist earthquake forces. Common 
deficiencies include: (a) the lack of a top reinforcement mat for seismic flexure and uplift, (b) the lack 
of footing shear reinforcement, (c) the lack of joint shear reinforcement at the column-foundationjoint, 
and (d) the bending of the main column reinforcement outward rather than inward at the base, 
aggravating joint shear problems [Priestley et al 1992a]. Figure 2.2 shows other possible failures in 
bridge foundations, as identified by the Applied Technology Council [ATC 1983). 
Despite the perceived need for bridge foundation retrofit, earthquake damage to foundations has seldom 
been reported. Only a few of the failure modes depicted in Figure 2.2 have actually been observed 
in earthquakes. There are several possible reasons for this: 
(1) Foundations are usually buried and thus not inspected following an earthquake, 
(2) The premature failure of the structure above the foundation due to column shear, joint failure, 
lap splice failure, etc, may have prevented the full plastic column moment from being applied 
to the foundation, and 
(3) Foundation rocking may have occurred, limiting the forces in footings or pile-caps. 
A critical seismic deficiency for bridge foundations is the potential anchorage failure of column bars. 
This deficiency can be closely related to insufficient joint shear capacity and the lack of a top mat of 
footing reinforcement. Inadequate anchorage of column bars into footings allowed the complete pull-
out of the column bars resulting in the collapse of a freeway structure in the San Fernando earthquake 
[Priestley et al 1992a]. 
Although not reported for bridges, pile shear failures have been observed for buildings. In the 1993 
Hokkaido-nansei-oki earthquake, a school building of nearly new construction displaced laterally 40 
cm because of pile shear failures. This failure may not have been observed except that the soil 
liquified and slumped away from the building exposing the piles [Tanaka pers. comm. 1993]. Yan 
Xiao et al [ 1993) have studied the seismic behaviour of bridge column footings and have done tests on 
the rocking response of footings. 
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For earthquakes acting in the longitudinal direction of a bridge, almost all of the seismic force may 
be transferred into the abutments. (lbis depands on the degree of contact between the end of the 
bridge, the abutment, and the approach fill.) Abutment failures have been evident in past earthquakes 
mainly caused by poorly compacted or liquifiable soil conditions. Damage caused by soil slumping 
and consequent abutment settlement or rotation occurred to the Rio Viscaye, Rio Banano, and Rio 
Bananito bridges during the 1990 Costa Rica earthquake [Priestley et al 1992a]. Large scale tests on 
the seismic resistance of bridge abutments have been conducted at the University of California Davis 
[Maroney and Chai 1994]. 
GeotechnicaJ Hazarm 
Soil liquefaction is a seismic hazard that needs to be considered when evaluating an existing bridge. 
Typically liquefaction potential is highest for cohesionless soil layers which are below or near to the 
SOIL BEARING FAILURE 
FLEXURAL YIELDING Of REINFORCING 










(b) Pile foundatiom 
Fagure 2.2 Possible failure modes for bridge foundatiom [ATC 1983]. 
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CONCRETE SHEAR FAILURE 
ANCHORAGE FAILURE 
PILE FLEXURAL ANO/OR 
SHEAR FAILURE 
groundwater table. Soil liquefaction beneath footing or pile foundations can lead to the displacement 
of bridge supports. Unrestrained simply supported spans have frequently collapsed from liquefaction-
induced displacements. Examples of such failures are found in the 1964 Alaska earthquake, the 1985 
Chile earthquake, and the 1990 Costa Rica earthquake. 
In addition to liquefaction, other soil-related seismic haz.ards exist. Bridges on sloping sites can be 
damaged by earthquake-induced landslides or slope failures. Bridges located near or over faults can 
be damaged by the structural displacements induced by surface fault rupture. The potential for tsunami 
should also be considered when investigating the seismic haz.ards to a bridge. 
Procedures and Criteria for the Seismic Evaluation of Bridges 
To identify the seismic haz.ards of existing bridges and to assess the severity of these haz.ards in a 
consistent manner, seismic evaluation procedures and criteria are needed. A systematic procedure for 
seismic evaluation is useful because (a) a step-by-step or checklist approach, following the seismic-
force path of the structure, will ensure that no seismic deficiencies are overlooked, and (b) a more 
uniform basis for assessment assumptions can result. Evaluation criteria are required to define what 
is acceptable seismic performance for a given bridge. 
The evaluation criteria for existing bridges should be different from the design criteria for new bridges. 
For new bridge construction, conservative design and detailing requirements generally cost little 
compared to the seismic safety they provide. However, few older bridges can meet the requirements 
of building codes for new bridges, and retrofit to these standards is expensive. Some older bridges 
may be able to withstand severe earthquakes despite not meeting all code requirements. Criteria for 
existing bridges must be based on a more in-depth understanding of the available strength and ductility 
capacity of "substandard" structural details. 
Seismic evaluations can be carried out at different levels of detail. For a first-pass identification of 
potentially vulnerable bridges, a brief assessment is usually appropriate. As shown in Chapters 11 and 
12, discussing the prioritization of bridge retrofitting, this assessment may be based on only a handful 
of risk factors such as year of construction, bridge height and skew, soil type, and seismic zone. At 
the other end of the spectrum, a detailed evaluation-involving assessment of as-built conditions, 
dynamic analyses, and calculation of plastic mechanisms, strengths, and ductility capacities-is 
appropriate once the actual retrofit of a bridge is planned. In between, evaluations involving (for 
example) only quick hand calculations of seismic demands and capacities may be required. This type 
of middle-level evaluation procedure is likely to be appropriate for secondary screenings of a bridge 
stock to identify the highest priority retrofits. With the limited availability of funds for bridge 
retrofitting, procedures for seismic evaluations of low to medium detail are important. 
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Priestley et al [1992a] have briefly reviewed the seismic evaluation methods used in Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, and the United States. Further information on these methods is contained in the proceedings 
of the International Workshop on the Seismic Retrofitting of Bridges held in Bonnio, Italy [Calvi and 
Priestley, 1991). The most established seismic assessment methods have been two procedures from 
the United States: The Applied Technology Council ATC 6-2 approach [ATC 1983) and the current 
procedure of the California Department of Transportation [Caltrans 1992), which are described below. 
ATC 6-2 Evaluation 
The ATC 6-2 (1983) publication was a pioneering effort towards a consistent seismic assessment 
approach for bridge structures. Figure 2.3 shows a flow chart of the ATC procedure for evaluating 
existing bridges. The method requires the designer to follow the seismic load path for the bridge 
structure, and for evaluating existing bridges each element-eg, cap beam, column, or footing-to 
calculate the seismic force demand from analysis, and the element capacity. The demand on an 
element is considered to be the member forces resulting from a linear-elastic response spectrum 
(LERS) dynamic analysis for irregular bridges, or equivalent static lateral loads for regular bridges. 
The ATC procedure requires the demand to equal the sum of 100% of the response in one direction 
plus 30 % of the response in the perpendicular direction, and vice versa. 
ATC 6-2 recommends that bridges with movement joints be modelled with two separate analyses. In 
one analysis, a spring element is used to model the movement joint restrainer stiffness; in the second 
analysis the two sides of the joint are connected with a pin restraint. Column and foundation forces 
are taken as the worst of the two cases. 
Element Capacities 
The capacity of a member is determined based on conventional principles for calculating shear or 
flexural/axial strength, and is then multiplied by a ductility "indicator" (ie, ductility capacity) to give 
an equivalent capacity. Requirements for confinement and reinforcement anchorage and splices are 
similar to the New Zealand concrete code requirements (SANZ 1982). For "substandard" details in 
existing bridges, the ductility indicator is reduced from that assigned to code-complying details. 
For columns, ductility indicators are separately calculated for longitudinal bar anchorage, lap splices, 
column shear, and confinement. For confinement, the column ductility capacity depends on the amount 
of confining-steel area, the spacing of confining ties, and whether the ties are well anchored to the 
column core. The assigned column ductility capacity µ ranges from 2 to 6. For columns which fail 
in shear prior to flexural hinging, the ductility capacity is taken as 1. For columns which can begin 
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Figure 2.3 ATC 6-2 Seismic evaluation and retrofit procedure [ATC 1983]. 
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The ductility capacity cal.culation for column lap-splices considers the transverse reinforcement 
clamping the splices, and the splice length. The calculation for the capacity of bars anchored into 
foundations considers bar-anchorage length, transverse clamping-steel area, the presence of bar end 
hooks and their orientation inwards or outwards, and whether the foundation has a top mat of steel 
reinforcement. 
For footings, ductility indicators, µ, are as shown in Table 2.2. The ductility indicators correspond 
to the failure modes shown in Figure 2.2. 
At movement joints, support length demand is taken as the larger of (a) that resulting from the elastic 
analysis, or (b) the length N calculated by the following formula: 
N [mm) = 305 + 2.5L [metres) + lOH [metres), 
where L is the length of the adjoining bridge segments, and H is the average height of supporting 
columns or wall piers adjacent to the movement joint. This empirical formula is used because elastic 
analyses may underestimate movement demands. If movement joint restrainers are used, the support 
length demand can be computed by considering only the elastic analysis method but a minimum 
restrainer force of 0.20 times the deadload reaction must be used because "a linear analysis of a bridge 
often results in relatively low bearing or restrainer forces" [ATC 1983). 
Seismic demand for abutment displacements is taken as the computed abutment deflection in both the 
longitudinal and transverse directions. Displacement capacity of the abutments is taken as 76 mm 
(3 in) in the transverse direction and 152 mm (6 in) in the longitudinal direction. This seemingly 
arbitrary criterion is applied regardless of the abutment type or its construction details. The criterion 
is based on engineering judgement, experience from past earthquakes, and the consideration that large 
abutment displacements can prevent vehicles from using the bridge. For liquefaction, the capacity to 
demand (CID) ratio is taken as the effective peak ground acceleration at which damaging liquefaction 
is expected to occur, divided by the design acceleration coefficient. 
Capacity/Demand Ratios 
When all of the demands and equivalent capacities are determined, the engineer computes a capacity 
to demand (CID) ratio for each item checked. Structural elements with CID ratios less than one are 
susceptible to failure. The smaller the CID ratio, the more vulnerable the element is. An advantage 
of this approach is that it allows the engineer, by scanning the CID ratios, to quickly identify the 
vulnerable elements of the structure. This process can quickly indicate those elements which are likely 
to require retrofitting. 
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The general approach of ATC 6-2 has been applied to buildings in the subsequent publications A TC 14 
and the NEHRP Handbook for the Seismic Evaluation of Buildings [BSSC 1991) (formerly ATC 22). 
As the ATC evaluation approach has evolved, the procedure has become more thorough and more user-
friendly. The NEHRP Handbook, now widely used in the United States by structural engineers 
evaluating buildings, provides checklists designed to identify seismic deficiencies in 15 common 
building structure types (plus a none-of-the-above category). The text of the handbook provides 
background information for assessing the seismic behaviour of particular types of structure elements. 
The handbook could be considered a "middle-level" evaluation procedure as previously described. 
Table 2.2 Footing ductility indicators from ATC 6-2 (1983, page 36). 
Type of Footing Factor Limiting the Capacity Ductility 
Capscity 
µ 
Spread Footing Soil Bearing Failure 4 
Reinforcing Steel Yielding 4 
in the Footing 
Concrete Shear or Tension 1 
in the Footing 
Pile Footing Pile Overload, Compression 2 
Pile Overload, Tension 3 
Reinforcing Yielding in the Footing 4 
Pile Pullout at Footing 2 
Concrete Shear or Tension in the Footing 1 
Flexural Failure of Piles 4 
Shear Failure of Piles 1 
Drawbacks to the ATC 6-2 Method 
Priestley et al [1992a] identify the following four drawbacks with ATC 6-2: 
(a) Some requirements such as reinforcement-anchorage provisions are overly conservative due 
to the assumption that full compliance with the current code is necessary for ideal 
performance, 
(b) The method may be unconservative because demands are based on the elastic distribution of 
forces whereas the local ductility demand may be much higher than global ductility, 
(c) Some critical areas of bridge structures such as beam to column connections and column to 
footing connections are not covered, and 
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(d) The calculation of demand, based on an elastic distribution of forces, ignores the capacity-
design principle that the demand on non-yielding elements depends on the capacity of the 
yielding elements. 
The first three of these faults can be corrected with little change to the basic A TC 6-2 procedure. The 
last point requires a more fundamental (but beneficial) change in the seismic evaluation procedure. 
To properly understand the expected seismic performance of a structure, the engineer should determine 
the critical inelastic mechanism for the structure. Once the mechanism is identified, the associated 
strength and ductility capacities of the yielding elements should be calculated. The demand on the 
other 
elements of the structure is then based on this mechanism strength. Elements whose capacity exceeds 
the demand based on the mechanism strength are protected from failure and need not be ductile. This 
is the basic procedure of the New Zealand-born concept called capacity design [SANZ 1982]. The 
concept is used explicitly by engineers in New Zealand and several other countries, but it is not 
consistently used in the United States. One advantage of an explicit capacity design procedure is that 
the engineer develops a feel for the actual seismic behaviour of the structure. A capacity design 
procedure proposed by Priestley [1992a] for the seismic evaluation of bridges is outlined later in this 
section. 
Caltrans Evaluation Procedure 
The seismic evaluation procedure which was used by Caltrans (1992] is a revised and simplified 
version of the ATC 6-2 provisions, although in some areas much more specific procedures are 
provided. The Caltrans approach is outlined in Figure 2.4, which has been simplified (by the author 
of this report) from a procedural flow chart in Memo to Designers 20-4 [Caltrans 1992] which 
describes the current Caltrans seismic evaluation procedure. The memo notes that "the designer must 
be cautioned to follow all load path demands and assure that no portion of the resisting structural frame 
is deficient. Seismic evaluation must not be limited to column or pier ductility capacities.• However, 
unlike ATC 6-2 or the NEHRP Handbook, the Caltrans procedure is not strictly organised around a 
load-path approach. 
Bridge Analysis 
Memo 20-4 alludes to the advantages and drawbacks of a collapse-mechanism type of analysis: 
"Structural evaluation at ultimate conditions (ie, failure analysis) is an extreme 
challenge to an engineer. Cookbook or prefabricated processes do not lend 
themselves well to such a situation. Yielding of a single element in a particular mode 
may not cause collapse. 
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A potential failure mechanism must be achieved before collapse can talce place. The 
distribution, or redistribution, of additional load in a structural system after incremental 
yielding will be different for each structure. Therefore, each structure must be thoroughly 
evaluated.• 
However, as Figure 2.4 indicates, the Caltrans method relies upon computer LERS analyses, rather 
than hand-calculations or collapse-mechanism calculations, for its first-stage evaluations. Recently the 
Caltrans evaluation procedure has been revised as shown in Figure 2.5 [Zelinski 1994). 
Similar to the A7C' 6-2 recommendations, the Caltrans elastic analysis procedure requires that the 
stiffnesses assumed of abutments and movement joints be iteratively determined. Bridge Design Aids 
Chapter 14 [Caltrans 1990) provides guidance on dynamic analysis modelling assumptions. For 
longitudinal earthquake response, abutments provide horizontal restraint to a bridge principally in 
compression but not in tension. To account for this, Caltrans recommends allocating in the analysis 
model one half of the compressive stiffness to each abutment. This gives the correct total longitudinal 
stiffness to the bridge, and the correct output for abutment displacement, but the resulting compressive 
reactions to the abutments must be doubled. 
Caltrans Memo lo Designers 5-1/5-2 [Caltrans 1990) discusses the expected seismic behaviour of 
various types of abutments. Caltrans policy is •to accept abutment damage caused by earthquake action 
provided the damage does not result in collapse of the bridge•. Design loads and typical abutment 
details are provided in Bridge Design Aids, Chapter 1 [Caltrans 1990). Interim Memo lo Designers 
20-4 [Caltrans 1992) notes that "field inspections after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake suggest that 
abutments which moved up to 60 mm (0.2 ft) in the longitudinal direction into backfill soil appeared 
to survive with little need for repair." Attachment A to Memo 20-4 gives the bridge retrofit designer 
additional guidelines for linear elastic computer modelling, using the STRUDL computer program. 
Curved bridges are modelled with several computer runs in an attempt to represent the different tension 
and compression stiffnesses of the abutments. Long bridges are modelled in units of up to five spans. 
The number of vibration modes included in the analysis is typically talcen as three times the number 
of spans. As with A1C' 6-2, orthogonal direction effects are accounted for by combining 100% of the 
response in one direction with 30% of the response in the perpendicular direction, and vice-versa. 
Live loads are not combined with seismic forces, except for outriggers and C-bents (ie, single-column 
bents with large gravity-load eccentricities) where the effects of live loads and vertical accelerations 
can be significant. Special response spectrum curves are used in cases of deep and very soft soil such 
as the bay mud prevalent in the San Francisco area. 
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REVIEW AS-BUILT PLANS 
OBTAIN SITE SEISMICITY 
RUN LINEAR-ELASTIC RESPONSE SPECTRUM ILERI) ANALYSIS 
(USING THE COMPUTER PROGRAM ITRUDL) USING TRUSS 
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STIFFNESS 
RUN LERI ANALYSIS WITH JOINTS 
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COMPRESSION TRANSFER IN JOINTS 
('COMPRESSION MODEL') 
NO 
Figure 2.4 Caltrans seismic evaluation and retrofit procedure. Adapted from Caltrans Memo 
20-4 [1992) (subsequently revised, see Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5 Revised Seismic Evaluation and Substructure Retrofit Procedure [Zelinski 1994]. 
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Caltrans recommends that foundation springs be included in the computer model when such soft soil 
is present. Bridges less than 91m (300 ft) long, with no movement joints and with little or no skew 
are allowed higher damping values, 10 to 15% , compared to the 5% otherwise used [Caltrans 1992]. 
An equivalent static analysis is used to design restrainers at movement joints. In the Caltrans 
approach, "results obtainoo from [linear-elastic computer] analyses for the design of restrainer units 
have been proven to be inappropriate because of the demand to resist extremely large elastic column 
forces which are not actually attainoo" [Caltrans 1992]. The equivalent static method, described in 
Chapter 14 of Bridge Design Aids [Caltrans 1990] recommends that the longitudinal stiffness of bridge 
segments be calculatoo assuming that a majority of columns develop plastic hinges before the restrainer 
capacity is reachoo. In the example analysis given by Caltrans the longitudinal stiffness is calculated 
assuming that plastic hinges with zero stiffness (ie, pinned conditions) form in 75 % of the column 
ends, resulting in a stiffness which is one-eighth of the elastic value. The restrainer forces are 
calculate.<! based on this rooucoo longitudinal stiffness. Clearly, this approach involves gross 
approximations and assumptions. However, a study using non-linear models of movement joints 
indicates that the equivalent static approach may provide conservative results for the design of 
restrainers. [Priestley pers. comm. 1993]. More recent Caltrans policy is to model column end 
conditions according to expectoo behaviour or retrofit type. Well-confine.<! column ends are assumed 
to develop a plastic hinge at full yield forces, while those retrofitted with partial-confinement jackets 
(allowing lap-splice slip) are assume.<! to develop into a pin condition [Zelinski 1994]. Caltrans Memo 
to Designers 20-3 [Caltrans 1990] gives a useful discussion of design issues and practical considerations 
for the use of movement joint restrainers, considering typical bridge types and configurations. 
Column and Pier-Wall Capacities 
The Caltrans assessment of column capacities has been much more simplistic than the ATC 6-2 
procedure. Rather than calculating separate capacities for anchorage, lap splices, confinement, and 
shear, Caltrans uses a single ductility capacity depending on the column and bent type. These ductility 
capacities are shown in Table 2.3. In some cases the columns are modelled with a moment-released 
pin condition at one or both ends, thus reducing or eliminating the calculated contribution of the 
column to the required lateral strength of the structure. The pin condition is assumed at the bottom 
of a column if it has inadequate lap splice capacity at the base (ie, the lap length or amount of 
transverse "clamping" steel is deficient such that lap splices will slip before the column reaches its 
capacity). A pin condition at the base is also assumed if the column footing fails before the column 
capacity can be reached. At the top of the column, a pin condition is assumed if bar development into 
the superstructure is judged deficient, or if the superstructure fails before column capacity is reached 
[Zelinski 1994). 
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Pier walls are assumed to have weak-axis ductility capacities of up to 4.0. In many cases, however, 
the pier walls are assumed pinned at the base because the foundation fails before the wall's weak-axis 
moment capacity can be developed. 
Table 2.3 Colwnn ductility capacities ~igned by Cal tram for 
~ent purposes (Caltrans 1992). 
Colwnn Type Single Colwnn Bent Multi-Colwnn Bent 
Round Columns 1.5-2.0 2.0-3.0 
Rectangular Columns 1.0 1.5-2.0 
Round Column Pile Shafts 2.0-3.0 3.0-4.0 
(In-ground hinge only) 
Note For multi-column bent bridges with larger amounts of redundancy, such as several sets of 
three (or more) column bents, the maximum of the allowable ductility range may be used on 
columns. 
For single-column bent bridges, the maximum of the allowable ductility range should not 
predominate (more than 33 % of the fixed column ends) the range of ductility demands for the 
total bridge. [Caltrans 1992]. 
This procedure for assigning ductility capacities has been questioned [Chapman pers. comm. 1994] 
because it is ma.de without evaluating the likely failure mode of the column. The procedure also 
ignores the strength and flexibility of the foundation, which can affect the failure of the columns and 
the displacement capacity of the structure. 
Attachnuml A to Memo 20-4 [ Caltrans 1992] provides background discussion on using the equal energy 
assumption to relate inelastic force reductions to ductility capacities. The assumption is thought to be 
applicable for shorter period structures. Despite this commentary, the Cal trans procedure seems to be 
based only on the equal displacement principle: ductility capacities are used directly as force reduction 
factors. This approach may be unconservative for shorter period structures. Zelinski (1994] notes, 
however, that "for short bridges and short-period structures, general retrofit practice includes a 
rotational displacement capacity check". 
Caltrans computes column moment capacities based on probable material strengths. If the actual steel 
yield strength is not known, a strength of 1.1 times the specified yield is used. Column shear strength 
is compared to the demand corresponding to full flexural plastic hinging. Attachment B to Memo 20-4 
describes how column shear strength is assumed to vary with ductility. In potential plastic-hinge 
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regions the shear stress carried by the concrete, v0 , is assumed to degrade linearly from 0.58 ✓r., MPa 
(3.5 ✓r;, psi) prior to ductility 2, to mro at ductility 4. For columns with "moderate" levels of 
confinement, v0 is assumed to degrade from 0.58 ✓r., MPa at ductility 2, to 0.20 ✓r;, MPa (1.2 ✓r;, psi) 
at ductility 4. 
If the shear strength is less than the shear force corresponding to a flexural response at overstrength, 
then shear retrofit is required. Note that flexural overstrength is taken to be 1.5 times nominal flexural 
strength. If lap splices occur in a potential plastic hinge region, retrofit is required. As is discussed 
in Chapter 3, lap splice regions can be retrofitted with either a full-confinement or partial-confinement 
column jacket depending on retrofit design assumptions. As a final evaluation step, foundations are 
checked. Compared to new designs, more liberal soil and pile capacities are sometimes allowed for 
retrofit design. 
Until recently little guidance has been given for the evaluation of pier walls about their strong axes. 
Current Caltrans policy assigns a ductility capacity of 2.0 to pier walls in the strong.direction. It is 
felt that the massive sire and ample horizontal reinforcing found in most pier walls will allow them to 
respond elastically to major earthquakes. In the strong direction of the walls, the foundation piles or 
pile connections are usually determined to fail (or "fuse") long before the wall would reach its shear 
or flexural capacity. Thus the designer would assume that either foundation sliding or rocking 
(whichever is more likely) will govern the earthquake response. 
The Caltrans approach has been continually evolving in recent years. Some bridges are evaluated using 
a capacity design approach and an incremental plastic-mechanism (push-over) analysis. Until recently, 
these were usually borderline cases where a more detailed analysis can show that retrofit is not 
required. Initially, more than ninety percent of bridge retrofits were based on an elastic structural 
analysis only. Since 1993 however, the capacity-design and push-over analysis approach has been used 
on almost all major bridge evaluations. Caltrans engineers had felt that the elastic approach was easier 
to put into a step-by-step procedure, that the results were conservative, and that some added protection 
of serviceability in smaller earthquakes was provided as a side benefit [Zelinski pers. comm. 1993, 
1994). Note, however, that the Caltrans criteria are intended "to prevent collapse .... Where structure 
serviceability is defined as a design requirement, a more conservative design approach than that 
outlined in this Memo 20-4 must be followed.• 
Improved Evaluation Approaches 
Researchers have shown that elastic analysis methods for bridges can be inadequate. Priestley et al 
[1992a] have developed an improved evaluation approach. 
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Inadequacies of Elastic Analyses 
Priestley et al [ 1992a] provide a good discussion of the inadequacies of elastic dynamic analyses, noting 
that there "is a tendency to think, as a result of advances in computational models and the widespread 
availability in design offices of computers with considerable power, that our ability to predict the 
seismic demand on a bridge in terms of required moments, shears, displacements, etc, is at a much 
higher level of precision than our ability to predict capacities. This is a delusion, ... •. The following 
inadequacies of elastic analysis are identified: 
1 The basic parameters of elastic analysis and modal combination-mode shapes, periods and 
effective damping-are all altered by inelastic action, 
2 Predictions of site seismicity and elastic response spectra involve "uncertainty" factors in the 
order of 2, 
3 Modelling of movement joints involves significant and compounded approximations. Initial 
gaps, frictional resistance, three dimensional effects, and the effects of bridge curvature are 
usually neglected, 
4 Abutments and foundations are poorly modelled especially in the usual case when the 
compression and tension stiffnesses of an abutment are different, 
5 The effect of non-coherent (out-of-phase) seismic input is ignored. In softer soils seismic 
wavelengths may only be 150 to 450 m (500 to 1500 ft) causing out-of-phase effects in 
medium to long bridges, and 
6 Pre-yield member stiffnesses are often poorly modelled. 
Approach Recommended by Priestley et al 
Instead of an elastic analysis and a check of capacity to demand ratios, Priestley et al [1992a] propose 
an approach more representative of actual structural seismic behaviour. The approach is more general 
than the Caltrans method and has not been developed into a "procedure". However, Figure 2.6 shows 
a flowchart (prepared by the author of the present report) which outlines the basic steps of the method. 
As shown in the figure, the method requires (I) explicit consideration of the serviceability, damage-
control, and survival limit states, and (2) a diagnosis of the critical plastic mechanism for the structure. 
Rather than using an elastic dynamic analysis, the approach recommends a frame by frame incremental 




CONSIDER THREE LIMIT STATES: 
1. SERVICECABILITY 
2. DAMAGE CONTROL 
3. SURVIVAL 
AND DEVELOP LINEAR-ELASTIC RESPONSE 
SPECTRA (LERS) FOR EACH LIMIT STATE 
B DETERMINE THE CRITICAL COLLAPSE 
~-----1~ MECHANISM OF THE STRUCTURE AND 
DETERMINE THE LATERAL STRENGTH, V1, 
ASSOCIATED WITH EACH MECHANISM 
DESIGN RETROFIT 
MEASURES 
C ESTIMATE THE DUCTILITY CAPACITY OF 
THE ELEMENTS WHICH YIELD UNDER 
CRITICAL COLLAPSE MECHANISMS 
D CALCULATE THE GLOBAL DUCTILITY 
CAPACITY OF THE STRUCTURE FOR 
THE CRITICAL COLLAPSE MECHANISMS 
E ESTIMATE THE EQUIVALENT ELASTIC STRENGTH, 
Ve, USING THE "EQUAL-DISPLACEMENT" OR 
"EQUAL-ENERGY" PRINCIPLES, CONSIDERING 
THE PERIOD, t, OF THE RESPONSE. 
F COMPARE Ve TO THE LERS DEVELOPED IN 
STEP 1 TO DETERMINE THE PROBABILITY 
OF EXCEEDENCE OF EACH LIMIT STATE 
NO 
FINISH 
Figure 2.6 Seismic evaluation and retrofit approach proposed by Priestley et al. Adapted from 
Priestley et al [ 1992a). 
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a force-versus-deformation curve for each frame in the transverse direction. Such analyses have been 
used by bridge designers in New Zealand for many years [Chapman pers. comm. 1993) but their use 
in California is new, and until recently, for most bridge evaluations plastic analyses were not 
conducted. For longitudinal response the same push-over analysis is recommended, with the 
consideration that the moment transfer between a column and its superstructure may be limited by the 
torsion capacity of the cap beams. Note that although the above calculations can be done by hand, a 
computer program for plastic analysis would simplify the designer's job. The capability to write this 
type of program is straightforward, but no such software has been in wide use. 
Along the same line of thinking, Moehle and Aschheim [ 1993] note that for the evaluation of bridge 
structures "linear analysis methods fail to capture essential response characteristics of structures for 
which inelastic response is expected.• In agreement with Priestley et al, they recommend the use of 
non-linear "push-over" analyses for evaluating bridges. Elastic response spectrum analyses are still 
recommended for use in tandem with the "push-over" analysis, because they "are easily done and 
provide a useful benchmark for the estimation of inelastic displacement response". It is recommended 
that the relationship of strength and ductility capacity to equivalent elastic response to be based on the 
equal displacement principle for longer period structures, with linear interpolation to the zero period 
case for shorter period structures. This is the same as recommended by Priestley et al, except that 
some refinements are suggested in the determination of the period beyond which the equal displacement 
principle applies. 
Evaluation o{Member Strengths and Ductility Capacities 
In the Priestley et al evaluation approach, strengths and ductility capacities are to be calculated as 
realistically as possible. Several guidelines are provided, and areas where further research is needed 
are indicated. The guidelines recommend that flexural strengths be based on probable material 
strengths. An approach for assessing the flexural strength and ductility of sections with inadequately 
anchored or spliced longitudinal bars is presented. More test results are needed to further quantify this 
approach for the range of anchorage or splice lengths and amount of transverse steel encountered in 
existing bridges. Flexural strength versus ductility relationships are suggested for columns with poor 
confinement or lap splices in the plastic hinge region, as shown in Figure 2. 7. Note that such 
relationships could be used in an incremental collapse mechanism or "push-over• computer analysis 
program. Equations for the prediction of shear strength are given which have been shown to be more 
accurate than current code equations. Further refinements to the proposed equations have subsequently 
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Fagure 2.7 Flexural strength versus ductility capacity relationships [Priestley et al 1992a]. 
The Design Guidelines report by Priestley et al [ 1992a] also gives guidance on the design of beam to 
column knee joints, beam to column T-joints, and column to footing joints. Research is currently 
underway which should provide more infonnation on the evaluation of these connecting joints. General 
guidance on the evaluation of footings is provided, and it is postulated that the rocking response of 
foundations is permissible and perhaps desirable. An iterative method for predicting the rocking 
response of structures, based on a displacement response spectrum analysis, is presented. In the plastic 
mechanism type of analysis, foundation rocking can be considered in the same way as plastic hinging 
-with an assumed strength versus ductility relationship. More research is needed on the seismic 
performance of footings, including the behaviour of footings which yield in flexure. 
Determination of local ductility demands also depends on assumptions of elastic displacements. 
Priestley et al recommend that some attempt be made to assess which members will be essentially 
uncracked and which will be cracked when computing elastic displacements. Foundation flexibility 
effects should also be considered. As discussed in the next subsection, there is some question as to 
what stiffness assumptions are appropriate for elastic systems. 
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After individual section strengths, stiffnesses, and ductility capacities are determined, a global ductility 
capacity should be calculated. The global ductility depends on the local section ductilities, the 
geometry of the structure, and the correct identification of the inelastic deformation mechanism. 
Priestley et al provide some examples of how to calculate global ductility. In a computer "push-over" 
analysis program, the global ductility could be automatically calculated. 
Once the plastic mechanism strength and associated global ductility capacity are known they can be 
compared with the elastic response spectrum demand of the appropriate limit state earthquake. 
Maximum ductility capacities would be used for comparison against the survival limit state, while 
lower ductilities-corresponding to less allowable damage-would be used for comparison against the 
damage-rontrol or serviceability limit states. 
In the Priestley et al approach, the structure capacity v, is increased by a factor to give equivalent 
elastic capacity VE· The factor V E/V, is equal to the global displacement ductility capacity for longer 
period structures (the equal displacement assumption). For shorter period structures, VJV, is less than 
the global ductility capacity, and is calculated according to an interpolation formula. The resulting 
value of equivalent elastic capacity, VE• is compared with the elastic response spectrum demand to give 
an "annual probability of exceedance. "-that is to say the likelihood of the capacity being exceeded, 
based on the return period of the specified limit-state earthquake. 
Inelastic Response Assumptions 
One problem with the ductility-based approach to design is that stiffnesses of the elastic structure must 
be appropriately determined. Moehle and Aschheim [1993] discuss the problem and its effect on 
ductility-based design assumptions. Figure 2.S(a) shows the moment versus displacement response of 
a vertical cantilever column. For this structure, elastic stiffness could be considered as the initial 
stiffness, slope A, based on gross-section properties, or alternatively a reduced stiffness, slope B, 
calculated from cracked-section properties. 
Two problems are evident: 
1. If slope A is used in the evaluation procedure as the basis for computing ductility demands, 
much higher demands would be predicted than if slope B were chosen. 
2. As shown in Figure 2.S{b), if slope A is considered as the elastic stiffness, a shorter elastic 
period will be assumed, and from the displacement response spectrum, smaller displacements 
will be predicted than if slope B were considered. But for a given moment-displacement 
relationship and earthquake input only one inelastic displacement will result. Under the equal 
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displacement assumption, which elastic displacement is it equal to? It cannot be equal to both 
values. Thus the validity of the equal displacement assumption depends on what elastic 
stiffness assumptions are made. 
Preliminary research results [Moehle and Aschheim 1993] indicate that if Cal trans response spectra are 
used as earthquake input, the equal displacement assumption is more accurate when gross section 
stiffness (slope A) is assumed. If effective section stiffness (slope B) is assumed, displacement 
predictions using the assumption are conservative. Note, however, that it has been suggested [Priestley 
pers. comm. 1993] that the Caltrans ARS spectra are in themselves conservative in the longer period 
range. Although analytical studies have been done, it seems that more research is needed to validate 
the equal displacement assumption and to give guidance on selecting elastic stiffnesses for analysis. 
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.s 
The idea of using a displacement approach to design rather than a force approach is promising, and 
could correct some of the problems with current analysis approaches [Priestley 1993b, Moehle 1992). 
A displacement-based design procedure would require, however, a fundamental change in design codes 
and engineering practice. 
Analysis of Movement-Joint Effects 
One evaluation area which still presents problems is the assessment of movement joint and restrainer 
displacements and forces. Priestley et al [1992) discuss four different procedures which all seem 
unsatisfactory. 
The first two, previously discussed here, are the empirical ATC 6-2 approach based on span length and 
bridge height, and the Caltrans equivalent static procedure. 
The third procedure, also used by Caltrans, is an elastic dynamic analysis with restrainers modelled 
as elastic springs. This approach cannot account for the nonlinear behaviour of the movement joint 
as restrainers slacken or stiffen, or as the joint closes and the compression stiffness suddenly and 
dramatically increases. Also, the inelastic behaviour of the adjacent bridge segments is not accounted 
for. 
A fourth procedure-the relative ground motion approach-is based on assuming relative ground 
motions at the foundations as a result of non-coherent seismic input. The worst case input results from 
the largest anticipated ground displacements coupled with the shortest anticipated seismic wavelengths. 
This approach is appealing for its simplicity, but it ignores the fact that structure displacements may 
be larger than peak ground displacements, depending on the dynamic properties of the structure. Also, 
the approach implies that if ground motion is coherent there is no movement or force demand at 
movement joints, which is not true. 
The fifth procedure to evaluate movement joints is by using inelastic dynamic time-history analyses. 
This more complicated procedure is potentially the most rational and accurate method for determining 
the critical forces and displacements at movement joints. Efforts at this type of analysis are currently 
underway [Priestley pers. comm. 1993), including the development of appropriate hysteresis models 
for the movement joints. 
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CHAPTER3 
SEISMIC RETROFIT TECHNIQUES 
Various seismic retrofit techniques have been proposed, tested, and/or used for bridges in California, 
Japan, and elsewhere. Table 2.1 (in Chapter 2) outlines, for several common bridge seismic 
deficiencies, recommended seismic retrofit techniques. A number of effective seismic retrofit 
techniques for movement-joints, columns, and other potential seismic deficiencies are discussed in this 
chapter. Structural engineering research plays an important role in validating proposed retrofit 
techniques. In some cases further research is needed. 
Table 2.1 and this chapter are organized to consider the deficiencies of a bridge along a seismic-force 
path from the superstructure through to the foundations and abutments. It should be noted however, 
that in seismic retrofit design the bridge must be considered as a whole, as well as element by element. 
The retrofitting of one bridge element can affect the seismic response, and the need to retrofit other 
portions of the bridge. 
As in the previous chapter, the primary aim of this chapter is to summarize that information which 
would be most useful to the bridge retrofit designer. Thus, emphasis is placed on design criteria, 
actual applications of retrofit designs, and on those techniques which seem to be the most effective 
structurally. For further details of retrofit research, the reader is referred to the Design Guidelines 
report by Priestley et al [1992a], and to the proceedings of the Caltrans Second Annual Seismic 
Research Workshop (1993). 
3.1 Movement Joints. Seats. Restrainers. Bearings. and Base Isolation 
Seismically deficient movement joints can be retrofitted by adding restrainer (ie, linkage) rods or 
cables, seat extensions, or base isolation devices. 
Restrainers or Linkages 
The most common way of retrofitting deficient movement joints is by adding restrainers. The 
restrainer ties the two ends of the movement joint together using (typically) steel cables or high-strength 
rods. 
Research on three types of restrainers used by Caltrans has been carried out at the University of 
California, Los Angeles as described in 1989 publications by Selna, Malvar and Zelinski [Priestley et 
al 1992). The restrainer types tested include high strength bars, looped cable restrainers attached to 
box girder diaphragms, and straight-through cable restrainers attached to the box girder deck flanges. 
Cable restrainers can also be attached to box girder webs. 
Figure 3.1 shows a retrofit plan of a movement joint using added cable restrainers and pipe seat 
extenders. Figure 3.2 shows the details of the cable restrainers. The restrainers are attached with 
brackets to the box girder webs at one side of the joint, and looped around the strengthened end 
diaphragm of the box girder at the other side of the joint. Restrainer cables for precast girders are 
often wrapped around the supporting cross beam as shown in Figure 3.3 [Zelinski 1993). In addition 
to steel bars and cables, the Japanese have used steel chains and hinged steel plates to restrain 
movement joints. Design of restrainers should specify the initial tension or slackness of the restrainers 
considering the expected temperature movement of the joint and the temperature of the time of the 
restrainer installation. In New Zealand, bar-restrainers and linkage bolts for bridges usually have thick 
rubber pads under the plate washers at each end of the bar. The rubber pads allow temperature 
movements to occur, and they reduce impact forces on the restrainer bar. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, the design of movement joint restrainers by Caltrans is based on an 
equivalent static analysis which involves gross approximations and assumptions. Although the method 
may be satisfactory for the time being, more accurate design methods should be developed. 
Seat Extensiom 
Movement joint restrainers are intended to limit the movement of spans so that the spans do not fall 
off their supporting seats. Another solution to the problem, often used in conjunction with restrainers, 
is to extend the seat length. For box-girder bridges, Caltrans commonly uses steel pipe seat extenders. 
The pipes are placed through core-drilled boles in the end diaphragms of the spans on either side of 
the movement joint as shown in Figure 3.2. Typically the steel pipes are 220 mm outside diameter 
with a 22 mm wall thickness (8 inch nominal diameter, double-extra strong). 
Other types of seat extensions, which have been used in Japan, include added concrete corbels or added 
steel brackets anchored to the lip of the existing concrete seat. "Stopper" devices have also been used. 
These stoppers consist of steel or reinforced concrete brackets which restrain the movement of the end 
diaphragms of the spans. The seat extension and stopper devices discussed above can be used at 
abutment movement joints but may not be applicable at intermediate movement joints. 
Base Isolation 
Vulnerable types of support bearings such as steel rocker bearings can be replaced by base-isolation 
devices. For the Sierra Point overbridge on Route US IO 1 near San Francisco, California, the existing 
spherical steel bearings were replaced with elastomeric bearings containing lead plugs. In addition, 
movement joints were restrained using 22 mm (7 /8 in) diameter high-strength steel rods. 
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Skinner, Robinson, and McVerry (1993] cover the principles of seismic isolation and give a 
comprehensive list of projects where isolation has been implemented. Base Isolation and Energy 
Dissipation devices have been used for bridge retrofits in New Zealand, the United States, Japan, Italy 
and Canada. In Italy, large elasto-plastic absorbers are used at abutments to provide longitudinal 
restraint and damping. For relatively short bridges, the Italians have retrofitted movement joints by 
eliminating them; the bridge deck slab in the vicinity of the movement joint is replaced with a new slab 
made continuous over the joint. 
Babaei and Hawkins (1991] review seismic retrofit techniques for bridge superstructures. Their report 
discusses the seismic performance of movement-joint retrofit measures, and provides design 
information and cost estimates for retrofitting with restrainers, seat extenders, and base isolators. 
l,1 Beams, Beam-Column Joints, and Anchorage of Longitudinal Reinforcement 
If the beams of bents are identified as seismically deficient, they are typically difficult to retrofit 
because of interferences with the superstructure girders. Usually it is easier to add strength to the 
beam by prestressing and concrete jacketing than it is to add ductility capacity by improving 
confinement, anchorage, or shear capacity. Thus the best approach to retrofitting the beams of bents 
can be to strengthen the beam to force plastic hinging into the columns. The columns must then be 
checked for ductility capacity, and retrofitted if necessary. If clearances allow, beam deficiencies can 
also be remedied by adding a new beam between the columns, below the existing beam. This "link" 
beam can preclude failure in the original beam or beam-to-column joints as well as increasing the 
transverse strength and stiffness of the bent. Column shear demands will be increased however, so 
shear retrofit of columns may be necessary. Also, this retrofit does not mitigate moment demands in 
the bridge's longitudinal direction. 
An outrigger beam knee joint for the 1-980 freeway in Oakland, which was damaged in the Loma 
Prieta earthquake, has been repaired and retrofitted by Caltrans. The joint was retrofitted by 
completely removing all of the concrete in the joint region (by jackhammer) while leaving the existing 
reinforcement in place. New interlocking spiral joint reinforcement, at a close spacing, was added 
around the column longitudinal bars. An exterior cage of reinforcement consisting of 10 mm bars at 
a 115 mm spacing each way (/13 @ 4 1/2 inches), tied together through the joint, was added. Concrete 
was then placed, to the slightly increased dimensions of the new joint [Priestley et al 1992a]. This 
retrofit detail was tested at the University of California, San Diego, under cyclic in-plane loading and 
showed greatly improved response compared to the original detail [Ingham et al 1993]. Other types 
of retrofits for knee joints and external T-joints have been studied at the University of California, 
Berkeley [Thewalt and Stojadinovic 1993, Moehle and Sawyer 1993]. 
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The beam-column joints of non-outrigger multi-column bents are often deficient because of an 
inadequate anchorage length of the longitudinal column bars into the joint. Retrofit of such a 
deficiency is difficult. The addition of a new "link" beam below the existing bent beam, as discussed 
above, may be an effective solution in some cases. Prestressing of the joint region longitudinally along 
the beam and transversely through the beam, may be an effective retrofit method, but testing of the 
detail has been limited [Priestley 1993). 
U Elliptical and Circular Steel Column Jacketi02 
The typical deficiencies of bridge columns-inadequate lap splice length, shear strength, anti-bar-
buckling reinforcing, and concrete confinement-can all be mitigated by adding an external jacket to 
the column. Although several jacketing techniques have been studied, not all are fully effective or 
widely applicable. 
The success of a column-jacketing retrofit upgrade depends on the stiffness of the jacket to resist the 
column's tendency, caused by concrete cracking and spalling, to expand laterally. If this lateral 
dilation is effectively restrained by a column jacket then four potential seismic deficiencies can be 
corrected: 
(1) Existing longitudinal bar lap splices become more effective because a transverse clamping force 
across the splice is created, 
(2) Column shear strength is increased because the jacket acts in the same way as hoop 
reinforcing, allowing a truss mechanism for shear resistance to develop-also, diagonal shear 
cracks are restrained from opening by the jacket, preventing the degradation of aggregate-
interlock shear resistance, 
(3) Bar-buckling is restrained because the concrete cover does not spall, and 
(4) The lateral confining pressure on the concrete increases its ultimate strain. 
Most jacketing methods are applicable mainly to circular columns. Rectangular columns are more 
difficult to retrofit, because providing adequate jacket stiffness to confine the long flat sides of the 
column is problematic. For columns with high plan aspect ratios, through-bolts may be necessary to 
hold the long sides of the column jacket together. 
Elliptical or circular steel jacketing is the most common column retrofit method, and has been shown 




Circular columns are retrofitted using a circular steel jacket. In the typical Caltrans details, the jacket 
is fabricated in two semi-circular halves from steel plate of 10 mm to 25 mm (o/a inch to 1 inch) 
thickness. The two sections are placed around the column and field-welded together using complete 
penetration groove welds continuous along the length of the column. 
The space between the jacket and the existing column, specified to be 38 mm (1 1h inches) minimum, 
is then injected with grout. For full height jackets a 50 to 100 mm (2 to 4 inch) gap is provided 
between the top of the steel jacket and the beam or superstructure, and between the bottom of the steel 
jacket and the foundation surface. The gap at each end of the jacket is necessary to prevent an 
inadvertent increase in moment capacity caused by the jacket bearing against the foundation or 
superstructure [Caltrans 1992). 
Rectangular columns are retrofitted using elliptical steel jackets, constructed in a similar manner to the 
circular jackets. Details of the jacketing of a single-column bent with a rectangular column are shown 
in Figure 3.4. 
Elliptical or circular steel jackets are provided over the full height of the column if the retrofit is for 
inadequate shear capacity. Jackets may also be provided full-height for aesthetic reasons. If the 
retrofit is for inadequate concrete confinement, the jacket may be partial height, covering only the 
potential plastic hinge region. For partial height jackets, Caltrans specifies a minimumjacket length 
of 1.5 times the largest dimension of the original column. (For example, a 1.2 m x 1.8 m rectangular 
column could be retrofitted with an elliptical steel jacket 2. 7 m tall covering the plastic hinge region.) 
If lap splices are deficient, partial height jackets can also be used. Caltrans specifies the same 
minimum length for such jackets. In older California bridges, lap splices were commonly placed at 
the base of columns to facilitate construction, and since these locations are typically potential plastic 
hinge regions, the jacketing retrofit for lap splices can be the same as that for inadequate confinement. 
"Partial-Confinement" Jacketing 
For many bridge retrofit designs it is desirable to improve the inelastic displacement capacity of 
columns without increasing column moment capacity. If a column has deficient lap splices, a "partial 
confinement" retrofit may achieve this goal. The partial confinement retrofit used by Caltrans (called 
a "Class P" retrofit) has a 13 mm (1/2 inch) thickness of compressible plastic (polyethylene) placed 
around the column prior to the installation and grouting of the elliptical or circular steel jacket. The 
presence of this compressible layer allows cracking and dilation of the concrete at the column base, 
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However, the jacket prevents major spalling and deterioration of the concrete and buckling of the 
column bars. Therefore, the column can maintain its vertical-load-carrying capacity even when 
subjected to large inelastic displacement demands. 
In Caltrans bridge retrofits, a partial confinement steel jacket may be placed at the bottom plastic hinge 
region of a column with inadequate lap splices. The retrofit allows enough column rotation for the 
structure to meet its expected ductility demands, but, by allowing lap-splice slip, the retrofit limits the 
level of force which is delivered to the foundation. Thus the need to retrofit the foundation is avoided. 
With this approach, of course, adequate lateral capacity must still be provided somewhere in the 
structure. For many structures the Caltrans approach is to •fully retrofit one bent per frame•. That 
is, if a bridge structure between adjacent movement joints (ie, a frame) is supported on three bents, 
the columns and foundations of one bent are fully strengthened for the design lateral forces. The base 
regions of the columns in the other two bents are retrofitted to maintain their vertical-load-carrying 
capacities at the expected inelastic displacements, but are assumed for design to have rero moment 
capacity at the base [Caltrans 1992). 
Although a pin connection may be used to model the base of a column with a partial-confinement 
jacket, the foundation capacities and column-shear strength should be based on the peak moment-
capacity of the column base (eg, that atµ, = 1.5 in Figure 3.6[c]). 
Figure 3.5 shows the column and foundation retrofit and strengthening design of a two-column bent 
with rectangular columns. The columns are retrofitted with full-height elliptical steel jackets. For the 
top 4.6 m (15 ft) of the columns, a partial confinement retrofit, with a 13 mm thick polyethylene layer, 
is used. This unusual detail is intended to allow greater strains in the continuous longitudinal bars in 
this region and thus limit the moment demand transferred into the beam, which is not retrofitted 
[Zelinski 1994). The bottom to mid-height portion of the columns receive a full-confinement retrofit, 
plus the moment capacity at the bottom of the column is increased with the addition of 25 reinforcing 
bars, 36 mm diameter (#11), placed around the rectangular column inside the elliptical steel jacket. 
Note that in conjunction with this column strengthening, the foundations are extensively retrofitted; new 
piles and pile caps are used and temporary support of the superstructure is required. (Figure 2.27). 
Research Results 
Research on elliptical and circular steel jacketing of bridge columns has convincingly shown the 
effectiven~ of such jackets. Figure 3.6(a) shows the lateral load versus displacement hysteresis loops 
for a circular column with 20-bar-diameter lap splices in the plastic hinge rone; the strength of the 
column degrades rapidly after the first cycle to displacement ductility,µ, = 1.5 and the hysteresis loops 
are pinched showing poor energy absorption capacity. An identical column with a grouted circular 
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The hysteretic load versus displacement response is stable up to µ = 1 with good energy dissipation 
capacity and no strength degradation untilµ = 8 when column_longitudinal reinforcement is fractured. 
Perfonnance of Partial-Confinement Jackets 
Figure 3.6(c) shows the hysteresis loops for a third column which was retrofitted using a "partial 
confinement• steel jacket. As with the original column, bond failure occurred at the lap splice at µ 
= 1.5. However, strength degradation was less rapid and it was possible to displace the column to 
µ = 1 without losing the vertical load carrying capacity [Yuk Hon Chai et al 1991, Priestley et al 
1992a]. Thus it appears that the concept of a partial confinement retrofit is valid. It may be prudent, 
however, to conduct further research on partial confinement retrofit designs for the following reasons: 
1 Partial confinement jacketing of rectangular columns is now common in California, but the 
detail has not been tested on rectangular columns. 
2 The hysteresis loops for the partial confinement retrofit, Figure 3.6(c), show a reasonable 
ductility capacity, but also show strength degradation and pinching. This degradation and 
pinching may or may not be a problem for the bridge structure, depending on the overall 
retrofit design, the actual hysteretic response characteristics, and on the earthquake demand. 
Inelastic, dynamic time-history analyses of structures with partial-ronfinement jacketed 
columns could help verify the adequacy of such retrofits and to evaluate the overall retrofit 
strategies which use partial confinement jacketing. Consideration of the residual moment 
capacity of a column with a partial-ronfinement retrofit may lead to more accurate seismic 
evaluations and more efficient retrofit designs than the currently-used assumption of a pin-
condition. 
3 A thinner or less compressible layer of polyethylene could be explored to see if strength 
degradation can be reduced, while not increasing peak strength. This could further improve 
the seismic performance of the retrofitted bridge, while not increasing peak shear or foundation 
demands. 
4 Columns with deficient shear capacity are sometimes retrofitted using a full height steel jacket 
which provides full confinement over most of the column height, and only partial confinement 
at the lap splice region, where a layer of polyethylene is used around the column. Figure 2.20 
is an example of this type of jacketing detail. Such retrofit methods for shear-deficient 
columns have not been laboratory tested for either circular or rectangular columns. It may be 
that the partial confinement detail is not as effective in improving shear capacity as a jacket 
providing full confinement over the full height of the column. 
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Rectangular Columns with Lap Splices 
Figure 3. 7(a) shows the lateral load versus displacement hysteresis loops for a rectangular column with 
inadequate lap splices. Similar to the circular column, bond failure occurred in the lap splices at µ = 
1, after which the strength degraded rapidly. The hysteresis loops were pinched and the ideal moment 
capacity was not reached. Figure 3.7(h) shows the response of an identical column retrofitted using 
an elliptical steel jacket. The hysteresis loops are stable up to µ = 1, when lap-splice failure 
eventually occurred. The energy dissipation, (equal to the area inside the hysteresis loops) is good up 
until the end of the test atµ = 9. 
Note that not all jacketing methods are so successful. Figure 3. 7(c) shows the lateral load versus 
displacement response of a column retrofitted with a stiffened steel-plate rectangular jacket. As 
evidenced by the limited ductility capacity and poor energy dissipation, this retrofit method is only 
marginally effective [Priestley et al 1992a]. Consequently, this method was not used for permanent 
retrofit work in California. 
Retrofit of Shear Strength, Confinement, and Bar-Buckling Deficiencies 
Figure 3.8 shows the effectiveness of elliptical steel jacketing for rectangular columns with deficient 
shear strength. The hysteresis loops in Figure 3.S(a) are for a column that suffered a brittle shear 
failure at displacement ductility,µ, of 1.5. An identical column which was retrofitted with an elliptical 
steel jacket showed excellent seismic performance with hysteresis loops stable up to µ = 8 (Figure 
3.8(h)). Similar results have been obtained for circular columns deficient in shear strength [Priestley 
et al 1992a]. 
The improvement in seismic response provided by jacketing is less dramatic for columns whose only 
deficiency is insufficient transverse reinforcement for confinement and bar buckling restraint. Figure 
3.9 shows the original and retrofit hysteresis loops for circular columns without lap splices. The 
original column showed good hysteretic response up to µ = 5 when the longitudinal bars in the 
compression rone of the plastic hinge buckled. (Note that with higher axial loads the original column 
performance would not be as good.) The column retrofitted with a circular jacket, Figure 3.9(b), 
showed improved behaviour with good hysteretic response up to µ = 8. 
Research on steel jacketing has also been carried out in Japan with emphasis on retrofitting regions 
where reinforcing is prematurely terminated. For the Japanese jacketing designs, epoxy is sometimes 
used between the jacket and column instead of cementitious grout [Priestley et al 1992a]. 
Dimensions of Steel Jackets 
Caltrans [1992] has developed tables of recommended steel jacket dimensions and thicknesses for 
various column sizes. The tables are based on providing a specified amount of confining pressure at 
a specified radial dilation strain. This design approach was developed at the University of California, 
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San Diego [Priestley et al 1992a). For columns with lap splices, the critical radial dilation strain is 
taken as 0.001. For concrete confinement where no lap splices are present a larger radial dilation 
strain, 0. 004, is permissible. The contribution of the steel jacket to shear strength is considered in the 
same manner as for hoop or spiral reinforcing, based on a truss analogy with diagonal compression 
struts between inclined cracks in the concrete section. Specific design equations for elliptical and 
circular steel jackets are given by Priestley et al [1992a, 1994). 
For a given rectangular column, different elliptical jacket dimensions can be used as shown in Figure 
3.10. More oblong-shaped elliptical jackets, Figure 3. lO(a), will provide better shear strength and 
confinement for strong axis behaviour, while more circular-shaped jackets, Figure 3.1 O(b ), will provide 
better shear strength and confinement for weak axis behaviour. Caltrans [ 1992) design criteria define 
the overall dimensions of the jacket so that the aspect ratio A/B of the ellipse is equal to the aspect 
ratio h/b of the column. The jacket shape and dimensions end up being different from those of a true 
ellipse, however, because the elliptical shape is approximated as four circular segments. A true ellipse 
has a continuously variable radius; in practice the steel jackets are typically fabricated with just two 
different radii, r1 for the long sides of the column and r2 for the short sides of the column, as shown 
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Figure 3.10 Geometry of elliptical colwnn jacketing. 
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3.4 Other Column Jacketing Methods 
Besides elliptical steel jacketing, other materials and-methods can be used to add confining jackets to 
bridge columns. Most of these other methods are applicable mainly to circular columns. Although 
some methods may be applied to rectangular columns, the designer must ensure that the jacket provides 
sufficient confining stiffness and strength on all sides of the column where it is needed. In general, 
jackets of rectangular geometry, even if they are stiffened, are not as effective as elliptical jackets or 
jackets with through bolts. It is important that unproven techniques for column jacketing be laboratory 
tested. Several retrofit methods designed on engineering judgement have been shown by laboratory 
tests not to be effective. 
Fibreglass/Epoxy Column Jackets 
Fibreglass/epoxy jackets may be preferable for circular columns near salt-water environments, where 
steel would be likely to corrode. In some cases the final column diameters for fibreglass/epoxy jackets 
are 50 mm to 100 mm (2 to 4 inches) less than for steel jackets, so the fibreglass/epoxy retrofit may 
also be preferred in situations of tight clearances. Approval of fibreglass/epoxy jackets by Caltrans 
has been delayed, however, by questions of durability [Zelinski 1994). 
Research on fibreglass/epoxy retrofitting has been carried out at the University of California, San 
Diego [Priestley et al 1992a]. Their tests have shown that columns with inadequate lap-splice lengths, 
jacketed with fibreglass and epoxy and pressure grouted to 1700 kPa (250 psi), show excellent seismic 
response, similar to that of steel jacketed columns. 
Caltrans specifies three levels of confinement with fibreglass/epoxy jacketing: active confinement at 
1700 kPa (250 psi), active confinement at 690 kPa (100 psi), and passive confinement. The active 
confinement is accomplished by installing an elastomeric bladder around the column before wrapping 
with fibreglass and epoxy. After wrapping, cement grout is pumped into the bladder up to the 
specified pressure. For passive confinement, the fibreglass/epoxy is wrapped directly around the 
column without grout. For both active and passive jacketing, multiple layers of the fibreglass/epoxy 
are used to achieve the desired total thickness. 
Active confinement is used only at potential plastic hinge regions in columns. The lower confining 
pressure, 690 MPa, is used where the required displacement ductility capacities are less than 4.5 or 
where there are no lap splices. For lap splice regions, and for higher ductility demands, a confinement 
pressure of 1700 MPa is used. The passive fibreglass/epoxy jacketing is used outside of the plastic 
hinge regions where column shear strength is inadequate. For columns where shear strength is the only 
seismic deficiency, a full-height passive jacket is used [Caltrans, 1992). The passive jacket can also 
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be used for plastic hinge zones without lap splices. The thicker jacket required for active confinement 
may not be cost competitive with steel jackets [Zelinski persr comm. 1994). 
Passive fibreglass/epoxy jacketing is also used at lap splice locations where a "partial confinement" 
retrofit is desired. As discussed in the section on steel jacketing, the intent of partial confinement is 
to allow some lap splice slip (thus limiting force demands in the foundations) but to prevent serious 
degradation of the plastic hinge region and the consequent loss of the column's vertical load carry 
capacity. 
Caltrans had developed a standard specification for the fibreglass/epoxy jacketing materials-glass and 
polyaramid fibres and high-elongation epoxy-and has tabulated required thicknesses of the jacketing. 
For a 1.8 m (6 ft) diameter column, for example, the total fibreglass/epoxy jacket thickness was 
specified as 6.1 mm (0.24 inches) for passive confinement, 13.8 mm (0.54 inches) for low pressure 
active confinement and 17.5 mm (0.69 inches) for the higher pressure active confinement [Caltrans 
1992). However, after two trial installations, use of the fibreglass/epoxy jacketing is on hold until 
issues of durability are resolved [Zelinski pers. comm. 1994). Priestley at al [1992a] present the basis 
for some of the design criteria used by Caltrans. 
Other Methods 
Active confinement of circular columns can also be provided using prestressed wires wrapped around 
the column. The effectiveness of such jacketing has been demonstrated in tests of the University of 
California, San Diego, and general design criteria have been developed. However, cost-effective 
installation methods have not yet been developed [Zelinski 1994), Carbon fibre wrapping can also be 
used to jacket both circular and rectangular columns. Tests conducted in Japan indicate that the 
jacketing improves the ductility and strength of columns which have prematurely terminated 
reinforcement and are prone to shear failure [Priestley et al 1992a]. 
Column confinement can also be added to bridge columns by removing the cover concrete, adding 
additional reinforcing steel ties, and then placing new cover concrete, This retrofit method was 
investigated by Dekker and Park [ 1992) on a full scale specimen representative of a 1936-designed 
New Zealand bridge. The test is discussed in Chapter 6 of this report. Reinforced concrete jackets 
with substantial transverse reinforcing can be used to retrofit bridge columns, although the approach 
is generally more expensive than using a steel or fibreglass/epoxy jacket. 
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Pier Walls 
Bridge pier walls have been retrofitted in California using jacketing methods which are similar to those 
used for columns. In fact, for bridge structures the distinction between a pier wall and a column is 
not always clear; rectangular "columns• may have plan aspect ratios of 3 or more. As mentioned in 
the previous section, for such columns the jacket may need through-bolts to provide the necessary 
confinement to the long sides of the column. The situation is the same with pier walls. 
Steel jackets for pier walls have been designed by Caltrans with flat steel plates along the long sides 
of the wall, joined around the ends of the wall with flat or circular steel-plate segments. The long 
sides of the jacket are tied together with through-bolts. Typically these are 32 mm (1 \4 inch) diameter 
high-strength bolts, in holes drilled through the existing wall on a grid spacing of 1.2 to 2.4 meters 
(4 to 8 ft) in each direction. Cementitious grout is injected between the steel jacket and the concrete 
column. 
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As with steel column jackets, the pier wall retrofit can be full or partial height, and full or partial 
confinement. Full height jackets are used if the strong-direction shear strength of the wall is deficient. 
The partial confinement detail at lap splices uses a 13 mm (1h inch) layer of compressible polyethylene 
wrapped around the wall before jacketing. 
For wide columns with flared bases, which are similar to pier walls, Caltrans has used through-bolted 
plates in an attempt to confine lap splices. This detail is shown in Figure 3. 11. 
Research on retrofit methods for pier walls has been carried out at the University of California, Irvine 
[Haroun et al 1993]. Half-scale wall specimens were retrofitted with steel jackets, or plates, of various 
heights and with various arrangements of through-bolts. The wall specimens were then tested in the 
weak direction. The specimens had either 16-bar-diameter-long or 28-bar-diameter-Iong lap splices 
in the vertical reinforcing at the base of the wall. Specific design recommendations based on the 
research have yet to be developed. Continued testing may be necessary to (a) assess the effectiveness 
of the through bolts in providing weak direction confinement, (b) develop retrofit methods for strong 
direction shear strength deficiencies, and (c) investigate the performance of partial confinement 
retrofits. 
3.6 Foundations 
For bridge retrofits in California, footings are often substantially strengthened using added piles and 
an expanded pile cap. Figure 3.12 shows the details of the strengthening of the pile foundation for the 
two-column bent retrofit of Figure 2.20. The existing foundation for each column consisted of six steel 
H-piles and a 2. 7 m x 1. 8 m (9 ft x 6 ft) plan pile cap. The strengthened foundation contains twenty-
four added steel pipe piles with a pile cap expanded to 4.9 m x 5.5 m (16 ft x 18 ft). For this 
strengthening, the superstructure is temporarily supported on shoring, while the existing pile cap is 
undermined so that new bottom mat reinforcing can be placed underneath it. A new top mat of 
reinforcing is added above the existing pile cap to provide the negative flexural capacity needed when 
piles are in tension due to overturning. The top mat of reinforcement can also improve the anchorage 
capacity of the column bars into the foundation, because the reinforcement restrains flexural-tension 
cracks from opening at the top of the foundation, near the anchored bars. 
Such methods as shown in Figure 3.12 are effective in strengthening the bridge foundation. The 
problem is that such foundation retrofits are expensive-several times more expensive than column-
jacket retrofitting. Paradoxically, while a large portion of retrofit costs are spent on foundations, few 
foundation failures have been noted in past earthquakes. However, this observation is likely to change 
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Figure 3.12 Details of foundation strengthening using new pipe piles and a new pile cap [Zelinski 1993]. 
have highlighted the lack of toughness in foundations once columns are retrofitted [Zelinski pers. 
comm. 1994]. 
A less expensive foundation strengthening scheme, using soil tension anchors, is also used by Caltrans. 
This retrofit, shown in Figure 3.13 is most efficient when the compressive capacity of the soil is not 
being fully utilized. Otherwise the full tension cannot be applied to the soil anchors without 
overloading the soil. If the anchors are not tensioned the rotational stiffness of the foundation is greatly 
reduced. As shown in Figure 3.13 the soil anchors are often placed between the existing piles, and 
a reinforcing concrete topping is added to the existing footing or pile cap. 
More important than strengthening foundations to increase their capacity in the soil may be the retrofit 
of foundation joint shear and anchorage deficiencies. Yan Xiao et al [ 1993) tested a footing retrofit 
with an added reinforced concrete topping which had two layers of reinforcing and was attached to the 
existing footing with drilled dowels. The as-built specimen had failed in shear at the column-footing 
joint at a load of less than 60 percent of the column capacity. The retrofit footing of a second test 
specimen allowed the column to reach its flexural strength, and the ultimate displacement of the column 
was 1.5 times greater than for the as-built specimen. The final failure was caused by a degradation 
of the footing overlay at a ductility of 4. Thus the retrofit appears to be effective to limited ductility 
levels. 
Adding external prestressing to existing footings and pile caps may be an effective retrofit technique 
for column to foundation joint shear and anchorage deficiencies. However, the development of feasible 
design details and experimental research is needed to validate this retrofit concept. Research is also 
needed on establishing requirements for tying the top reinforcing mat of a foundation down to the 
bottom reinforcing mat [Zelinski 1994). Priestley et al [ 1992a] provide some general design criteria 
for bridge foundation retrofits. 
Abutments 
Caltrans has occasionally used a seismic anchor slab to strengthen and stiffen the abutments of existing 
bridges. As shown in Figure 3.14, the waffle-shaped slab connects the existing abutment to new piles 
or drilled piers. The goal of this type of retrofit is to "attract larger seismic forces to the abutments 
and [thereby] reduce the amount of column, footing, or other retrofit which may be required in 
adjacent bents. The seismic anchor slab is more effective on shorter bridges with no hinges. 
However, it has been proposed for use on larger structures with expansion hinges" [Caltrans 1992). 
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Figure 3.14 Abutment retrofit using new anchor slab and piles [Caltrans 1992]. 
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If the abutments of a straight bridge are being _retrofitted primarily for longitudinal direction 
earthquakes, then soil tieback anchors can be used instead of an anchor slab. For transverse 
direction earthquakes, large anchor piles can be installed and monolithically tied to the existing 
abutments. Figure 3.15 shows the schematic seismic retrofit of a curved bridge using tension tie backs 
for north-south direction earthquake, and cast-in-drilled-hole anchor piles for restraint in the east-west 
direction [Caltrans 1992]. Similar retrofits using anchor piles were used on the Kunou viaduct for the 
Tomei expressway in Japan [Priestley 1992a). 
3...8 Other Retrofit Technigues 
Multi-column bents can sometimes be strengthened with the addition of an infill structural wall (or 
• shear" wall) between two of the columns. This method was used for the retrofit of two-column bents 
on the Nishiokazu viaduct on the Tomei expressway in Japan [Priestley 1992a]. The designer of such 
a retrofit must consider the effects of the retrofit on increasing the seismic forces in the bent's 
foundations. 
For the Asada ramp of the Metropolitan expressway in Kawasaki Japan, columns and cantilever beams 
were strengthened using added external post-tensioning [Priestley 1992a]. Again, for such a retrofit 
the designer must be careful to determine whether the potential seismic failure has been redirected into 
other elements, and to assess the strength and ductility capacity of the new mechanism. 
In San Bernadino County California, on the Colton 1-10/1-215 interchange, seismically deficient pier 
wall bents were strengthened with the addition of a new reinforced concrete outrigger frame as shown 
in Figure 3.16. The outrigger frame is used in conjunction with a partial confinement steel jacket at 
the base of the pier walls. For this design, the designer must take care to consider the high shear 
forces and flexural rotations which can develop in the short cap-beam spans between the existing pier 
walls and the new columns [Priestley 1992a, Zelinski 1994). 
For the retrofit of San Francisco's double deck viaducts, an extensive strengthening design which 
included replacing columns and adding new longitudinal edge beams has been employed. This retrofit 
concept, using independent edge beams, was proof tested with a large scale model at the University 
of California, San Diego. A similar retrofit scheme using integral edge beams was tested at the 
University of California, Berkeley. Both retrofit schemes were shown to offer excellent seismic 























Figure 3.15 Retrofit of a curved bridge using movement joint restrainers, abutment tension 
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Figure 3.16 Retrofit of a pier wall bent using a new outrigger frame and a partial confinement 




EVALUATION AND PROPOSED RETROFIT MEASURES FOR THE THORNDON 
BRIDGE 
The seismic evaluation and retrofit designs for the Tbomdon bridge in Wellington illustrate the 
practical application of some of the evaluation and retrofit methods discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The 
project made use of the most recent research results available, and followed a capacity-design 
approach. Although the capacity design approach has been used in New Zealand for over 15 years, 
it is only in the last few years that it has been used for bridge retrofit work in California and 
elsewhere. The example of the Tbomdon bridge shows how the capacity-design method can avoid the 
problems, discussed in Chapter 2, of the great uncertainty in modelling complex structures and 
predicting earthquake demands. 
Three main examples from the Tbomdon bridge project are presented here: the retrofit of 
superstructure linkages in Section 4.2, of single-column piers in Section 4.3, and of multi-column piers 
in Section 4.4. Some additional proposed retrofit measures for the bridge, including a comprehensive 
investigation of possible ground-improvement methods, are reviewed in Section 4.5. The 
superstructure linkage retrofit is a unique application of the capacity-design principle. 
The design of retrofit concepts for the bridge was carried out by BCHF consulting engineers from June 
to October of 1994, with the present author as part of the engineering team (see acknowledgements). 
The material in this chapter emphasizes work conceived and developed by the present author, such as 
the superstructure linkage retrofit, but also reviews work principally done by others at BCHF. 
4.1 Background 
The Tbomdon bridge and its expected seismic performance have been described by Chapman and 
Kircaldie (1992] and BCHF consulting engineers [BCHF 1994a, Billings and Powell 1994]. Retrofit 
concepts have also been proposed by BCHF [ 1994b]. Information from these papers and reports is 
summarized below. 
Description of the Bridge and Site 
The Thomdon bridge carries the Wellington Urban Motorway over railway and harbour facilities for 
a length of 1.34 km (0.85 miles). Ramps at the halfway point provide access to and from a major 
local street, Aotea Quay. The bridge comprises two parallel structures, each with three lanes, carrying 
traffic volumes of 71,000 vehicles per day on the section north of the ramps, and 53,000 vpd on the 
section 
south of the ramps. In 1992 the replacement value of the bridge was estimated to be NZ$50 million 
[Chapman and Kirkcaldie 1992). 
Structural Features 
Planning for the bridge began in the mid 1950s, design took place between 1963 and 1967, and 
construction was finally completed in October 1969. Design was undertaken in three stages, with each 
stage tending to reflect the current developments in seismic design, which were undergoing major 
evolution in New Zealand during this time. 
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 show some typical portions of the structure (also showing retrofit measures 
which are discussed later). The bridge superstructure consists of precast, prestressed I-girders, simply 
supported with spans ranging from 20 to 42 metres (66 to 136 ft). At the northern end (the first 
construction stage), these are supported on 9 multi-column piers founded on groups of 600 mm 
diameter steel-encased concrete piles. For the remainder of the bridge the I-girders are typically 
supported on single-column piers with cast-in-place box girder umbrellas. 
North of the ramps (the second stage of construction), these single-column piers are founded on groups 
of 600 mm diameter steel-encased concrete piles. South of the ramps (the third construction stage), 
1.5 metre diameter cast-in-place drilled piers are typically used at the foundations [Chapman and 
Kircaldie 1992). 
The original structure was designed for a lateral seismic acceleration of0.3g and typically the seismic 
detailing improved with each stage of construction. The structure was not designed using the "capacity 
design" concept and consequently the inelastic mechanisms are not well defined [Billings and Powell 
1994]. 
Site Conditions 
The bridge is sited on the shore of the Wellington Harbour on reclamations which were constructed 
in stages between 1882 and 1970 and which contain potentially liquefiable hydraulic fills. The 
reclamations were placed over sediments which are also susceptible to liquefaction. The fill typically 
consists of silts and sands varying in depth from 4.5 metres to a maximum of 17 metres. Considerable 
variability is exhibited by the fill, reflecting several stages of deposition. For a short length along the 
bridge, the fill is retained by a mass concrete seawall, up to 17 metres high, which runs adjacent to 
the seaward side of the bridge. 
The active Wellington fault trace runs adjacent to the bridge over much of its length and passes beneath 
the bridge approximately midway between the ramps and the south abutment. An earthquake on this 
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fault could result in permanent ground movements of up to 5 metres horizontally and 1 metre 
vertically. Permanent ground displacements of up to-1 metre can also occur in a "fault-disturbed" area 
which covers the southern half of the bridge. Movement on the fault has been estimated to rocur on 
average every 480 to 780 years, with the last rupture estimated to have occurred between 300 and 450 
years ago. Seismologists estimate that there is an 11 % probability of the Wellington fault rupturing 
over the next 50 years [Chapman and Kirkcaldie 1992, BCHF 1994b], 
The bridge spans over numerous railway tracks, two major city streets, and a number of utilities and 
services. There are several buildings and parking areas located near to and underneath the bridge, 
including a busy passenger ferry terminal. 
~ Seismic Performance 
A detailed seismic assessment of the Thorndon bridge [BCHF 1994a] revealed several potential seismic 
deficiencies. The study indicated that the bridge: 
was vulnerable to major damage and collapse at relatively low levels of seismic ground shaking. 
Vulnerable items included collapse of the off-ramp due to liquefaction of an underlying sand layer, 
collapse of spans due to either insufficient seating length or due to failure of the bridge pilocaps, and 
collapse of spans onto the ferry terminal due to failure of the seawall and retained ground in this area. 
In an earthquake caused by the Wellington fault, which runs under the bridge, collapse of the main 
bridge and the off-ramp where they cross the fault can be expocted [BCHF 1994b], 
Some of the spocific seismic deficiencies are discussed in Soctions 4.2 through 4.5. 
Approach to Seismic Retrofitting 
The weak link in many of the piers of the bridge is yielding of the pilocap reinforcement. 
Accordingly, most of the proposed retrofit work strengthens the pile caps. In the assessment of the 
unretrofitted bridge, column performance was typically not identified as critical. However, after 
retrofitting the pilocaps, the force and displacement demands on the columns are increased and in many 
cases nocessitate column retrofitting. 
The retrofit measures proposed to address the column and pilocap deficiencies are based on the 
extensive programs of bridge retrofit research and implementation carried out in California and 
elsewhere, and particularly rely on the re-commendations of Priestley et al [ I 992a, I 994) and Yan Xiao 
et al [1994). 
69 
The retrofit measures proposed for the columns and foundations do not include adding any new piles. 
For most piers the capacity of the existing piles is adequate to--resist the overstrength of the column or 
pilecap mechanism above. For some piers compression or uplift demand on the piles exceeds nominal 
capacity; foundation rocking could occur in these cases. The research results of Yan Xiao et al (1994] 
show that such rocking is not detrimental to seismic response; in fact limited rocking of foundations 
can be beneficial in dissipating earthquake energy and isolating the structure above. Shear or flexural 
failures in the piles do not occur, except for the ductile flexural mechanisms for the multi-column piers 
(described in Section 4.4) and for ground-block sliding movements due to liquefaction (described in 
Section 4.5). Accordingly no retrofit is needed for any of the existing bridge piles. 
An explicit capacity design approach was used for both the seismic assessment of the unretrofitted 
bridge and the design of proposed retrofit measures. The essential first step in this approach is the 
identification of the governing mechanism for the inelastic lateral displacement of the structure. In 
many cases the proposed retrofit measures change the governing mechanism. Retrofitting is designed 
to eliminate undesirable mechanisms such as pilecap yielding, cap-beam flexure-shear failures, column-
shear failures, or beam-column joint failures, and instead support the development of more ductile 
mechanisms such as the flexural hinging of steel-jacketed columns or existing steel-encased concrete 
piles, or in some cases foundation rocking. These effects of retrofitting are described in Sections 4.3 
and 4.4. The retrofitting of the superstructure linkage bolts, described in Section 4.2, is a unique 
application of the capacity-design principle, where linkage capacities are designed to exceed the 
overstrength linkage force demands which can come from the adjacent movement joints. 
4.2 Evaluation and Retrofit of Superstructure Linkages 
Because of the use of precast simply-supported girders, the Thomdon bridge has numerous 
superstructure movement joints-typically two joints at each pier. Such movement joints are commonly 
a source of seismic vulnerability in bridges. A unique retrofit scheme of providing a few high-strength 
slack linkage bolts at each movement joint has been proposed for the Thomdon bridge. 
Seismic~ent 
By the standards of the day, the Thomdon bridge was constructed with good seismic detailing at the 
superstructure movement joints. Seating lengths at the ends of the superstructure girders vary from 
approximately 450 mm (18 inches) for construction stages 1 and 2, to 760 mm (30 inches) for 
construction stage 3. In California, bridges of the same era can have seating lengths of only 150 to 
200 mm (6 to 8 inches). On the Thomdon bridge, substantial linkage bolts are provided to tie adjacent 
spans together. Thick rubber pads are used under the ends of the linkage bolts to reduce earthquake 
impact forces. For construction stages 2 and 3, the linkage bolts are 8 to 12 metres long (25 to 40 ft), 
extending across the umbrellas, and a welded end detail is used rather than threaded bolt ends. This 
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allows the entire length of the bolt to yield, giving excellent elongation capacity. At the multi-column 
piers of stage 1 however, much shorter linkage bolts,with threaded ends, were used. Little elongation 
capacity could be expected in these bolts because failure would occur at the threads. 
Despite the reasonable seating lengths and restrainer capacities for the Thomdon bridge, span unseating 
could still occur due to pennanent ground deformations. The ground deformations can result from 
liquefaction, or from movements of up to 1 metre in the Wellington fault-disturbed area. (The main 
5-metre offset of the Wellington fault is addressed separately.) 
Stage 3 Portion of the Bridge 
In the stage 3 area of the bridge, ground movements from fault-disturbance are anticipated, but the 
linkage bolts typically have a greater capacity than that corresponding to the failure of the pilecaps. 
Thus, for this region of the bridge, the linkage bolts will not yield and there would be no span 
unseating from movement-joint deficiencies. However, as discussed in Section 4.4, the failure of the 
pile.caps in this portion of the bridge could lead to excessive settlement of the supporting piers and 
possibly to span collapses. This situation is shown in Figure 4. l(a). 
To address the seismic deficiency of the pilecaps, retrofitting would be implemented to strengthen the 
substructure as will be discussed in Section 4.4. Once the substructure is strengthened, the columns 
and foundations would have enough capacity to cause the yielding of the linkage bolts under induced 
ground movements. This yielding could tend to concentrate at a single movement joint. (Typically 
this would be at whichever movement joint the vertical hold down bolts first failed.) With only one 
movement joint to take up the major portion of induced ground movements, span unseating could 
occur. This situation is shown in Figure 4. l(b). 
Stage 2 Portion of the Bridge 
In the stage 2 area of the bridge, permanent ground movements due directly to disturbance from the 
Wellington fault are not expected. However, this area of the bridge site is susceptible to liquefaction 
which could result in pennanent sliding movements of the blocks of ground on which the bridge is 
founded. The failure of the mass concrete seawall is also possible, which would increase ground-block 
sliding movements. 
In the stage 2 area of the bridge, the existing linkage bolts are of a smaller diameter than those used 
in the stage 3 area. These linkage bolts can typically yield under longitudinal ground displacements 
before the columns or pilecaps reach their capacities. The yielding could tend to concentrate at one 
movement joint resulting in span unseating ·as shown in Figure 4. l(b). In the stage 2 area this type 
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Proposed Retrofit Measures 
A scheme of linkage-bolt retrofitting has been devised to prevent unseating collapses due to permanent 
ground movements. The retrofit requires replacing typically 3 or 4 of the existing linkage bolts at each 
superstructure umbrella with high strength Dywidag or Macalloy bolts. The retrofit is shown 
schematically in Figure 4. l(c) and Figure 4.2. Figure 4.4 shows the location of the existing and 
replacement linkage bolts on a cross-section of the bridge. 
The new Dywidag or Macalloy bolts are installed with slackness at each end of the umbrella. The 
slack bolts are anchored within the umbrella to allow equal displacement at each end of the umbrella. 
If the fault-disturbance tends to pull the bridge apart, the existing linkage-bolts will yield, but the high-
strength slack bolts will engage before unseating occurs. Thus ground displacement demands can be 
distributed to several adjacent movement joints without any span collapses. 
Typically, the initial linkage-bolt yield strength after retrofitting is less than the column lateral strength. 
Thus for longitudinal-direction displacements the linkage-bolt yielding can preclude serious damage to 
the substructure, assuming that the weak pilecaps in the area have been retrofitted. 
The slack bolts are designed so that the ultimate strength of linkages at a movement joint before 
unseating exceeds the overstrength of the linkage bolts in the adjacent joints, including the hold-down 
bolt overstrength. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, which shows that the design strength of the initially 
slack bolts plus the yield strength of the snug bolts at the left movement joint (Tn,sL\CK + Ty.SNUG) 
should exceed the hold-down bolt overstrength plus the snug bolt overstrength at the right movement 
joint (1.6 V n,HOLD-DOWN + 1.3 Ty.SNUG). The overstrength factors of 1.6 and 1.3 are chosen by 
judgement. For the hold-down bolts a higher overstrength factor of 1.6 was chosen because strain 
hardening, bolt kinking, and shear-friction type mechanisms could increase strengths. For the existing 
snug linkage bolts, strain hardening will be limited because of the long bolt lengths. Laboratory testing 
has been recommended to verify the bolt strengths, overstrengths, and displacement capacities [BCHF 
1994b]. 
The linkage bolt retrofitting is complicated by variations, among different bridge piers, in the number 
and size of the existing linkage bolts. A general aim of the retrofit is to protect against abrupt changes 
in the linkage capacity along the length of the bridge. The snug and slack linkage capacity is designed 
to exceed the snug linkage plus hold-down overstrength at the adjacent joints, considering at least two 
movement joints on either side. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
At the umbrellas, replacement linkage bolts are anchored where possible in umbrella box girder cells 
which have existing access manholes. Otherwise replacement linkage bolts are grouted into the existing 
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bottom locations of the umbrellas because girder end-diaphragms are weaker in these locations. To 
provide the maximum plan rotation capacity at the movement joints, the new slack linkage bolts are 
located near the center of the superstructure width at the umbrellas [BCHF 1994b]. 
75 
4.3 Evaluation and Retrofit of Single-Column Piers 
The majority of the piers on the Thomdon bridge are supported on single columns. Seismic 
evaluations indicate deficiencies in the performance of these piers, which can be addressed by 
foundation strengthening and column jacketing retrofit measures. 
Seismic ~ent 
Structural calculations reveal that the pilecaps typically represent the weak link in the seismic resistance 
of the single-column piers. The assessment of pilecap strength considered likely crack patterns, yield-
line mechanisms, and strut and tie modelling. 
The reinforcing of the existing pilecaps was apparently designed primarily for gravity loads, because 
the amount of reinforcing in the top mat of the pilecaps is typically very small compared to that in the 
bottom mat. Consequently a ratcheting type of permanent displacement can occur when the pilecap 
is subjected to cyclic flexural yielding due to earthquake actions. The ratcheting results from the 
following sequence of effects: (a) for earthquake actions in one direction, flexural cracks open from 
the bottom of the pilecap and the bottom reinforcing steel yields and elongates; (b) upon reversal of 
the earthquake actions, the top reinforcing steel yields in tension and the bottom reinforcing steel is 
subjected to a matching compression force. However, this compression force is not enough to reverse 
the permanent tensile strain present in the bottom reinforcement, or to close the cracks at the bottom 
of the pilecap; (c) therefore on successive cycles, the inelastic tensile strain in the bottom reinforcement 
accumulates, and the pilecap hinge develops a cumulative rotation in one direction. 
According to Dr Richard Fenwick of the University of Auckland, the strain-ductility demands on such 
"one-way" plastic hinges, for a given plastic rotation, can be three times those for a conventional 
plastic hinge [Billings and Powell 1994]. This type of pilecap failure is schematically illustrated in 
Figures 4. l(a) and 4.S(b). 
For the single-column piers of the unretrofitted bridge, failure of the columns is typically precluded 
by yielding of the pilecaps. After pilecap retrofitting is implemented, however, column yielding 
becomes a likely inelastic mechanism for many of the single-column piers. The original designers of 
the Thomdon bridge made an effort to increase the amount of transverse reinforcement at the column 
ends above what was typically used in construction of that era. However, the amount of transverse 
reinforcement is still typically inadequate to provide the desired column ductility capacities, as judged 
by current evaluation methods. For the seismic assessment, column strengths and ductility capacities 
were calculated using a moment-curvature analysis based on the Mander stress-strain model for 
confined concrete [Billings and Powell 1994]. Column shear capacities were assessed according to the 
recommendations of Priestley et al [ I 994]. 
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Proposed Retrofit Measures 
The proposed retrofit measures for a typical single-column pier of the Thomdon bridge are shown in 
Figure 4.4. The figure shows that the pilecap is strengthened using a new reinforced-concrete overlay, 
and post-tensioned reinforcement which is cored through the existing pilecap. The overlay is tied to 
the existing pilecap with drilled, grouted dowels, so that the overlay and pilecap will behave 
compositely. The overlay covers the sides of the existing pilecap with end-blocks which protect the 
post-tensioning anchors. The dowels across the overlay-pilecap interface are calculated to act in shear 
friction, and the end-blocks of the overlay, which contain stirrups as vertical reinforcement, are 
assumed to contribute to the shear capacity at the interface. 
Drilled dowels are also provided to lap with the reinforcement of the existing piles, to develop the 
potential pile tension force through the full depth of the pilecap plus overlay. Considering a strut-and-
tie model of the forces in the retrofitted pilecap, the additional dowels at the existing piles allow a 
steeper compression-strut mechanism to develop on the uplift side of the pilecap. These additional 
drilled dowels at the existing piles are also assumed to contribute to the horizontal shear-friction 
capacity at the overlay-pilecap interface. 
Among the numerous single-column piers of the Thomdon bridge there is considerable variation in the 
layout, geometry and reinforcing details of the existing pilecaps, as well as variation in column 
capacities and construction constraints. Consequently, the proposed retrofit designs for different 
pilecaps also vary. For some pilecaps the reinforced-concrete overlay is not needed and the added 
post-tensioning alone strengthens the pilecap sufficiently to force plastic hinging into the columns. For 
other pilecaps, the post-tensioning is not needed, and an overlay alone is proposed. Typically the 
pilecap retrofitting is designed for strength only, to force plastic hinging into the columns. In some 
cases, however, inelastic behaviour of the pilecaps, either retrofitted with an overlay only or 
unretrofitted, may be acceptable. Laboratory testing has been recommended to assess the ductility 
capacity of the inelastic pilecap response. 
Where column plastic hinging is possible, new steel jackets are provided over the potential plastic-hinge 
zone of the column as shown in Figure 4.4. The jackets improve the confinement of the concrete and 
restrain the column bars against buckling. Fibreglass/epoxy jackets have also been considered for use 
on the Thomdon bridge [BCHF 1994b]. Compared to the pilecap retrofit measures, the design criteria 
for the column jacketing are well established, as described in Section 3.3 of this report. 
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Figure 4.4 Proposed retrofit measures for a typical single-column pier. 
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4.4 Evaluation and Retrofit of Multi-Colwnn Piers 
The first construction stage for the Thomdon bridge used four to five columns per pier. The columns 
of each pier are connected by a continuous pilecap below, and a continuous cap-beam above which 
supports the superstructure girders. A number of deficiencies are evident in these multi-column piers 
which are addressed with retrofit measures such as infill concrete walls, pilecap overlays, and column 
jackets. 
Seismic ~ent 
Figure 4.5 shows the expected earthquake failure mechanisms for the typical multi-column piers of the 
Thomdon bridge. 
Transverse Direction 
Under transverse-direction earthquake effects, a strong-column-weak-beam mechanism develops as 
shown in Figure 4.S(a). The yielding :rones of this mechanism, in the capbeam and pilecap, have not 
been detailed for ductile performance and the inelastic rotation capacity of these elements is assessed 
as being deficient. Flexure/shear failures could develop in the pilecap and capbeam possibly leading 
to collapse. In addition, the beam-column joints of the cap-beam may be vulnerable to failure, 
particularly if the overstrength of the cap-beam is developed, or if the cap-beam alone were to be 
retrofitted. 
Longitudinal Direction 
In the longitudinal direction, the multi-column bents are vulnerable to pilecap failures, as shown in 
Figure 4.S(b). This potential pilecap failure is similar to that described in Section 4.4 for the single 
column piers. The inelastic rotation capacity at the pilecap yielding areas is diminished due to the 
bottom of the pilecap being much more heavily reinforced that the top of the pilecap. 
The heights of the multi-column piers vary along the length of the bridge. For the shorter columns, 
a column shear failure could preclude a pilecap failure as shown in Figure 4.S(c). As described in 
Section 2.2, there is virtually no inelastic displacement capacity in such a failure mode, and several 
catastrophic bridge collapses have occurred in earthquakes due to the shear failure of short columns. 
Proposed Retrofit Measures 
The proposed retrofit measures for the multi-column piers of the Thomdon bridge are shown in Figure 
4.6. 
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(b) Longitudinal Direction 
Retrofit measures for multi-colwnn piers of the Thorndon bridge, and earthquake response mechanisms. 
Transverse Direction 
For transverse direction earthquake effects, reinforced concrete walls are infilled between the columns 
of the pier. 
The infill walls are dowelled into the cap-beam above and the pilecap below. The addition of the walls 
causes an entirely new inelastic mechanism to govern the seismic response of the pier: a ductile 
flexural hinging of the existing piles as shown in Figure 4.6(a). The existing piles were constructed 
with steel sleeves (or jackets) which confine the reinforced-concrete pile core, providing excellent 
inelastic rotation capacity. The infill walls are designed for the overstrength of the pile-hinging 
mechanism and effectively prevent failures in the cap-beam, pilecap, or beam-column joints. 
Longitudinal Direction 
For longitudinal-direction earthquake effects, full-height steel jackets are added to the columns, and 
a reinforced concrete overlay is added to the existing pilecap. The steel jackets prevent shear failures 
from occurring in the columns. The overlay is used to strengthen the pilecap and force an inelastic 
mechanism elsewhere in the pier. For the more lightly reinforced columns, flexural hinging of the 
jacketed columns is expected to govern the seismic response. For the more heavily reinforced columns 
a pile uplift and foundation rocking mechanism may govern seismic response. These possible 
mechanisms are shown in Figure 4.6(b). The pilecap strengthening is designed for the lesser of the 
overstrength of these two possible mechanisms. Because of the uncertainty in pile uplift values, a high 
overstrength factor is used for the foundation rocking mechanism. 
4.5 Other Proposed Retrofit Measures 
Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 described the evaluation and typical retrofit of superstructure linkages, 
single-column piers, and multi-column piers for the Thorndon bridge. Additional retrofit measures are 
proposed for the bridge [BCHF 1994b], some of which are briefly described in this section. 
Structural Retrofit Measures 
Seat Extensions at Ramps and Abutments 
Two of the most vulnerable areas of the Thorndon bridge are the seating conditions of the two ramps 
where they meet the main structure. No linkage bolts have been provided at these locations. The 
recommended retrofit measure to address this deficiency is to add reinforced-concrete seat extensions 
dowelled into the existing ramp support seats. The details of the existing structure make such a retrofit 
relatively straight forward. 
The seat extension was considered preferable to the option of adding new linkage bolts at the ramp 
connections. The ramp juncture locations represent major geometric and stiffness discontinuities in 
the bridge structure where large relative movements are prone to occur. If the retrofit attempted to 
restrain these movements with linkage bolts, it is doubtful that the failure of the linkage bolts could be 
82 
protected against. There would be practically no upper limit to the force demands on linkage bolts in 
such a location. Instead of trying to restrain relative movements at the ramp junctures, the seat-
extension retrofit allows considerable movements to- take place without span collapse. Reinforced-
concrete seat extensions are also used at the bridge abutments, where it would be expensive and 
disruptive to replace the existing linkage bolts [BCHF 1994b]. 
Wellington Faull Offset 
A seismic retrofit solution has been proposed to prevent collapse of the main bridge structure where 
it crosses the Wellington fault. The rupture of this strike-slip fault is predicted to cause a relative 
offset displacement ofup to 5 metres (16 ft) horizontally. The main bridge axis crosses the fault trace 
at an angle of 25 to 30 degrees. The strike-slip offset of the fault would principally cause pulling-apart 
displacements of adjacent bridge piers with some relative transverse movement between the piers. 
The proposed retrofit consists of frames built up of steel beams, dowelled and bolted to the undersides 
of the superstructure umbrellas on either side of the fault. Several of the linkage bolts at these 
umbrellas are replaced with slack linkage bolts. The steel frames act as 2.5 metre-long seat extensions 
to allow the relative pulling-apart and transverse movement of the piers on either side of the fault. The 
frames are designed with a shear-key stopper which, along with the slack linkage bolts, ensures that 
pull-apart fault offsets are distributed to each end of the span and that transverse offsets are 
accommodated by the plan rotation of the suspended span. The goal of the retrofit is only to prevent 
collapse and reduce the likelihood of casualties; the bridge spans above the fault would need to be 
replaced after the Wellington fault earthquake to correct roadway geometrics [BCHF 1994b]. 
Ground Improvement to Prevent Liquefaction 
A major part of the Thomdon bridge site is susceptible to soil liquefaction. Several methods of 
improving ground conditions to reduce the likelihood of liquefaction were investigated by BCHF 
consulting engineers [BCHF 1994b]. Their findings and recommendations are summarized below. 
Seismic Assessment 
Underneath the northern half of the Thomdon bridge is a layer of beach sediments which is susceptible 
to liquefaction. Liquefaction of this soil layer would result in permanent slope displacements occurring 
as the overlying reclamation fill material would move in a large-scale sliding block type of ground 
failure. The ground acceleration at which the beach sediments liquefy is assessed to be 0.16g in a 
magnitude M=7.4 earthquake. The slope displacements are predicted to occur in arcs forming 
scallops, eventually joining up to form a complete block movement. Where the original sea bed profile 
is steep, this block movement may extend as far back as the original high water mark. 
At a ground acceleration of approximately 0.2g, permanent slope displacements are assessed to be 
small, with magnitudes less than 25 mm. At higher levels of shaking the magnitude of the 
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displacements increases, with values up to 1,500 mm predicted for ground accelerations of around 
0. 74g. The foundations of the overbridge are assessed to maintain gravity support at this higher 
shaking level, but the piles would suffer significant and irreparable damage. 
Underneath the off-ramp of the Thomdon bridge is a layer of sandy hydraulic fill which is assessed 
to liquefy at a peak ground acceleration of around 0. 19g in a magnitude M = 7.4 earthquake, or at 
a ground acceleration of around 0.25g in a magnitude M = 6.0 earthquake. 
When the sandy fill deposit liquefies, the seawall retaining the fill is expected to fail by either 
overturning or sliding. This failure would permit a seaward movement of the body of liquefied 
material and the gravel rockfill above. It is possible that the seawall may move as much as 10 to 20 
meters. Ground movements were assessed to decrease with distance back from the seawall, but would 
remain large (in the order of meters) as far back as the off-ramp pier foundations. These ground 
movements would apply very large lateral loads to the off-ramp piles and pilecaps, almost equal to the 
soil passive pressure, and the off-ramp would most likely collapse [BCHF 1994b]. 
Preferred Retrofit Measures: Stone Columns and Jet Grouting 
To reduce the magnitude of the permanent slope displacements which could occur underneath the main 
bridge, it is necessary to improve the strength of the liquefiable materials, which are located some 10 
metres below existing ground level. This improvement would not need to eliminate the permanent 
slope displacements, but would aim to reduce the magnitude of the displacements to a level at which 
the bridge foundations could maintain structural integrity. 
The preferred method of ground improvement to the Thomdon bridge site to mitigate liquefaction 
effects involves a combination of stone columns (vibro-replacement) and jet grouting techniques. The 
stone columns would be implemented at discrete points along 10 m wide strips on both sides of the 
overbridge where there are no headroom restrictions. The stone columns would extend beneath the 
interface beach layer, to depths of approximately 15 m. 
With the stone column technique a vibrating cell or "vibroflot• is lowered through the sandy deposit, 
partially being driven and partially aided by the vibrating action and water jets liquefying the deposit 
locally. When at the desired depth, aggregate is fed down a central column and compacted in place 
from the bottom up. As the vibroflot is withdrawn a dense stone column is formed in place. Both the 
vibrating action of the vibroflot and the compaction of the stone column densify the surrounding sandy 
material to a level designed to prevent liquefaction. For the liquefiable area underlying the off-ramp, 
preliminary designs suggest installing stone columns at approximately 2.0 m centres on a triangular 
grid along 10 to 20 meter wide strips of ground both on the seaward and landward side of the off-
ramp. 
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Beneath the overbridge where headroom is restricted, jet grouting methods would be used to improve 
the strength of the weak fill and beach materials. With the jet grouting technique, injection tubes are 
installed through the fill and beach materials to the desired depth, and then a system of high pressure 
water, air, and grout jets are employed to mix the material in place with the grout. The injection tubes 
are rotated and withdrawn to form columns of "soilcrete" of up to 1.5 m diameter. A portion of the 
insitu material is removed through the centre of the injection tube. The diameter of the injection tube 
is small in comparison to the diameter of the soilcrete column formed. The soilcrete columns would 
be constructed over approximately 50% of the ground area beneath the overbridge, over a depth of 
approximately 5 m centred at mid-depth of the liquefiable soil layer. The soilcrete columns are 
constructed so that adjacent columns are in contact with each other, forming the system of celled walls 
[BCHF 1994b]. 
Alternative Ground-Improvement Methods 
In addition to the stone column (vibro-replacement) and jet grouting systems recommended above, 
additional ground improvement techniques were investigated. Compared to the preferred methods, 
these alternative techniques were generally found to be more costly for application on the Thomdon 
bridge. 
Two of the alternative ground improvement techniques, displacement piling and compaction grouting, 
are similar to the stone column method in that their effectiveness lies in densifying ground material to 
prevent liquefaction and loss of strength. Like the stone column technique the methods involve 
treatment of the ground at discrete points on a (typically triangular) grid. The spacing of the grid is 
designed so that the area in between the treatment points is densified. The two alternative ground 
densification methods are described below [BCHF 1994b]: 
Displacement Piling 
Solid piles are driven through the sandy deposit to the desired depth, displacing and 
compacting the loose soils around the piles. This action reduces the void spaces in 
the loose deposit, and therefore increases the insitu density. Several options are 
possible for the type of displacement pile, with timber piles, steel tube piles, and 
precast concrete piles available. 
Compaction Grouting 
Grout pipes are installed to the desired depth, and then a stiff low-slump grout mortar 
is injected under high pressure. This grout displaces and compresses the surrounding 
material, increasing its density as described above for the displacement piling. 
Ground heave needs to be carefully controlled so that the grout compacts the soil 
instead of displacing it vertically. 
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Two additional ground improvement methods were investigated which, similar to the jet grouting 
technique, rely on ground containment rather than ground densification. 
The objective common to these techniques is to form a system of structural cells which contain the 
liquefied soil and prevent large scale lateral ground spreading. The cells can be arranged on a square 
grid, with the spacing of the grid designed so that the walls are capable of withstanding the lateral 
forces from the liquefied mass, and so that they provide sufficient shear resistance to earthquake 
shaking. The two methods are described below [BCHF 1994b]: 
Contiguous Concrete Piles 
Bored reinforced concrete piles are constructed in the sandy fill to the desired depth. 
It is likely that the bored boles will have to be cased before placement of the 
concrete, unless continuous flight auger equipment is used which pumps the concrete 
from the base of the auger as the auger is withdrawn. The piles are constructed so 
as to be touching, forming the system of celled walls. 
Diaphragm Walls 
Diaphragm walls are constructed with heavy hydraulic grabs to the desired depth, 
with a bentonite slurry mixture keeping the excavations open before the concrete is 
pumped in place. The system of interlocking strong walls can be constructed to a 
similar design as with the concrete bored piles or soilcrete columns. 
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CHAYf~R S 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
The review of seismic evaluation and retrofit methods and examples, presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 
4, leads to several conclusions: 
A Past earthquakes have clearly demonstrated the seismic vulnerabilities of existing bridges-
particularly for bridges designed before the early 1970s. The most serious seismic problems 
include the unseating of bridge spans, and the non-ductile failure of columns, beam-column 
joints, and column-foundationjoints. Although these deficiencies are typically more severe for 
California bridges, New Zealand bridges also have these seismic deficiencies. 
B Improvement of bridge structural analysis methods is needed. Elastic analyses give an 
inadequate picture of the true seismic response. Incremental plastic mechanism or "push-over" 
analyses are recommended. These plastic-analysis methods have been more commonly used in 
New Zealand than they have in California or elsewhere. Methods of modelling movement joints 
need to be improved. 
C Analysis assumptions such as initial stiffness which are used to correlate elastic analyses with 
expected inelastic behaviour (eg, the equal displacement assumption) seem to need verification. 
Displacement-based design procedures are a promising alternative to the ductility-factor approach 
now used. 
D Step-by-step seismic evaluation procedures are useful to bridge engineers. The development of 
a bridge evaluation handbook, similar in fonnat to the NEHRP Handbook for buildings [BSSC 
1991), and improved and updated from the ATC 6-2 document, would be valuable. 
E Several seismic retrofit techniques are now well established in California and elsewhere. Grouted 
elliptical and circular steel jacketing of columns is an effective retrofit solution for columns with 
inadequate lap splices, shear capacity, bar-buckling restraint, or concrete confinement. 
Effective details for restrainers and seat extenders at bridge movement joints have been 
developed and are widely used in California. However, methods for analytically modelling the 
movement joints and restrainers need improvement. 
F Experimental testing of new retrofit designs is important. Some retrofit measures, designed 
based on engineering judgement, were subsequently shown by testing to be ineffective. 
Additional research may be needed in the following areas: 
• Partial-confinement jacketing of columns with lap-splices is now common in California, but 
further experimental and analytical research should be done to validate this retrofit concept 
for rectangular columns and shear-deficient columns, and to improve hysteretic response. 
• The evaluation of movement-joint behaviour in bridge superstructures is problematic. 
Experimental studies of the force-displacement capacities of typical movement-joint details, 
and studies of earthquake demands on movement joints would be useful. 
• Seismically deficient beam-column joints and column-foundation joints are difficult to 
effectively retrofit. Additional development and experimental testing of potential retrofit 
methods, such as added external prestressing, are needed. 
• Strengthening foundations and abutments to resist greater seismic forces has been common 
in California. These seismic strengthening measures are expensive, and paradoxically, little 
earthquake damage has been observed in bridge foundations. Further study of bridge 
abutment and foundation behaviour is warranted, including studies of foundation rocking 
response. 
G A novel scheme of retrofitting the superstructure linkages at the numerous movement joints of 
the Thorndon bridge has been developed. The retrofit uses high-strength, slack linkage bolts 
and a capacity-design philosophy to ensure that earthquake displacement demands can be 
distributed to several movement joints, rather than being concentrated at one location and 
possibly causing span unseating. The retrofit design eliminates the need for complex modelling 
of the structure or precise estimation of earthquake demands at movement joints, procedures 
which would be of questionable accuracy. 
H The proposed column and foundation retrofit measures for the Thorndon bridge illustrate the 
application of recent bridge seismic retrofit research and the capacity-design approach to seismic 
evaluation and retrofitting. The design of the retrofit measures emphasizes the development of 
desirable inelastic seismic response mechanisms, with less emphasis on computer modelling of 
the structure. This approach will make the structure less sensitive to the large uncertainties 
inherent in predicting earthquake force and displacement demands. 
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Part II 
STUDIES OF A 1936-DESIGNED 
NEW ZEALAND BRIDGE 

CHAPfER 6 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF COLUMN/CROSSBEAM TESTS 
This chapter describes the structural features of the subject bridge on reviews previous seismic 
investigations and laboratory testing. The previous studies include an initial seismic assessment by 
Works Consultancy [Chapman 1991), testing of the column/crossbeam portion of the bridge by 
Rodriguez and Park [Park et al 1993), and testing of two retrofit measures for the column/crossbeam 
specimen by Dekker and Park [1992). 
Although this chapter only covers work done by others, the discussions of the work presented here are 
influenced somewhat by the subsequent findings of the present author. The testing of the 
column/foundation-beam specimen and the inelastic analysis of the bridge offer some new insights into 
the results of the previous studies. 
6.1 Description of the Briru:e Structure 
The subject bridge is typical of many of the long, multi-span bridges in New Zealand which were built 
to cross the country's wide shallow rivers and flood plains. The overall length of the bridge is 1100 
m (3600 ft) consisting of ninety 12.2 m (40.0 ft) spans. The bridge has a reinforced concrete T-beam 
superstructure supported on four-column bents. The four columns are in tum supported on a 
foundation beam with five octagonal reinforced concrete piles. The piles extend 8.2 m (27 ft) below 
the bottom of the foundation beams. Figure 6.1 shows a partial elevation of the bridge, and Figure 
6.2 shows a typical bridge cross-section. 
Figure 6.3 shows the reinforcing details of the four-column bents. Plain-round (undeformed) 
reinforcing bars were used throughout the structure. Deformed reinforcing was not commonly used 
in New Zealand concrete construction until the middle 1960s. 
Structural Integrity 
At the time the bridge was designed, structural integrity was emphasized as an important seismic design 
consideration. A New Zealand Public Works Department design instruction from 1933 required that 
"wherever possible the structure should be made monolithic, and where this is not possible the structure 
shall be well tied together.• This sound design philosophy was a result of the magnitude 7 .8 Napier 
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Cross-section of the prototype bridge (Chapman 1991). 
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Although long structures need movement joints, the design of the subje.ct bridge incorporates the 
movement joints without sacrificing the monolithic integrity of the structure. The bridge contains 17 
movement joints, one at every fifth span. At each movement joint, double columns are used so that 
separate columns support the spans on each side of the joint as shown in Figure 6.1. The double 
columns share a common pile foundation. Additional control joints are placed between every span, 
down the center of the transverse crossbeam (bent-beam) as shown in Figure 6.3, Se.ction D-D. The 
girder top reinforcing is not continuous through this joint, so that despite the continuous appearance 
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Reinforcement details or bridge column investigated [Park et al 1993]. 
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Column Details 
As shown in Figure 6.3, the columns of the typical bent are each 457 mm wide by 406 mm deep (18 
by 16 inches). The longitudinal reinforcement in each column consists of four 28.6 mm (1¼ inch) 
diameter bars. Transverse reinforcement steel consists of9.5 mm (¾-inch) diameter rectangular hoops 
at a 152 mm (6-inch) spacing. Four 19.0 mm (¾-inch) diameter diagonal bars are used at the flared 
bottom end of the column, at a slope of 2 vertical to 1 borirontal. The top end of each column is 
flared both longitudinally and transversely, and eight 19.0 mm (¾-inch) diagonal bars-two pairs of 
bars in each direction-are used at a slope of 1 to 1. The column longitudinal bars have 180- degree 
end books at the bottom and a straight anchorage length at the top. The diagonal bars and transverse 
hoops all have 180-degree books at both ends [NZPW 1936). 
Initial Seismic ~ent 
As a pilot study on the seismic assessment of bridges, Works Consultancy Services conducted seismic 
evaluations of five structures selected to be representative of common New Zealand bridge types 
[Chapman 1991). One of these five bridges was the subject structure. The pilot study indicated that 
the bridge columns were likely to be the weakest link in the seismic resistance of the structure. The 
crossbeam and foundation beam which the columns frame into each have greater moment capacity than 
the column section itself. Thus a weak-column strong-beam plastic mechanism is expected to develop 
under lateral seismic forces in the plane of the bent (ie, forces transverse with respect to the bridge 
axis). Although this is an undesirable mechanism in multi-storey buildings, it is an acceptable 
mechanism for single-level structures such as bridges. In fact, the weak-column strong-beam plastic 
mechanism may be preferable for bridges because damage to columns is easier to inspect and repair 
than damage to bent-beams or foundation beams. The critical areas of the subject structure, then, are 
the potential plastic-binge regions at the top and bottom of each column. 
For the subject bridge, the pile foundations are typically well contained by the surface soil, thus the 
foundation was judged not to be a critical link in the seismic capacity of the bridge. This may not be 
the case for other New Zealand bridges of similar construction which have foundation piles in river 
beds subject to erosion and scour. 
Transverse-direction Earthquake 
The brief seismic assessment of the bridge from the pilot study came to the following conclusions 
[Chapman 1991). For transverse seismic forces: 
(1) "assuming the probable, rather than the specified minimum yield strength of the reinforcing 
steel, the pier columns would yield at a seismic loading of 0.3 g, provided that the piles do 
not yield first and that the column reinforcement anchorages do not fail (see below). 
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[2] with the above structure yield strength, an available structure displacement ductility of four 
is necessary to meet current design requirements for the most important bridges in the most 
active seismic areas. 
[3] the pier-<:<>lumns are unlikely to tolerate cyclic displacements much exceeding yield because: 
[a] the rectangular hoops are widely spaced so that the column core concrete is poorly 
confined and the main reinforcement would be poorly restrain~ against buckling, 
[b] the capacity of the upper part of the column to resist shear forces necessary to 
develop a plastic mechanism is marginal, and, 
[c] the top anchorage length of the plain round column bars into the cross beam is 
approximately 50% of the current design code requirements, suggesting that bar 
anchorage failure would be likely. 
[4] the piles are strong enough to resist the shear forces from the column hinging, but would 
themselves hinge first in flexure if they are standing as columns with a free height of more 
than approximately 1.5 to 2 metres (such as in a river bed)." 
The subsequent experimental and analytical studies of the bridge at the University of Canterbury have 
provided additional information on the above conclusions. The details of the further studies are 
presented later in this report, but a preview of the results directly relating to the above pilot-study 
conclusions is as follows: 
• For conclusion 3(c): Bar-anchorage failure does indeed control the moment capacity 
at the top of the column. Test results [Dekker and Park 1992) indicate that the 
moment capacity is diminished by 24 % compared with an anchorage-retrofit 
specimen. 
• For conclusion 1: the test results and calculations by the present author indicate a 
lateral strength of 0.45 times the seismic weight. The calculations consider (a) the 
contribution of the diagonal bars and axial load to flexural strength, (b) the shorter 
clear span between column plastic hinges related to the end flares and diagonal bars, 
(c) the 24% strength reduction at the top bar anchorages, and (d) probable material 
strengths and seismic weights. 
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• For conclusion 3(b): Calculations based on the New Zealand concrete code (SANZ 
1982] indicate inadequate shear strength at the plastic hinges (90 kN capacity to 102 
kN demand) if the diagonal bars are ignored. However, the diagonal bars increase 
the shear capacity significantly. Also, the code assumption that the concrete 
mechanism carries no shear (Ve = 0) is a conservative one. 
• For conclusion 3(a): The transverse ties meet current code requirements for bar-
buckling restraint, and bar buckling did not occur in the tests even at very high 
ductility. The confinement of concrete was also shown by the tests to be adequate. 
The conservative confinement requirements of the former New Zealand concrete code 
[SANZ 1982] have recently been relaxed for columns with low axial load levels 
[SANZ 1995]. 
Longitudinal-direction Earthquake 
For seismic forces in longitudinal direction, the pilot study [Chapman 1991) concluded that: 
"the bridge is likely to be supported by the abutment approach fills and by interaction 
between sections of its length. Longitudinal behaviour is unlikely to be critical on 
firm ground as each span is monolithic with its supporting piers. On soft or sandy 
silts where soil liquefaction could occur pier/pile damage could result from individual 
longitudinal movements of the piles relative to the superstructure." 
i.l Tests of Original Colwnn/Cro~beam Specimen 
The initial assessment identified the critical areas of the subject bridge to be the top and bottom end 
regions of the columns. The amount of transverse column reinforcing was well below that required 
by the 1982 New Zealand concrete code [SANZ 1982], and the top bar-anchorage detail was suspect. 
Experimental testing of specimens representing the column-hinge regions of the bridge was carried out 
at the University of Canterbury to determine the severity of the presumed seismic deficiencies and the 
likely effectiveness of possible retrofit measures. 
Test Specimen 
A full-scale specimen representing the top half of the column and a portion of the crossbeam and deck 
slab was constructed following the original structural drawings for the bridge. The specimen was 
tested upside-down with the crossbeam bolted to the laboratory floor. Figure 6.4 shows the 
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The rectangular column section is 457 mm by 406 mm (18.0 by 16.0 inches) and is reinforced by four 
plain (undeformed) longitudinal bars 28 mm in diameter. The concrete was placed with the fonnwork 
in the upright position (with the crossbe.am on top) as it would have been in the construction of the 
actual bridge. The specimen was cast with one batch of concrete. Before testing, the specimen was 
inverted. 
Materials 
The compressive strength of the concrete for the specimen, obtained by testing 200 mm high x 100 mm 
diameter (7.9 x 3.9 inch) cylinders at 28 days, was t: = 19 MPa (2800 psi). The measured yield 
strengths of the plain-round steel reinforcement were ~ = 308 MPa (44,700 psi) for the R28 (I. IO 
inch diameter) longitudinal reinforcement and f)'b = 350 MPa (50,800 psi) for the RIO (0.39 inch 
diameter) hoops. 
The longitudinal and transverse column reinforcement was from Grade 275 steel,.as was the crossbe.am 
and slab reinforcement. The prototype bridge would have been constructed using steel with a specified 
yield strength of240 MPa (34,800 psi). However, Chapman (1991] reports that site sampling in New 
Zealand has shown that in structures built during the period 1930 to 1970, 95 % of the samples of steel 
reinforcement possessed a yield strength which was at least 15 to 20% greater than the specified value. 
That is, the 5 percentile value was 276 to 288 MPa (40,000 to 41,800 psi). 
Test Set-up and Procedure 
Figure 6.5 shows the test set-up for the column/crossbe.am specimen. A 100-tonne hydraulic jack was 
used to apply the cyclic, static lateral loading at the top of the specimen. The axial compressive load 
was applied to the column by steel rods on each side of the specimen, tensioned by hydraulic jacks. 
The axial load ratio was maintained at Pl(~, = 0.085 throughout the testing. Linear potentiometers 
were used for measuring the lateral displacements of the top of the unit and the longitudinal 
deformations in the potential plastic hinge region of the column. Electrical-resistance strain gauges 
were attached to the column longitudinal reinforcement and to the hoops in the expected plastic-hinge 
region. 
As shown in Figure 6.6, the experimental yield displacement, ~. was calculated by extrapolating a 
straight line from the origin of the measured lateral-load versus lateral-displacement curve through the 
point on the curve at 0. 75 Vi, up to Vi, where Vi is the theoretical ultimate lateral capacity. Vi was 
calculated from the column flexural strength using the code approach of a rectangular compressive 
stress block, an ultimate concrete stain of 0.003, the measured values of the concrete compressive 
strength and steel yield strength, and assuming a strength reduction factor q, = 1. 
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Having defined ~. the subsequent cycles of loading were displacement-controlled to increasing levels 
of displacement ductility ratio, µ = l:l./~. 
The specimens were tested with (typically) two cycles of lateral load at each ductility level up to a 
displacement ductility, µ, of 7. Figure 6.7(a) shows the measured lateral-load versus lateral-
displacement hysteresis loops for the specimens. The dashed lines in the figure indicate the theoretical 
ultimate lateral load V1 including the reduction due to the P - l:l. effect. 
Test Results 
The first flexural cracks in the unit commenced at about 50% of the theoretical ultimate lateral load. 
Starting from low levels of ductility, one main flexural crack developed at the critical section of the 
column. Atµ = 6 this crack opened to a width of about 10 mm. As the testing progressed, the 
measured lateral load versus lateral displacement hysteresis hoops became pinched and there was a 
significant loss of stiffness in the column. 
The maximum measured lateral load was about 70% of the theoretical lateral capacity, V1, calculated 
assuming adequate anchorage of longitudinal reinforcement. The flexural strength was calculated at 
the critical section of the column and included the contributions from both the longitudinal column bars 
and the inclined column bars at that section. The test confinned the poor anchorage of the straight, 
undeformed longitudinal column bars. The poor anchorage led to reduced lateral capacity and to an 
increasingly flexible structure as the test progressed. 
The test was terminated after the load cycle to a displacement ductility, µ = ± 1. At this level of 
lateral load there was some concrete crushing and the longitudinal and transverse reinforcement were 
exposed in one comer of the column. The critical section in the column, where the major crack 
formed, was about where the diagonal bars crossed the longitudinal bars in the column. 
The strain measurements confirm that, as the test progressed, the anchorage of the longitudinal bars 
deteriorated, resulting in slip of the bars. The longitudinal concrete strain at the critical region of the 
column, measured by the linear potentiometers attached to the column, is much higher than the strain 
measured on the longitudinal bars in that region by strain gauges. The difference in measured strains 
indicates that significant slip of the plain round bars occurred from the onset of inelastic behaviour of 
the subassemblage. The pinching of the lateral-load versus lateral-displacement hysteresis loops shown 
in Figure 6. 7(a) also reflects the bond deterioration of the plain-round reinforcing bars. 
The strain gauges on the column hoops recorded strains below yield. Hence the concrete mechanisms 
of transferring shear were making a significant contribution to the shear strength of the column [Park 
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6.4 Tests of an Anchorage-Retrofit Specimen 
The first repair and upgrade of the original specimen was designed to improve the anchorage of the 
column longitudinal bars. This was achieved by breaking into the deck-slab concrete, welding steel 
plates onto the exposed ends of the column longitudinal bars, and reinstating the removed concrete. 
Anchorage Test Block 
First a trial of the procedure was conducted by casting a concrete block with a 28 mm (1.10 in) 
diameter plain round Grade 275 bar in it, as shown in Figure 6.8. When the concrete had gained 
strength a hole was chipped in the end of the block to expose the end of the bar, so that a steel plate 
with a centrally drilled hole could be fitted over the bar and welded in place from above. The 
remaining cavity was then filled with a cement-based mortar. The 28-day compressive strength of the 
concrete was 24 MPa (3500 psi); the 28-day strength of the mortar was 30 MPa (4400 psi). 
The protruding end of the bar at the other end of the block was loaded in tension in a testing machine, 
with the block held to provide the reactive load. The test revealed that the steel plate provided 
sufficient anchorage to allow the bar to develop its yield strength in tension. The anchorage block was 
then tested with the reinforcing bar in compression. At a force of 64 percent of the steel yield strength 
the specimen failed with a cracking around the concrete-mortar interface. 
Figure 6.8 
15mm fillet weld 
Mortar 
85x85x 12mm steel plate 
I"' 250mm .. I 
------·--
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plain round bar 
0 
SECTION A-A 
1mm = 0,0394in 
Test specimen for anchorage-retrofit detail using a steel end plate 
[Park et al 1993]. 
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Retrofit Procedure 
The procedure was then used to retrofit the anchorage of the longitudinal bars in the column/crossbeam 
specimen. After chipping out the deck concrete to expose the ends of the longitudinal bars, it was 
discovered that the deck reinforcement running in both directions directly adjacent to the column bars 
prevented the square steel plates from sliding over the column bars far enough for adequate welding. 
To get around this problem, the plates were trimmed to fit past the slab bars, and were welded to the 
slab bars as well as to the end of the longitudinal columns bars. In practice, construction adjustments 
of this type resulting from "on-site discoveries" are common in the seismic retrofitting of structures. 
The excavated concrete around the ends of the bars was replaced with cement mortar as for the test 
block, shown in Figure 6.8. 
The repair of the specimen was completed by injecting epoxy resin into the flexural cracks of the 
specimen which had formed in the previous lateral load test. 
Test Results 
The anchorage-retrofitted specimen was then tested under the same set-up and loading as were 
previously used for the original specimen. For this test, it was again found that cracking tended to 
concentrate in one or two large cracks. Figure 6.7(b) shows the measured lateral-load versus lateral-
displacement hysteresis loops. The test demonstrated that the addition of the end-plate anchorages 
permitted the column to reach its full theoretical flexural strength, although the lateral-load versus 
lateral-displacement hysteresis loops again showed a marked pinching and loss of stiffness at low 
lateral-load levels. It was evident that significant elongation of the column bars was occurring over 
their unbonded length, between the critical section for flexure in the column and the anchor plates at 
the bar ends. Hence the degradation of bond strength that had occurred along the column bars during 
the first test had not been restored by the epoxy-resin injection. Some crushing of column concrete 
was observed at the end of the test, particularly at the column corners in the plastic hinge region [Park 
et al 1993). 
6.S Tests of a Confinement-Retrofit Specimen 
The second repair and retrofit of the column/crossbeam specimen involved chipping off the cover 
concrete of the column in the vicinity of the plastic hinge region and placing additional transverse 
hoops. The three new hoops, shown as A2, B2, and C2 in Figure 6.9, were each placed as two C 
shaped halves, lapped, and fillet welded in place. The removed cover concrete was then reinstated. 
The installation of the new hoops reduced the hoop spacing from 152 mm in the original specimen to 
76 mm in the confinement-retrofit specimen. 
The confinement-retrofit specimen was then tested under the same set-up and loading as were used 
previously. It was found that the lateral-load versus lateral-displacement behaviour of the sub-
assemblage was again dominated by the earlier bond failure along the end regions of the longitudinal 
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column bars (Figure 6.7(c)). The column deformations resulted mainly from the elongation of the 
unhanded lengths of longitudinal bar between the critical section in the column and the anchor plates. 
Hence large plastic hinge rotations were not required to occur in the column. The unit achieved its 
theoretical ultimate strength only at large lateral displacements, because of its very flexible behaviour 
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Confinement-retrofit specimen with new hoops added at A2, B2 and C2 
[Dekker and Park 1992). 
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CHAPTER 7 
COLUMN TO FOUNDATION-BEAM TEST AND OBSERVATIONS 
After the testing of the as-built and retrofitted column-top plastic-hinge detail, by Rodriguez, Dekker 
and Park, described in Chapter 6, the present author undertook the testing of the second critical area 
of the bridge, the column-bottom plastic-hinge region. This chapter describes the column to 
foundation-beam testing and observations. Originally it was planned to test a confinement-type retrofit 
of the column/foundation-beam specimen, but the seismic evaluation and initial testing results showed 
clearly that such a retrofit would have little effect on the seismic response of the structure. 
z.1 Test Specimen and Materials 
A full-scale specimen representing the bottom half of the column and a portion of the foundation beam 
was constructed following the original structural drawings of the bridge. Figure 7 .1 shows the column 
to foundation-beam test specimen and reinforcing details. 
Reinforcement Details 
As with the previous test specimen the rectangular column section is 457 mm by 406 mm (18.0 by 
16.0 inches). It is reinforced with four plain-round longitudinal bars 28 mm in diameter, approximating 
the l ¼-inch (28.6 mm) bars of the actual bridge. The bars are anchored into the foundation beam with 
a 915 mm embedment length and 180-degree end hooks, as shown in Figures 7.1 (test specimen) and 
6.3 (the actual bridge). Diagonal bars 20 mm in diameter approximate the ¾-inch (19.1 mm) diameter 
diagonal bars of the prototype, and 10 mm hoops are used to represent the 3/a-inch (9.53 mm) diameter 
hoops of the prototype. The diagonal bars and hoops both have 180 degree hooks at the ends of the 
bars. The hook diameters and extensions are representative of the standard used at the time of the 
bridge's design (NZBRC 1931] and check against the overall bar lengths given in the reinforcement 
schedule of the original drawings. 
At the top of the specimen, the column longitudinal bars are welded to a 10 mm-thick steel plate. 
Similarly, at each end of the foundation beam the beam longitudinal bars are welded a 10 mm-thick 
end plate. The reinforcing cage for the column to foundation-beam specimen is shown in Figure 
7 .2(a). All of the reinforcing is undefonned. 
Concrete Placement and Strengtm 
The specimen was held upright for the placement of the concrete. The concrete was placed in two 
batches as would have been done for the construction of the actual bridge. The first batch of concrete 
was used to place the foundation beam. The specified slump of the concrete was 100 mm, however 
the actual slump of the concrete when delivered to the laboratory was 180 mm. It was decided to 
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Figure 7.1 Colwnn to foundation-be.am test specimen and reinforcing details. 
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accept the concrete despite its non-conformance to the slump specification, because (a) the expected 
critical plastic hinge region did not extend into the foundation beam, (b) it was judged that the concrete 
would still come up to near its specified strength, and (c) material specifications and quality control 
in 1937 were probably not strict, particularly for foundation concrete, so that it could well be that some 
of the actual bridge foundations were cast with higher-slump concrete mixes. 
Construction Joint 
The column to foundation-beam specimen is designed to have a construction joint level with the top 
surface of the foundation beams, between the two pours of concrete. One day after the concrete 
placement it was intended to roughen the construction joint surface by wire-brushing away the still-
pliant mortar paste and exposing a rough surface of course aggregate to an amplitude of 6 mm (¼-
inch). This was not possible, however, because the high-slump mix allowed segregation of the 
concrete, and the top few centimetres of the foundation beam contained little course aggregate. To 
create a sound construction joint, the concrete at the column location was chipped down 70 mm (3 
inches) below the top surface of the foundation beam, where a rough surface of projecting course 
aggregate could be exposed. The surface was air-blasted clean prior to the placement of the column 
concrete. The original structural drawings for the bridge give no details regarding construction joints. 
In practice the joints may have been prepared with a roughened surface or may have been formed with 
keys. 
Concrete Strength 
The column concrete was placed, from one batch in two lifts, eight days after the placement of the 
foundation concrete. The slump was 110 mm. Both batches of concrete were specified to have a 20 
mm top-size aggregate and 19 MPa compressive strength at 28 days. Table 7.1 shows the results of 
the compressive strength tests, taken from 200 mm high by 100 mm diameter (7.9 by 3.9 inch) 
uncapped cylinders. The foundation concrete had a 28-day strength of 19.3 MPa (2800 psi) and a 
strength of 20.1 MPa (2920 psi) at the time of the column to foundation-beam test. The column 
concrete had a 28-day strength of 20.0 MPa (2900 psi) and a strength at test of 23.6 MPa (3430 psi). 
For the structural calculations, a strength of 23.6 MPa was typically used for the test specimen, and 
20 MPa was assumed for the actual bridge. 
Steel S~t~ 
Grade 275 (40,000 psi) reinforcing steel was used in the test specimen. Tension tests on sample 
lengths of the reinforcing steel showed that actual yield strengths are 15 to 23 % greater than the 275 
MPa specified minimum. Figure 7 .3 shows the stress-strain behaviour of one of the test samples. All 
of the test samples showed a well-defined yield point and yield plateau as shown in Figure 7.3. It is 
interesting to note that the plain-round reinforcing exhibits an upper yield point approximately 10 MPa 
above the lower yield point and yield plateau. Deformed reinforcing typically does not show such a 








Test of the column to foundation-beam specimen: (a) Reinforcing steel cage, (b) 
Test set-up, (c) Damage to the plastic hinge region atµ= 6, (d) Top plate where 
three of the longitudinal bar end welds failed; testing the capacity of the fourth 
weld, (e) Displacement of the new top plate due to bond slip, (f) Anchorage 
splitting failure at the bottom ends of the longitudinal bars. 
concentrations at the deformations cause a slight premature yielding and a rounding of the stress-strain 
curve for deformed reinforcing. 
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Age at Test Compressive Average 
(days) Strength Results Strength 
(MPa) (MPa) 
1.2 1.8 1.8 
7 12.0, 12.6, 10.2 11.6 
29 17.8, 21.0, 19.0 19.3 
105 19.9, 20.2, 20.1 20.1 
(at test) 
7 13.0, 14.8, 14.0 14.3 
28 20.4, 19.9, 19.7 20.0 
97 23.2, 23.3, 24.3 23.6 
(at test) 
Datum from measuring / 
between gage points 
Data from extensometer 
--.•---- R28, Specimen 2 
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Tensile Strain 
Figure 7.3 Typical stress versus strain behaviour of the reinforcing steel used in the colwnn 
to foundation-beam specimen. 
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Table 7 .2 shows the results of the reinforcing steel testing. In the structural calculations 337 MPa 
(48,900 psi), the average for the R28 specimens, is used as the steel yield strength for the test 
specimen. For the actual bridge, the specified yield strengths-would have been 240 MPa (34,800 psi). 
However, accounting for typical overstrengths [Chapman 1991), a strength of 280 MPa (40,600 psi) 
is used for the prototype bridge in the structural calculations. 
Table 7.2 Reinforcing Steel Strengths 
Bar Yield A.-erage Ultimate AYerage Elongated leogtm Anrage 
Sue Strength Yield Strength Ultimate between 60 mm gauge Percent 
Results (MPa) Results (MPa) points Elongation•• 
(MPa) (MPa) (mm) 
R28 431 337 519 519 73-76-85•-74-74 24 
331 519 72-74-88•-76-76-74 
349 519 74-90•-74-75-77-74 
R24 314 319 485 485 74-74-86•-76-74 23 
330 487 76-77-88•-74-72 
312 480 72-76-87•-79-73 
R20 334 338 495 495 70-72-84•-73-73-72 21 
341 495 72-85•-74-74-72 
339 495 71-73-85•-72-73-73 
Rl2 319 317 432 434 68~8-79•-70-69 14 
312 434 68-78•-71~7~8 
319 437 66~9-71-78•~8 
RIO 335 336 463 466 68-81 •-70-69 IS 
341 472 70-67-76•~7~9 
333 463 78•-72-70-68~8 
* Indicates gauge segment where necking and fracture occurred. 
** Average percent elongation is the average for all those gauge segments except those where 
necking and fracture occurred. 
Strength of Test Specimen versm Prototype 
The strength of the test-specimen column differs from the strength of the prototype column. This is 
due to: 
(a) the difference in steel yeild strengths as indicated above, 
(b) the slight difference in reinforcing bar areas, eg, a 28.0 mm diameter bar is 'used to model 
the prototype's I 1/8 inch (28.6 mm) diameter bar, and 
(c) the slight difference in concrete strength. 
These differences result in the moment strength of the test column being 16 % greater than that of the 
prototype. The differences in moment strength as well as shear strength have been taken into account 
in the calculations and the results in this and the subsequent chapters. 
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Test Set-up and Instrumentation 
As shown in Figure 7.4, the test set-up for the column to foundation-beam specimen was similar to 
that for the column to crossbeam specimen. Cyclic, static lateral loading was applied to the top of the 
specimen, the load point corresponding to the mid-column-height inflection point in the actual structure. 
The lateral load was applied by a hydraulic jack reacting against a steel frame, and was monitored by 
a full-bridge load cell on an 8-volt DC power supply. The lateral displacement of the column was 
recorded by two linear potentiometers, one at the level of the lateral load and one at a level 500 mm 
below. 
Axial Load 
An axial compressive load of 300 kN (67,000 lb) was applied to the column at its centerline, by a 
crosshead and roller assembly over the top of the specimen. The crosshead was pulled down by two 
steel rods, one on each side of the specimen, tensioned with hydraulic jacks. The tensioned rods were 
connected to a 40 mm steel plate which passed underneath the specimen and was bolted to the 
laboratory reaction strong floor. Hydraulic lines connected the two axial-load jacks in parallel to a 
single hand pump, so that the loads on the jacks were equal. The applied axial load of 300 kN was 
monitored by calibrating the pressure gauge on the hand pump. 
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Test set-up for column/foundation-heam specimen. 
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Base Reaction 
Hydraulic jacks were also placed between the base of the specimen and reaction blocks at each end to 
prevent the potential sliding of the specimen. The pressure gauge for each of these jacks was 
calibrated so that any change in the horiwntal reaction force, indicating sliding at the base of the 
specimen, could be observed. Before testing, a compressive load of 200 kN was applied to each jack 
to lock the base of the specimen in place. A horiwntal dial gauge was set up to record any sliding 
movement. 
Four 38 mm (l 1/2-inch) diameter boll'> held each end of the foundation beam down to the reaction floor. 
This tie-down reaction was located at points on the foundation beam corresponding to the likely 
inflection points of the actual bridge foundation beam under lateral forces-ie at points half-way 
between adjacent bridge columns. For compressive base reactions, a 50 mm (2-inch) thick layer of 
cement mortar was placed underneath the entire specimen. A vertical dial gauge was installed to check 
if there was any uplift displacement of the specimen at the hold-down bolts during testing. The test 
specimen was painted white so that the development of cracks could be observed more clearly. 
lnstrwnentation 
The instrumentation of the column plastic hinge region ts shown in Figure 7.5. Six linear 
potentiometers were attached to each side of the column to measure the longitudinal deformations of 
the concrete. Eighty electrical-resistance strain gauges were attached to the reinforcing steel in the 
column plastic hinge region. Strain gauges were placed on each of the four longitudinal bars at five 
levels, on each of the four diagonal hars al three levels, and on both legs of four of the transverse 
hoops. At each strain gauge location, two gauges were used on opposite sides of the bar, so that bar-
bending strains could be accounted for. 
The load-cell, linear potentiometers, and strain gauges were all connected to a data- acquisition unit. 
Half-bridge circuits were used for the potentiometers and quarter-bridge circuits were used for each 
of the strain gauges. Excitation for the potentiometers and strain gauges was 4 volts DC. The data 
acquisition unit was controlled hy a micro-computer and the custom-designed PC Lah software. In 
addition to the digital data acquisition, an analog x-y plotter was used lo record lateral-load versus 
lateral-displacement, and a strain indicator was used to check the load cell output. Figure 7 .2(b) shows 
the test set-up just prior to testing. 
Interior versw, Exterior Column Effect 
The lest models one of the interior columns of the typical four-column hridge pier shown in Figures 
6.2 and 6.3. The details at the hase of the exterior column are somewhat different than those at the 
interior column as shown in Figure 6.3. The significance of the different detailing the exterior columns 
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Figure 7.5 Instrumentation of column plastic hinge region. 
7 .3 Test Procedure and Observations 
Figure 7 .6 shows the loading sequence for the column to foundation-beam specimen. Lateral loading 
and displacements to the east (ie, tension in the load cell) were defined as positive. The first two 
cycles in each direction were load-controlled to 0. 75 times the calculated ideal capacity of the 
specimen, V;, Following the method illustrated in Figure 6.6, the experimental yield displacement, 
A.,, was calculated as 1.33 times the deflection recorded at 0.75 V;, The yield displacement A., for the 
specimen was 16.0 mm (0.67 % structure drift). Because of an error in calibrating the load-cell, the 
first cycle was actually taken to a load of only 0.68 V;, However, the calibration error was detected 
by comparing the strain indicator readings to those of the data acquisition system, the load cell was re-
calibrated, and the readings from the first cycle were corrected. 
After the first four cycles of load, remaining cycles were displacement controlled. The specimen was 
displaced two cycles in each direction to the yield displacement, 16.0 mm, then two cycles in each 
direction toµ = 2 (.1 = 32.0 mm), then toµ = 3 (.1 = 48.0 mm), and so on up toµ = 1, with two 
cycles in each direction at each increment of ductility, µ. At each of the ductility levels µ = 8, 9, and 
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10, one cycle of displacement in each direction was applied. Although it is not shown in Figure 7.6, 
three additional cycles in each direction to the maximum displacement stroke of the hydraulic jack 
(approximately µ = 12) were applied before finishing the test. The cycles of testing to the larger 
ductilities were conducted because they could potentially provide further useful information about the 
structural behaviour. However, for the actual bridge such large ductility demands would not be 
expected. 
Specimen Cracking 
The first flexural cracking of the specimen in each direction was observed during the first cycles at a 
lateral load of approximately 30 kN, 23 % of the flexural capacity of the section. Cracks in the 
specimen occurring under eastward displacement cycles were marked with a red pen; cracks occurring 
under westward displacement cycles were marked with a blue pen. The number of the data scan at 
the time of cracking was also marked on the specimen alongside each crack as shown in Figure 7.2(c). 
The first cracking of concrete due to compression occurred, on the eastern face of the column, at a 
ductility, µ of 2. Only minor cracking due to compression on the opposite, western face occurred 
during cycles to µ = -2 in the opposite direction. It was not until µ = -3 that a similar level of 
cracking due to compression occurred on the western column face. Likewise, spalling of the 
compression concrete occurred one ductility level sooner for the eastern column face than for the 
western column face. Spalling at the eastern face occurred at µ = 5; spalling at the western face 
occurred atµ = 6. Figure 7.2(c) shows the column plastic hinge region of the specimen atµ = 6. 
Throughout testing, the flexural cracks which developed in the specimen were spaced relatively far 
apart, as would be expected in concrete members with plain-round reinforcing bars. The spacing 
between adjacent cracks over the height of the column was typically 150 to 300 mm (6 to 12 inches). 
For each direction of loading, the first crack in the specimen occurred just at the top of the flared 
column base, 300 mm (12 inches) above the foundation beam. The column diagonal bars cross the 
longitudinal bars at approximately this location. Up to ductility,µ = 5, the horirontal crack in this 
location was the widest of the flexural cracks. Figure 7. 7 shows that the width of this crack was 6.0 
mm (0.24 inches) atµ = 3 and 10.5 mm (0.41 inches) atµ = 5. 
This crack and the two horirontal cracks 200 mm and 350 mm above it were where most of the crack 
opening and closing took place. Beyond ductility level 5, the upper two of the three cracks began 
opening wider, indicating that the plastic-hinge region was lengthening. As shown in Figure 7.2(c) 
diagonal shear cracking occurred in the upper part of the column but did not occur in the region where 
the diagonal bars are present. 
Axial Load and Horiwntal ReactioM 
During the testing, the force in the axial load jacks fluctuated as the column was displaced laterally. 
The tendency is for the axial load to increase with lateral displacement and as testing progresses, 
because the axial loading system restrains the lengthening of the column. For the actual bridge under 













A Flexural-tension cracks on west face first observed at V = 35 kN. 
B Remove and recalibrate load cell. 
C Flexural-tension cracks on east face first observed at V = -26 kN. 
D Cracking due to compression crushing on east face(µ = +2.0). 
E Minor cracking due to compression crushing on west face. 
F More extensive cracking due to compression crushing on west face (µ = -3.0). 
G Spalling on east face (µ = +5.0). 
H Fracture of top-plate weld for first east longitudinal bar. 
Fracture of top-plate weld for second east longitudinal bar. 
J Fracture of top-plate weld for one west longitudinal bar. 
K Test remaining top-plate weld and repair top plate. 
L Spalling on west face (µ = -6.0). 
M Anchorage splitting cracks occur at the base of the foundation beam. 
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Figure 7.7 Maximwn crack width measured during testing. 
this way. Therefore, during testing, the pressure in the axial load jacks was periodically adjusted so 
that the applied axial load would remain roughly constant at 300 kN. Typically the axial load was 
adjusted two or three data scans before the peak lateral displacement was reached. At the peak lateral 
displacement of each cycle, recordings of axial load varied from 283 kN to 326 kN. Between the peak 
lateral displacements in each direction the axial load tended to drop slightly. The minimum recorded 
axial load was 254 kN. 
Readings taken from the dial gauges and reaction rams at the base of the specimen indicate that there 
was no sliding of the specimen and that the foundation beam remained fixed at its hold-down locations 
throughout the test, as intended. Periodic readings of the excitation voltage to the load cell, 
displacement potentiometers, and strain gauges indicate that the voltage remained constant. 
Lateral Force-displacement Hysteretic Behaviour 
The lateral-load versus lateral-displacement hysteresis loops of the column to foundation beam test up 
to ductility 7 are shown in Figure 7. 8. The decreasing slope of the loops during the first four cycles 
in each direction (µ = 0. 75 and µ = 1.0) indicates some stiffness degradation of the specimen 
occurring prior to the yielding of the tension reinforcing steel. This yielding occurred at ductility µ 
= 2 in each direction, at which time the specimen reached its theoretical capacity, as shown by the 
hysteresis loops of Figure 7.8. Slight pinching of the hysteresis loops can be observed at µ = 1.0. 
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The pinching becomes pronounced by µ = 3. As is discussed later, the stiffness degradation and 
pinching of hysteresis loops indicates bond-slip of the flexural reinforcing. 
The theoretical lateral-force capacity of the specimen-calculated using (a) the (approximate) actual 
material strengths, fy = 337 MPa and f., = 22 MPa, (b) the contributions of the diagonal bars, and (c) 
an ultimate concrete strain of 0.005-was 135 kN (30.3 kips). The maximum capacity measured 
during testing was 138 kN in the eastward direction and 144 kN in the westward direction. Both 
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Lateral-load-versus-displacement hysteresis loops, to µ = 1, for the 
column/foundation-beam test. 
Failure and Subsequent Testing of the Longitudinal-Bar End Welds 
On the first cycle of displacement to ductility,µ = -5, nearing the peak displacement at a lateral load 
of 124 kN (27 .9 kips), two loud bangs were heard indicating that something had broken. At each of 
these loud noises the lateral-load capacity suddenly dropped by approximately 20 kN (4.5 kips) as 
shown at points A and Bin Figure 7.8. 
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Failure or Bar-End Welds 
Upon inspecting the specimen it was discovered that the welds had fractured at the connection of the 
two longitudinal bars on the east side of the column to the steel plate at the top of the specimen. As 
shown in Figure 7.9(a), the longitudinal bars slipped approximately 5 mm with respect to the top-plate 
as a result of the weld fracture. 
Testing was continued. On the next cycle in the other direction, toµ = +5, capacity was diminished 
13% compared with the previous cycle toµ= +5 (103 kN compared with 119 kN previously). But 
the welds of the two tension bars on the west side of the column did not fracture as had the welds on 
the east bars. The slightly diminished capacity in this direction atµ = +5 probably resulted from the 
loss of anchorage of the two compression bars, whose end welds had failed. 
The second cycle to ductilityµ = -5 showed a 30% drop in capacity (87 kN compared with 125 kN 
just before the weld fracture). This loss of capacity clearly resulted from the loss of end anchorage 
at the top of the column, of the two tension bars. The slip of these bars with respect to the top plate 
was again approximately 5 mm. 
On the first cycle toµ = +6, at a displacement corresponding toµ = +5.3, one of the westward 
longitudinal-bar end welds failed with a loud bang. At this failure, the lateral-load capacity 
immediately dropped 15 kN as shown at point C of Figure 3.17. Testing was continued and the peak 
displacement at µ = +6 was reached without failure occurring in the last remaining longitudinal-bar 
end weld. 
The failure of these end welds was not anticipated. The end welds are located 190 mm (7.5 inches) 
above the column inflection point and 1.9 m (6.2 ft) above the critical section of the column. It had 
been assumed that over this 1.9 m length, equal to 68 bar diameters, enough bond resistance would 
be present so that the tension force in the end welds would be small. This assumption was shown, by 
the fracture of the welds, to be incorrect. 
Testing of Bar-End Weld 
Because no instrumentation was in place to measure bar strains away from the plastic hinge region, 
the tension force present at the ends of the R28 bars, which caused the welds to fail, was not known. 
To gain this important piece of data, it was decided to test the capacity of the remaining intact weld. 
This was accomplished by setting up a hydraulic jack which pushed down on the end of the bar and 
reacted against the steel top-plate. 
The testing of the weld is shown in Figures 7 .2(d) and 7 .9(b). As shown in the latter figure, the top 
end of the R28 bar was countersunk so that a concentric point load could be applied to it through a ball 
bearing. The reaction to this load was carried into the steel top-plate through a small cross-head frame 
118 
Figure 7.9 
Fracture of weld 
10mm top plate 
Gap between top 
plate and concrete 
after weld fracture 
Concrete 
.___,.,._j_R28 Column longitudinal bar 
(a) Fracture of welds at NE. SE, NW longitudinal bars 
Test load, P 
Ball bearing and countersink 
for applying test load 




l--l-R28 Column longitudinal bar 
(b) Testing of weld at SW longitudinal bar 
25mm new 
top plate 
l-.-i-R 28 Column longitudinal bar 
(c J Replacement of top plate and welds 
Fracture, testing and repair of the longitudinal-bar end welds to the specimen 
top-plate. 
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around the hydraulic jack as shown in Figure 7.2(d). The cross-head frame was made up of 150 mm-
deep steel channel sections, and was welded to the top plate. The hydraulic jack and its pressure gauge 
were calibrated before the weld test. 
Estimate of Tension Force at Weld Failure 
The weld failed under a test load of 95 kN (22 kips). This equals 46 96 of the yield strength of the R28 
bar. How representative this test result is of the capacity of the three other welds which failed 
previously, during the testing of the column to foundation-beam specimen, must be considered. On 
the one hand, the capacity of the fourth weld should be somewhat greater than the capacity of the first 
three welds, because it did not fail under the column testing to µ, = 6. On the other hand, a small 
amount of grinding on top of the top-plate at the weld was necessary to locate the bar before testing 
the weld. This grinding may have slightly reduced the capacity of the weld. 
The capacity of the first three welds which failed can also be estimated based on the drop in lateral 
load at fracture during the column test. Assuming a moment arm between internal tension and 
compression forces that stays constant at 300 mm at the critical section, the lateral-load drop of 20 kN 
(for the first two bars) corresponds to a drop in bar tension of 110 kN at the critical section. The 
lateral-load drop of 15 kN for the third bar corresponds to a bar-tension drop of 85 kN. However, 
the drop in bar-tension at the critical section is not necessarily equal to the loss of capacity at the end 
weld, because the amount of bond-resistance along the 1. 9 m length between the critical section and 
the end weld may have changed due to the sudden increase in bar-slip upon the fracturing of the end 
welds. 
Considering the above factors and test data, it is estimated that the tension in the ends of the 
longitudinal bars, at a column displacement ductility of 5, was between 35 and 55 % of the yield force 
(72 kN to 114 kN). 
~ Continuation of Column-specimen Testing and Observations 
After testing the weld, the top-plate of the specimen was removed and replaced with a new 25 mm 
thick top-plate. The new top-plate was attached to the four longitudinal bars using countersunk plug 
welds as shown in Figure 7.9(c). Testing of the column to foundation-beam specimen was then 
continued. 
It was observed that slip of the bars at the top of the specimen was still occurring. Upon loading in 
each direction, the two longitudinal bars which were in compression pushed the new top-plate away 
from the specimen. At a ductility of 10, the slip at the compression bars caused a gap of as much as 
10 mm between the top-plate and the concrete as shown in Figure 7 .2(e). 
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Because the stiffness and strength degradation characteristics of the specimen seemed to result mainly 
from the poor bond characteristics of the plain-round reinforcing bars, it was judged that there would 
be little purpose in testing a confinement retrofit or jacketing of the column. Thus it was decided to 
test the original specimen to extreme ductility levels. Figure 7 .10 shows the lateral-load versus lateral-
displacement hysteresis loops through to the end of testing, approximately µ, = 12. 
Figure 7.10 Lateral-load-vers~-displacement hysteresis loops, to µ, - 12, for the 
colwnn/foundation-beam test. 
Splitting Failure at Bar Bottom Anchorage 
At a displacement ductility factor, µ, = 9, splitting cracks were observed in the bar-anchorage region 
of the foundation beam. At µ, = lO the foundation beam concrete was spalling as a result of the 
splitting failure at the bar anchorage. Figure 7 .2(f) shows, at the conclusion of testing, the splitting 
failure at the bottom end-hooks of the column longitudinal bars. The splitting failure occurred at both 
sides of the foundation beam. After the conclusion of testing the specimen was laid on its side, and 
it was observed that the longitudinal splitting cracks had propagated to the bottom surface of the beam. 
Upon removing the loose concrete, it was observed that the end hooks of the longitudinal bars had 
slipped approximately 4 mm, and the concrete above and below the hooks was pulverized because of 
anchorage bearing stresses. 
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Figure 7 .2(f) also shows the spalling of the column plastic-hinge zone at the conclusion of the test. 
Close inspection of the plastic hinge region showed a gap of approximately 1 mm between the 
longitudinal bars and the surrounding concrete. This gap probably caused by the dilation of the 
crushed concrete rather than to the diameter reduction of the reinforcing due to Poisson's effect. 
Measurement between the longitudinal-bar strain gauge locations, t>riginally 152 mm apart, showed 
almost no residual elongation in the reinforcing. This confirms that because of the poor bond, the 
yielding of the steel was distributed over a substantial length of the longitudinal bar, and that there was 
no concentration of large steel strains in the plastic hinge region. The longitudinal bars did not buckle 
during the testing. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND POSSIBLE RETROFIT SOLUTIONS 
The analysis of the column/foundation-beam test results presented in this chapter is organised around 
three topics: (a) the effect of the plain-round reinforcing bars and the consequent bond slip and 
stiffness degradation, (b) the effect of the supplementary diagonal bars and the column shear 
capacity-these two topics are related because the diagonal bars contribute to shear capacity-and (c) 
the plastic hinge behaviour relate.d to concrete confinement and bar-buckling restraint. The 
experimental results are compared with the seismic performance which would be predicted by a typical 
engineering assessment, using structural design codes or similar provisions. The results indicate better 
seismic performance for the subject structure than that implied by design codes, which are not strictly 
applicable to structures with plain-round reinforcing bars. 
Effect of the Plain-Round Reinforcing Bars and Bond Slip 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the slope of the load-versus-displacement hysteresis curves for 
the column/foundation beam specimen decreased during the first four cycles in each direction (µ = 
0. 75 andµ = 1.0, Figure 7.8). This stiffness degradation, prior to yielding of the reinforcing steel, 
suggests that bond slip in the specimen began in the very early stages of testing. The steel and 
concrete strain measurements confirm that bond slip occurred in the specimen even in the first "elastic" 

























Concrete and steel strain profiles in the column plastic hinge region at µ = + 1. 
Strain Results at p. = 1 
Figure 8.1 shows readings of steel and concrete strains in the column plastic-hinge region at the peak 
westward displacement of the first cycle to ductility factor 1. the steel strains are taken at five heights 
on each of the four longitudinal bars, and at three heights on each of the four diagonal bars as shown 
in the figure. The concrete strains include crack-opening displacements and are averaged over the first 
200 mm above the foundation beam, where one flexural crack was present, and over the next 600 mm 
of the plastic hinge height, where the three main flexural cracks of the column were present. The 
concrete strain readings are measured by the linear potentiometers attached to the tension and 
compression faces of the column and translated to strains at the depths of the longitudinal bar 
centerlines. Thus the difference between concrete and steel strain readings in Figure 8.1 indicates the 
bond slip between the two materials, at the longitudinal bars. 
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Atµ = l, the longitudinal tension reinforcement had reached a maximum strain equal to 87 % of yield. 
The average concrete strain (including crack opening) over the same region is almost twice the steel 
yield strain and 2.2 times the maximum steel strain.~ Thus, bond slip at the tension reinforcement is 
evident. 
There is also some bond slip at the compression reinforcement. At µ = l, the maximum strain in the 
compression longitudinal bars is 46 % of yield strain. The average compression strain in the concrete 
at the same location is 60% of the steel yield strain, and 1.3 times the maximum steel strain. 
Strain Results to µ = 3 
The amount of bond-slip between the reinforcing steel and the surrounding concrete increases with 
testing to higher ductility levels. Figure 8.2 shows lateral-load versus strain hysteresis loops for steel 
strain and average concrete strain in the plastic-hinge region of the column specimen. The steel strain 
is taken at a point on one of the longitudinal bars near the center of the plastic hinge region. The 
concrete strain includes crack displacements and is taken at the location of the longitudinal bars, on 
a 600 mm gauge length over the plastic-hinge region. Again, the difference between concrete and steel 
strains indicates the amount of bond-slip taking place. 
Figure 8.2 indicates that at µ = 3 the tensile strain in the longitudinal reinforcing steel is 1.4 times 
yield. The concrete tensile strain at the same location is 8.3 times the steel yield strain and 5.9 times 
the strain in the longitudinal steel. The large difference between concrete and steel strains shows that 
extensive bond-slip occurs, and confirms that bond-slip is the cause of the pinching of the lateral-load 
versus displacement hysteresis loops. 
Figure 8.2 also shows that bond-slip increases with testing to increased ductility levels. Table 8.1 
indicates that the longitudinal reinforcing reaches a strain of 1.4 times yield at ductility µ = 2. Then 
at increasing column displacements to ductility 3, the steel strain does not increase beyond the previous 
maximum value of 1.4 times yield. Thus the column is accommodating increasing lateral 
displacements without increasing steel strain, but instead with an increasing zone of yielding, ie, an 
increasing length of the longitudinal reinforcement yields with each cycle to increasing displacement. 
Thus the rone of yielding of the reinforcement becomes much longer than the typical plastic-hinge 
lengths found in columns with well-bonded deformed reinforcing. 
Figure 8.2 and Table 8.1 show that the ratio of concrete strain to steel strain in the plastic-hinge region 
steadily increases with increasing column displacement ductility. The ratio is 2.2 at ductility 1, 3.6 
at ductility 2, and 5.9 at ductility 3. These results indicate that substantial bond-slip occurs even at 
low to moderate ductility levels. 
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Table 8.1 Comparison of Average Concrete Strain, Including Cracking, With Steel Strains 
at Longitudinal Bars 
Displacement Steel Tensile Strain Concrete Strain Concrete Strain 
Ductility Factor Yield Strain Steel Yield Strain Steel Strain 
1 0.87 2.0 2.2 
2 1.4 5.0 3.6 
3 1.4 8.3 5.9 
Additional Evidence of Bond Slip 
Unfortunately the strain gauges on the longitudinal bars debonded afterµ = 3, and no steel strain data 
were obtained for the testing to higher ductilities. However, other data confinn that the bond of the 
flexural reinforcing steadily deteriorated as testing continued. The severe deterioration of bond is 
evident in the following observations: 
1 The pinching of the lateral-load versus lateral-displacement hysteresis loops, shown in Figure 
7.8, begins atµ = l and becomes more pronounced with cycles to increasing displacement. 
This directly reflects the progressive degradation of bond along the length of the longitudinal 
reinforcing. The lateral-load versus displacement hysteresis loops for the previous test, of 
the column/crossbeam specimen (Figure 6. 7), show similar pinching and progressive stiffness 
degradation. 
2 The failure of the longitudinal-bar end welds at the top of the column/foundation-beam 
specimen, occurring atµ = 5, indicates that a tremendous amount of bond deterioration had 
taken place. As discussed in Section 7 .4, the end-welds were located 1.9 m above the critical 
section of the column and failed under a tensile load of approximately 45 percent of the bar 
yield force. This means that over the 1.9 m length, equal to 68 bar-diameters, only 55% of 
the bar yield force could be taken out in bond resistance. If a unifonn bond stress is assumed 
over the surface area of the bar for the 1. 9 m length, a very low bond stress is calculated: 
Bond stress 
= .55 fr A, 
~~I 
0.55 (337MPa) (616mm2) 
~ (28 mm) ( 1900mm) 
= 0.69 MPa = 0.14,/i: (1oopsi 
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3 The anchorage-splitting failure of the concrete at the column-bar end hooks in the foundation 
beam indicates very low bond resistance in the straight embedment length above the end 
hooks. The splitting failure, described in Section 7.5, initiated at the end hooks at a 
displacement ductility of 9, when the bond-resistance along the length of the longitudinal bar 
was well degraded. The longitudinal bars are embedded 1.2 metres below the critical column 
section into the column haunch and foundation beam where they are terminated with 180-
degree hooks. For the anchorage splitting failure to occur, almost all of the tensile force in 
the longitudinal bars must have been transferred to the end hooks, meaning that there was 
almost no bond resistance along the 1.2 m of anchorage length above the hooks. 
Effect on Structural Performance 
Compared with deformed reinforcing, the plain-round reinforcing bars offer poor bond-resistance and 
undergo a more rapid deterioration of bond strength under cyclic earthquake actions. The New 
Zealand concrete code NZS 3101 [SANZ 1982) specifies that the embedment length of plain-round 
reinforcing should be twice that required of deformed reinforcing. This factor of two may be 
unconservative for plain-round reinforcing subjected to cyclic earthquake forces, particularly at higher 
ductility levels. The pending 1995 revision of NZS 3101 prohibits the use of plain-round bars for main 
longitudinal reinforcing. In other circumstances where plain-round bars may be used, straight bar 
anchorages or lap splices are prohibited. Bar anchorages must have hooks, and both bars of lap splices 
must have hooks [SANZ 1995, Bull 1995). 
Structures with plain-round reinforcing suffer greater stiffness degradation under earthquake actions 
than structures with deformed reinforcing. This stiffness degradation, and a pronounced pinching of 
lateral-load versus displacement hysteresis loops, are due to the bond-slip at the reinforcing bars. 
Further insight into the behaviour of structures with plain-round reinforcing could be gained by 
mechanically modelling structures which undergo bond slip. 
The pinched hysteresis loops indicate a reduced ability of the structure to dissipate earthquake energy, 
compared with a structure with deformed reinforcing steel. The stiffness degradation and pinched loop 
shape could compromise the earthquake performance of structures with plain-round reinforcing steel.· 
However, the extent to which earthquake performance is affected is unknown and requires further 
study. 
Lateral Capacity and Strength Degradation 
There is relatively little strength degradation in the response of the column/foundation-beam specimen. 
The reduction of lateral capacity which is evident results from the spalling of the concrete in the 
plastic-hinge region and to the P-'1 effect. At a structure drift of 2. 7 percent, the lateral capacity of 
the column/foundation-beam specimen had diminished by 8 % • The 8 % reduction is calculated by 
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comparing, from the hysteresis loops of Figure 7 .8, the lateral capacity of 130 kN at 2. 7 percent drift 
with the 141 kN maximum capacity at 1.2 percent drift. 
The column/crossbeam test specimen, with its straight bar anchorages, showed a more rapid 
degradation of strength. From the hysteresis hoops of Figure 6. 7(a), the lateral strength at 2. 7 percent 
structure drift (equal to 3.0 percent test-specimen drift) is 74 kN. The peak lateral strength is 88 kN, 
indicating a strength degradation of 16 % . The column/crossbeam specimen suffers strength 
degradation due to the end-anchorage deterioration of the straight column bars. This causes a capacity 
reduction in addition to that caused by concrete spalling and the P-.1 effect. 
Combined Capacity of Top and Bottom Hinge Regions 
The lateral-load-versus-displacement characteristics of the two tests can be combined to estimate the 
earthquake response of the whole bridge structure. The column/foundation-beam test describes the 
behaviour of the bottom plastic-hinge region, while the column/crossbeam test describes the behaviour 
of the top plastic hinge region. These two sets of test results are adjusted from the steel-yield strengths 
of the test specimens (308 MPa for the column/crossbeam and 337 MPa for the column/foundation-
beam) to the estimated steel-yield strength of the actual structure, 280 MPa. Structure drift is defined 
as equal to the structure's lateral displacement divided by the height of 4.80 metres from the centreline 
of the foundation-beam to the centreline of the crossbeam. The lateral-capacity-versus-displacement 
envelopes of the two plastic-hinge regions are easily combined to give a lateral-capacity envelope for 
the entire structure. 
Figure 8.3 shows the estimated lateral-capacity-versus-displacement envelope of the bridge structure 
under transverse earthquake loads. For the as-built (ie unretrofitted) structure, the peak lateral capacity 
is 0.45 times the seismic weight. At a structure drift of 2. 7 percent this capacity is diminished by 
12 % . The 12 % reduction reflects the combination of the 8 % reduction which occurs in the column-
bottom plastic hinge and the 16 % reduction which occurs in the column-top plastic hinge. 
Anchorage-retrofit Structure 
If end-plates are added to the tops of the column-longitudinal bars to retrofit the bar-anchorage 
condition, the maximum lateral capacity is increased and the rate of degradation of strength is reduced. 
The dashed line of Figure 8.3 shows the estimated capacity-versus-displacement envelope of the 
anchorage-retrofit structure. The lateral capacity is increased lo 0.53 times the seismic weight, because 
of the improved moment strength at the top of the column. The reduction of lateral capacity at 2. 7 
percent structure drift is 8 % . 
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Lateral-strength-versus displacement envelopes for the as-built bridge and 
anchorage-retrofit bridge. 
The upgraded capacity and strength-degradation characteristics of the anchorage-retrofit structure will 
improve its earthquake perfonnance. The extent of the improvement is unknown however, and would 
depend on the particular earthquake characteristics. Having defined the strength-envelopes, stiffness-
degradation, and hysteresis-loop-pinching characteristics of the earthquake response, accurate analytical 
studies of the bridge, using different earthquake records, can now be conducted. Inelastic time-history 
structural analyses can be carried out to compare the earthquake perfonnance of the as-built bridge 
structure with that of the proposed anchorage-retrofit structure. Such analyses are presented in Chapter 
9. 
8.2 Effect of the Dia1wnal Reinforcing. and Colwnn Shear Capacity 
The supplementary diagonal bars at the column haunch contribute to both the shear and flexural 
strength of the column. 
Diagonal Bar Contribution to Flexural Strength 
Figure 8.1 shows the diagonal-bar and longitudinal-bar strains in the column plastic-hinge region at 
ductility, µ = 1. The two diagonal bars which extend past the tension face of the column haunch, bars 
G and H, carry significant tension due to column flexure, with strains similar to those of the main 
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flexural reinforcement, the longitudinal bars E and F. Thus the diagonal bars make a substantial 
contribution to the flexural strength of the column, and hence to the lateral capacity of the structure. 
The above conclusion is con finned by the measured strength of the column/foundation-beam specimen. 
The peak lateral capacity was recorded, at ductility factorµ = 2, to be 138 kN (31.0 kips) in the east 
direction and 144 kN (32.4 kips) in the west direction. These measured capacities correspond closely 
to the calculated nominal flexural strength of 135 kN (30.3 kips). The assumption used in calculating 
the nominal strength-that the two tension-diagonal bars reach yield and fully contribute to the flexural 
strength-is thus verified. 
For the column/crossbeam test specimen, Figure 6.4, diagonal bars are present in both plan directions, 
anchored into the longitudinal girders and the transverse cross-beam. Thus there are eight diagonal 
bars at the top of each column. All of these diagonal bars contribute to the flexural strength of the 
column under earthquake actions. The nominal moment strength of the critical section at the top of 
the column is calculated as 244 kNm (180 kip-ft). This corresponds closely to the measured maximum 
moment strength of 236 kNm (174 kip-ft) from the anchorage-retrofit specimen. Thus the assumption 
used in the calculations-that the diagonal bars in each direction contribute to the column flexural 
strength-is verified for the top end of the column as well as for the bottom. 
Diagonal Bar Contribution to Shear Strength 
The diagonal bars also contribute to the shear strength of the column. As shown in Figure 8.1, under 
lateral forces two of the diagonal bars are subjected to significant tensile strains while the other two 
bars carry little strain. The two diagonal bars G and H, which extend past the tension face of the 
column haunch, yield in tension when the column reaches its flexural strength. The horirontal 
component of the yield force in these two bars provides a substantial portion of the column's shear 
resistance at the plastic hinge. Meanwhile, the opposite two diagonal bars, bars C and D in Figure 
8.1, tend to carry a small compression or tension force which does not significantly increase or 
decrease the column shear resistance. It is thus considered accurate to assume that two of the diagonal 
bars contribute to the shear strength while the contribution other two bars can be ignored. 
The contribution of the diagonal bars to shear strength is also evident in the crack development of the 
column/foundation-beam specimen. Unlike the column stirrups which do not contribute to shear 
strength until diagonal cracking develops, the two tension diagonal bars resist a portion of the column 
shear even before diagonal cracking. The tension in the diagonal bars reduces the shear stress in the 
concrete and reduces the amount of diagonal shear cracking. 
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This effect is evident in the photo of Figure 7 .2(c), taken at ductility factor 6 for the column specimen. 
At the top of the photo is the portion of the column just above the diagonal bars. In this location, 
flexural cracks in each direction have extended into diagonal shear cracks. Below these two crossing 
diagonal cracks are the three main flexural cracks in the plastic-hinge region which have extended 
horizontally across the column and joined up without turning into diagonal shear cracks. Thus the 
presence of the diagonal bars in this region has reduced the amount of diagonal shear cracking. The 
reduced diagonal cracking does not affect the overall seismic performance of the bridge, but it re-
confirms the assumption that the diagonal bars contribute to the column shear strength. 
Calculations of Shear Capacity 
Calculations of the shear capacity of the column specimen have been made by the present author. 
Results of the calculations are shown in Table 8.2. According to the New Zealand code provisions 
[SANZ 1982, 1995], if the diagonal bars are not considered, the shear capacity of the column plastic-
hinge region is deficient. The code assumes Ve = 0 and Vs = 90 kN to give a shear capacity of only 
89% of the shear demand, which is 102 kN. However, if the diagonal-bar contribution is included, 
the shear capacity is calculated as 161 kN, or 158% of the shear demand. 
Furthermore, the code assumption that Ve = 0 is a conservative one. The less conservative expression 
proposed by Paulay and Priestley [1992, page 127] Ve= 4Vb IP/A/0 , results in Ve= 58 kN. Thus 
a more realistic estimate of the column shear strength at the plastic-hinge regions would be Ve + Vs 
+ VsD1Ao = 58 + 90 + 71 = 218 kN. This strength is comfortably above the earthquake shear 
demand of 102 kN. As observed in the tests, column shear failure did not occur. The less conservative 
calculation for Ve indicates that even without the diagonal bars shear strength will be adequate, Ve + 
Vs = 58 + 90 = 148 kN. 
Comparison to Code Provisions 
The foregoing comparison of possible calculation assumptions shows that if the shear strength of the 
subject bridge column is assessed by the NZS 3101 code [SANZ 1982, 1995], and ifan assumption is 
made to neglect the diagonal bar contribution, then it will be concluded that the column shear capacity 
is deficient. Such assumptions might be considered conservative, but would not be unreasonable in 
engineering practice. In fact the pilot-study assessment of the bridge [Chapman 1991] concluded that 
the shear capacity is marginal. A more detailed evaluation of the column shear capacity, allowing a 
Ve > 0 or some contribution to shear capacity from the diagonal bars, shows, however, that the 
column shear capacity is in fact adequate. 
This example illustrates the point that the assumptions used for the seismic evaluation of existing 
structures often need tq be more accurate than those used for designing new structures. For new 
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bridges conservative design assumptions would only slightly increase construction costs. But for an 
existing bridge, an overly-eonservative assessment of column shear capacity could require that 
expensive retrofitting, whereas a more detailed and accurate assessment of shear capacity could 
eliminate the need to retrofit. 
Table 8.2 Calculated Shear Demands and Capacities ror the Bridge Colwnn 
I Test Specimen I Actual Structure I 
II ~- Demand I 135 kN I 102 kN I 
Shear Capacity, 
Steel Contribution: 
fy 337 MPa 280 MPa 
V 8 , stirrups 120 kN 90kN 
V 80, 2 diagonal bars 94 kN 71 kN 
Shear Capacity, 
Concrete Contribution: 
(. 22 MPa 20 MPa 
PJA/., 0.074 0.012 
(Pu=P1eo, = 300 kN) (Pu = 0.8 DL-EQ = 46 kN) 
NZS 3101 (1982 and 1995) 
V c at plastic hinge 0 0 
V c outside plastic hinge 0.226 ✓r. = 166 kN 0.192 ✓( = 134 kN 
Paulay and Priestley ( 1992) 
0.201 ~ = 147 kN V c at plastic hinge 0.081 J.t: = 58 kN 
V c outside plastic hinge 0.226 ( = 166 kN 0.192 (. = 134 kN 
Paulay has postulated that for members with plain-round bars which undergo significant bond slip, the 
"entire shear mechanism changes", compared with that for structures with deformed bars. "The reason 
is that the traditional truss mechanism, relying on perfect bond, cannot develop. Typical 45-degree 
struts in the concrete will not develop. An arch mechanism must be mobilised" instead. Consequently, 
the "shear provisions of NZ,S 3101, or A Cl 318 for that matter, are entirely irrelevant" for structures 
with plain-round reinforcing bars [Paulay pers. comm. 1994). 
However, Kordina et al (1989) have tested (monotonically) the shear strength of prestressed concrete 
beams with unbonded tendons. They conclude that "even for prestress without bond, shear stress can 
be predicted best on the basis of a truss analogy •.. a tied-arch model seems less suitable for the 
determination of the shear-carrying capacity." 
Also, engineers evaluating concrete structures with plain-round reinforcement have little choice but to 
use the shear-strength provisions from design codes or research results, which were developed for 
structures with deformed reinforcement. Special shear-strength evaluation provisions for concrete 
structures with plain-round reinforcing have not been developed. Further research in this area would 
be useful. 
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Plastic Hinge Behaviour and Concrete Confinement 
Based on the strain readings of the linear potentiom~rs, the curvature profiles of the plastic-hinge 
concrete section have been calculated for the column/foundation-beam test. Figure 8.4 shows the 
column curvature measured over segments of the plastic-hinge region at ductility factors of l, 3, 5, 
6 and 7. As shown in the figure, up to a ductility factor of 5, the curvature was concentrated in one 
of the 150 mm gauge lengths, which is where the main flexural crack was located, approximately 300 
mm above the foundation beam. As shown in Figure 7. 7 this crack opened to a maximum width of 
10.5 mm at ductility factor of 5. 
Beyond ductility 5, the maximum opening widths of the other two flexural cracks began to increase, 
indicating an increase in curvature further up the column. As shown in Figure 8.4, the curvature 
began to develop over a greater length of the column at ductilities 6 and 7. 
Curvature Ductility 
Based on the curvature measurements, the average curvature ductilities can be calculated. The 
curvature ductility is taken as the maximum measured column curvature, over a 150 mm gauge length, 
divided by the plastic-hinge curvature measured over the 150 mm gauge length of the main flexural 
crack during testing to ductility factor l. Figure 8.5 shows the measured curvature ductilities during 
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Column curvature profile over the plastic hinge region at displacement ductilities 
of 1, 3, 5, 6, 7. 
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In general, curvature ductilities will increase in step with displacement ductilities. If the plastic-hinge 
length remains constant, curvature ductility will increase_ linearly with displacement ductility. 
However, the column can also accommodate increased displacement ductilities without increased 
curvature ductilities, if the plastic-hinge length increases. 
Plastic Hinge Length 
Figure 8.5 shows that initially the column plastic-hinge length, t P' is about 200 mm, 0.5 times the 
overall section depth. As the column is tested to cycles of increasing displacement however, the 
curvature profile over the column length becomes less peaked. At the displacement ductilities 4, 5, 
and 6 the curvature profile is more even because the plastic-hinge length, tP, has increased to about 
400 mm, 1.0 times the overall section depth. The relationship between plastic-hinge length, curvature 
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an increase in concrete plastic-hinge length, t ,. 
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The significance of the concrete-section curvature and plastic-hinge length results for the column is 
diminished by the extensive bond slip resulting from the use of plain-round reinforcing bars. The bond 
slip at the reinforcing bars means that the column section behaviour violates the typical assumption of 
structural mechanics that "plane sections remain plane", and the typical relationship between curvature 
and material strains is no longer relevant. Because of the bond slip, the length of yielding of the 
reinforcing bars is much greater than the plastic-hinge length based on concrete-section curvature. 
Thus the concrete curvature ductility at the plastic hinge does not give an indication of the maximum 
:-einforcing steel strain, as it would do for well-bonded reinforcement. This point is reflected in Figure 
8.2 where, under the same column displacement demands the concrete-strain ductility demand is shown 
to be several times greater than the steel-strain ductility demand. 
Column-hinge Lengthening and Degradation 
The linear-potentiometer readings were also used to record the axial lengthening of the column 
specimen during the testing to increased levels of lateral displacement. Figure 8.6 shows the 
progressive lengthening of the column during testing. The lengthening is substantially restrained by 
the constant axial load on the column, so that the residual column lengthening, after testing to 
displacement ductility 7, is only 4.5 mm. Another reason for the small amount of plastic-hinge 
lengthening is that the inelastic strains which develop in the plain-round column bars are substantially 
less than those which would develop in deformed column bars. 
8 
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Column lengthening during the testing of the column/foundation-beam specimen. 
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Although the cover concrete of the column specimen began to crack on the compression face at 
displacement ductilities of2 to 3, and major spalling began at ductility 5, the strength degradation of 
the specimen was not pronounced. At a displacement ductility of 5 the column strength had degraded 
to 88 % of its maximum strength, measured at ductility 2. This 12 % percent degradation of strength 
results from to the loss of cover concrete. The amount of strength degradation was small because the 
core concrete remained intact and was adequately confined by the transverse reinforcing. Figure 7 .2(c) 
shows that the column core was intact at a displacement ductility of 6. Figure 7 .2(t) shows a degraded 
column core, but the degradation occurred only after several cycles to extreme displacements(µ. = 12). 
Required Tramverse Reinforcing Steel Areas 
The pilot-study assessment of the bridge had indicated that the "the column-core concrete is poorly 
confined". This assessment was made based on the requirements for transverse reinforcement in the 
1982 New Zealand Concrete Code [SANZ 1982]. For the subject bridge column, the 1982 code 
requires an area of transverse reinforcing 3. 15 times that which is provided by the 9.5 mm (3/8 inch) 
ties at 152 mm (6-inch) spacing. 
Research results over the last ten years have shown, however, that the 1982 concrete confinement 
requirements are unduly conservative for columns with low to moderate axial loads [Watson et al, 
1994] For the subject column with its low axial load level, the revised version of the concrete code 
[SANZ 1995] requires no transverse reinforcement for concrete confinement. Transverse 
reinforcement is required to stabilize the longitudinal bars against buckling but not for confinement. 
The area of transverse reinforcement provided in the subject bridge column is adequate, equal to 1.17 
times that required for bar-buckling prevention. Bar buckling did not occur in the tests even after 
testing to extreme ductility levels. 
These points are illustrated in Figure 8. 7. The figure shows a comparison of the transverse 
reinforcement requirements of the 1982 and 1995 versions of the New Zealand concrete code. The 
figure shows the required transverse steel area for the subject bridge column as a function of axial-load 
level. The actual axial-load level and transverse steel area of the subject bridge column are also shown 
on the plot. It can be seen that by the 1982 criteria the subject column is deficient in transverse 
reinforcement by a factor of 3, but by the 1995 criteria the provided amount of transverse 
reinforcement is adequate. 
Required Colwnn-tie Spacing 
Figure 8.7(b) shows the maximum allowable spacing of column ties according to the previous and 
current versions of the New Zealand concrete code [SANZ 1982 and 1995]. 
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Bar-Buckling Criterion 
To stabilize the longitudinal reinforcing against buckling, ties are required at a spacing no greater than 
6db, where db is the diameter of the longitudinal bars. For the subject bridge this maximum spacing 
is 6 x 28.6 = 171 mm. Thus the actual tie spacing of 152 mm meets the criteria to prevent 
longitudinal bar buckling. 
Plain-round bars may be less susceptible to buckling under earthquake actions than deformed bars. 
For the subject test Paulay has pointed out that "inelastic strains in the plain bars were much smaller 
[than they would be for deformed bars] because of the breakdown of bond". For the columns similar 
to those of the subject bridge Paulay estimates that "at µ = 8 deformed bars would probably have 
buckled because much larger reversive inelastic strains would have been sustained• in the steel [Paulay 
1994). This estimate of ductility capacity(µ. = 8), and the compliance with the 1995 code criteria for 
transverse steel area and the 6di, maximum tie spacing, indicate that even with deformed bars the 
seismic performance of the column with respect to bar-buckling would have been satisfactory. 
Although plain-round bars may be less susceptible to buckling, they are not immune to buckling and 
still need some transverse ties for anti-buckling stability. Rodriguez and Park (1994) tested columns 
with plain-round longitudinal bars with ties spaced at 13di,. This excessive tie spacing allowed the 
longitudinal bars to buckle and cause significant strength reductions at a displacement ductility of 
approximately 3.8 (interstory drift of 1.8%). 
Confinement and Shear-resistance Criteria 
The 1995 draft Concrete Code also requires, for concrete confinement and shear resistance, that 
column ties be spaced no further apart than h/4, where h is the least dimension of the column section. 
This requirement is relaxed from the h/5 maximum spacing required by the 1982 code. For the subject 
bridge, the h/4 criterion equates to a maximum tie spacing of 102 mm. This h/4 criterion governs over 
the 6di, anti-bar-buckling criterion, and thus the column-tie spacing is deemed inadequate by the 1995 
code. 
The code requirement for column-tie spacing to be less than h/4 can be conservative for columns with 
low axial load and shear demand, particularly if diagonal bars are present. The h/4 tie-spacing criteria 
is appropriate for new construction, because a more detailed criteria would be more complicated and 
the resulting savings in construction cost would be insignificant. But for the seismic evaluation of an 
existing structure, a more accurate estimate of required column-tie spacing may be necessary, because 
it could eliminate the need for expensive retrofitting. 
For the subject bridge column, the 1995 code requires no transverse reinforcement for confinement, 
and the shear capacity of the plastic-hinge region is good due to the contribution of the diagonal bars. 
However, a tie spacing of h/4 is still required. The issue is illustrated in Figure 8.7. At an axial-load 
level below that indicated by point "A" in the figure, transverse ties are not needed for concrete 
confinement; they are only needed for bar-buckling restraint. At axial-load levels less than point •A•, 
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then, it is not necessary for concrete confinement to have ties spaced at h/4 (102 mm). And because 
the two diagonal bars will cross any potential diagonal shear crack in the plastic-hinge region, the shear 
capacity of the column does not rely on a close spacing of ties. 
Outside of the column plastic-hinge region, the New Zealand concrete code [SANZ 1982 and 1995] 
specifies a maximum tie spacing, for shear resistance, of d/2. For the subject column, d/2 equals 170 
mm, thus the tie spacing of 152 mm outside the plastic hinge region complies with the code. 
Proposed Requirements for the Subiect Bridge 
Because the column ties are not heavily relied on for confinement or shear resistance, it should only 
be necessary in the subject column, even if it had deformed longitudinal bars, to meet the tie-spacing 
requirement of 6di, (171 mm) so as to prevent longitudinal-bar buckling. This proposed requirement 
is shown in Figure 8.7(b) by the dash-dot line. 
The proposed tie-spacing requirement would then indicate that the column-tie spacing of the subject 
bridge is acceptable-a conclusion which is validated by the test results. The proposed requirement 
is recommended as a basis for assessing the ductility capacity of existing columns similar to those of 
the subject bridge, with either deformed or plain-round reinforcement. The requirement gives a better 
indication of the true column-tie spacing required for the ductile earthquake response of column plastic-
hinge regions. Additional study may be needed, however, to determine the maximum allowable tie 
spacing for shear resistance. 
Additional research is also needed on the performance with respect to shear resistance and bar buckling 
of concrete members with plain-round reinforcement. It may be that transverse ties are not effective 
in the shear resistance of such members because an arch mechanism of shear resistance is developed 
instead of the traditional truss mechanism. It might also be found that less transverse reinforcement 
is required to prevent bar buckling in such members, compared with members with deformed 
longitudinal bars. 
8.4 Overall Assessment 
The testing of the column/foundation-beam specimen and the associated structural analysis reveal 
several new insights into the seismic behaviour of the 1936-designed New Zealand bridge. The 
conclusions drawn from the testing and detailed analysis could not have been deduced from a less 
detailed assessment which relied only on current design codes and practice. The detailed investigation 
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current and upcoming New Zealand concrete codes [SANZ 1982 and 1995]. 
Seismic Performance 
The preliminary seismic assessment of the subject bridge [Chapman 1991) concluded that "the pier-
columns are unlikely to tolerate cyclic displacements much exceeding yield ... ". This conclusion is 
generally supported by code provisions and other structural design guidelines. However, the laboratory 
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testing of the column/crossbeam and column/foundation-beam specimens presented here has shown the 
conclusion to be incorrect. 
For the subject bridge to survive a severe earthquake, it needs to have adequate strength and 
displacement capacity in its transverse direction. The lateral capacity of the bridge is governed by the 
flexural strength at the top and bottom of each of the bridge columns. The tests and calculations 
indicate that the lateral capacity is 0.45 times the weight of the structure. This lateral capacity is two 
or three times greater than that required of many new bridges. 
Even with a high lateral capacity, the bridge structure needs to accommodate the displacement demands 
imposed by a strong earthquake. The lateral displacement capacity of the bridge depends primarily 
on the inelastic rotation capacity at the plastic-hinge regions at the top and bottom of each of the bridge 
columns. The lateral-force versus displacement hysteresis loops for both the column/crossbeam test, 
Figure 6. 7, and the column/foundation-beam test, Figure 7 .8, indicate a ductile response to earthquake 
actions. The hysteresis loops show pinching and stiffness degradation, due to bond deterioration, but 
show only moderate strength degradation. The column/crossbeam and column/foundation-beam tests 
indicate that at a structure drift of 2. 7 percent, the lateral capacity of the bridge will diminish by only 
12%. 
Thus, the subject bridge has good lateral strength and inelastic displacement capacity to survive 
earthquake ground motions. This combination of strength and displacement capacity for the bridge 
means that it is likely to perform well even in a severe earthquake. Considering the earthquake 
response spectra of the New Zealand loadings code, NZS 4203 [SANZ 1992], the bridge has adequate 
strength and ductility capacity to sustain the code-specified level of earthquake shaking. This indicates 
that the subject bridge will probably perform in an earthquake just as well as a new bridge designed 
to the 1992 NZS 4203 criteria. The analytical studies of Chapter 9 confirm this conclusion. 
Need to Look Beyond Code Provisions 
The prediction of satisfactory earthquake performance from the subject bridge is based on the test 
results which show good lateral strength and displacement capacity. Using the New Zealand concrete 
code [SANZ 1982] criteria, the opposite conclusion was reached: poor earthquake performance was 
predicted for the bridge. However, a detailed seismic evaluation of the structure, which does not rely 
solely on code implied criteria, verifies the test results and the conclusion that the bridge's seismic 
performance will be satisfactory. Essential to an accurate seismic assessment of the bridge are the 
following points: 
140 
1 For columns with low axial load, the 1982 New Zealand concrete code [SANZ 1982] is 
overly-conservative in its requirements for concrete confinement. The 1995 draft code 
[SANZ 1995] has more accurate requirements. 
2 The supplementary diagonal bars at the top and bottom end flares of the subject bridge 
column contribute significantly to both flexural and shear strength. For such columns, the 
structural engineer must determine the critical section for moment capacity and plastic 
hinging, which may or may not be in the flared region of the column. For the subject bridge, 
a seismic evaluation which neglected the contribution of the diagonal bars would be overly 
conservative. 
3 The code assumption [SANZ 1982 and 1995] that Ve, the column shear capacity of the 
concrete section, equals zero may be overly conservative for the evaluation of existing 
structures. Paulay and Priestley (1992] and Priestley et al (1994] offer less conservative 
criteria. 
4 For columns with low axial load, good shear capacity, and large-diameter longitudinal 
reinforcing, the column-tie spacing requirements of the 1982 and 1995 concrete codes can be 
conservative. A more accurate requirement, described in Figure 8. 7 may be used instead. 
However, a limit in the maximum tie spacing is still required to ensure that the ties act as 
efficient shear reinforcement. Currently the code specifies the maximum tie spacing as h/4. 
5 Concrete structures with plain-round longitudinal bars can be less susceptible to bar-buckling, 
shear failures, and loss of confinement-and thus may require less transverse 
reinforcement-than similar structures with deformed longitudinal bars. The bond slip at 
plain-round bars makes bar buckling less likely and promotes an arch mechanism of shear 
resistance rather than the traditional truss mechanism. Bond slip can lessen curvature 
demands at plastic hinges and thus reduce the need for concrete confinement. 
Stiffness Degradation and Pinched Hysteretic Response 
Although the hysteretic response of the plastic-hinge regions of the subject bridge column indicate good 
displacement capacity and little strength degradation, the response also shows pronounced stiffness 
degradation and pinching. The stiffness degradation and pinching may have an adverse effect on 
earthquake performance because the energy-dissipation capacity of a structure is reduced. However, 
the hysteresis-loop shape generally does not have a big effect on seismic response, particularly for 
structures with longer periods of vibration. 
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Further insight on expected damage to the bridge for various earthquake scenarios could be gained by 
conducting inelastic time-history analyses of the structure. S_uch analyses can be used to check the 
validity of the code-specified earthquake demands, assess the effect of the pinched hysteretic response, 
and compare the earthquake performance of the as-built bridge with that of the bridge after seismic 
retrofitting. Such analyses have been carried out and are discussed in Chapter 9. Mechanically 
modelling the response of structures which undergo bond slip would also provide insight into the 
behaviour of structures with plain-round reinforcing. 
Confinement Retrofit Unn~ 
The subject bridge is shown by the tests and the detailed evaluation not to be vulnerable to earthquake 
damage related to insufficient transverse reinforcing or shear capacity. Thus there would be no benefit 
in a confinement-retrofit of the bridge columns, such as adding new column ties or an external column 
jacket. It had originally been planned to test a confinement-retrofit of the column/foundation-beam 
specimen, but the idea was discarded once it was concluded that the existing column was not in fact 
deficient in transverse reinforcing or shear capacity. 
Additional Considerations 
There are three additional, related considerations concerning how representative the testing is of the 
actual seismic performance of the prototype bridge. Two issues -- the different detailing at exterior 
columns and the restraint provided by the test-specimen top-plate - suggest that the actual bridge will 
suffer slightly higher stiffness and strength degradation than evident in the response of the test-
specimen. The third issue of surface rust on the plain reinforcing bars suggests the opposite effect: 
less stiffness degradation for the actual bridge compared to the test specimen. 
In sum, these additional issues are not considered to have a substantial effect on the validity test results 
reported here. One or more of the issues could be perhaps be studied as part of some future testing 
of structures with plain-round reinforcing. The three issues are discussed below. 
Interior versus Exterior Column Details 
The test has examined the behavior of one of the interior columns of the typical four-column pier of 
the prototype bridge. As shown in Figure 6.3, the detailing at the base of the exterior column is 
different than that of the interior column. The seismic performance at this column would probably not 
be as good as that at the interior column, because of bond slip of foundation beam bars and poorer 
confinement of the column-bar end hooks. 
Based on the test observations and results of Chapter 6 and this chapter, it is possible to estimate the 
effect of the different detailing at the exterior column. Three observations can be made: 
142 
1. The strength of the exterior column base region will initially be the same as that for the interior 
column. This is because the strength will still be governed by the column-yielding mechanism, 
since the moment strength of the foundation beam is more than twice that of the column. In fact, 
the cracking momenl of the foundation beam is approximately equal to the moment capacity of the 
column, so that full development of the foundation beam bars is not necessary to force plastic 
hinging into the column. 
2. Upon repeated cycles of seismic forces at moderate to high ductilities, the cracking moment of the 
foundation beam may be exceeded, after which bond slip at the foundation beam bars is likely to 
take place. Such bond slip would increase the amount of stiffness degradation in the response of 
the bridge. Conceivably, the bond slip could eventually degrade the capacity of the foundation 
beam and joint region to a level less than that required to force plastic hinging into the column. 
In this case, the response of the bridge would exhibit an increased rate of strength degradation. 
3. In the testing of the interior-column/foundation-beam specimen, at high ductility levels, a splitting 
failure occurred at the column-bar end hooks, as described in Section 7.5. The splitting cracks 
were first observed at a displacement ductility factor, µ = 9 (structure drift of 6.0 percent). At 
µ = 10 (structure drift of 6.3 percent), the foundation-beam concrete spalled because of this 
splitting failure. For the exterior column, there is less concrete surrounding the column-bar end 
hooks, and it is possible that the spalling and splitting failure could occur at a slightly lower 
ductility level than for the interior column. 
It is not likely that this difference is significant however, because (a) until the splitting initiates 
(at µ = 8 or 9 perhaps), the reduced amount of surrounding concrete is not relevant, (b) the effect 
on bridge seismic response is not crucial since any splitting failure would occur only at such high 
ductility levels, and (c) bond slip of the beam bars, discussed in item 2 above, may preclude any 
splitting failure at the column bars. 
To completely quantify the effect of the different detailing at the exterior columns, an additional test -
- of the exterior-column/foundation-beam region -- might be recommended. 
Restraint to Bond Slip Provided by Test Set-up 
As described in section 7.4, three of the column-bar end welds at the top of the specimen failed at 
displacement ductility factors, µ, of 5 and 6. The failures attest to a tremendous amount of bond slip, 
and indicate that the top-plate restraint used in the test set-up does not perfectly model the situation in 
the actual bridge. 
143 
In the actual bridge, once bond along the column bars deteriorates beyond the column inflection point, 
there would be no restraint similar to the specimen~ top pl~te to prevent further propagation of the 
bond slip. Thus in the response of the actual bridge, the amount of stiffness degradation may be 
greater than that shown in the test specimen. Because of the straight anchorages at the tops of the 
column bars, there could also be a reduction of strength at higher ductility levels, due to bond slip 
propagating over the entire length of the column bar. 
The level of increase in degradation due to this effect is uncertain. However, the load versus 
displacement hysteresis loops at ductilities,µ of 5 and 6 - including those labelled A, B, and C, in 
Figure 7. 8 - give some indication. Considering this evidence, the difference in response of the actual 
bridge compared to the test specimen, because of the lack of added restraint to bond-slip, could be 
assessed as follows: 
• Presumably there would be little difference in stiffness or strength characteristics up to a ductility, 
µ of 4. 
• Between ductilities,µ of perhaps 4 and 7, there would be an increase in stiffness degradation as 
bond slip propagates past the column inflection point. An increase strength degradation would not 
yet be evident. 
• At higher ductilities, lower ultimate capacities - ie., an increase in strength degradation - would 
be expected. 
• At the expected ductility demands of severe earthquakes (See section 9.4), the difference would 
not be significant, probably less than l0%. At the ductility demands of code-implied earthquake 
levels the difference would be negligible. 
To more precisely quantify this issue, a test specimen modelling the entire column height could be 
recommended. Alternatively, more in-depth studies of bond-slip behavior, including attempts at 
mechanical models, could be undertaken. 
Condition of Reinforcing Bars 
The reinforcing steel used in the test specimen was in good condition, was delivered directly from the 
fabricator to the laboratory, and was not corroded. For the actual bridge, the reinforcing steel would 
have been imported from the UK by ship, and may not have been protected from the weather when 
transported or stored at the bridge site. Thus the steel for the actual bridge would probably have had 
surface rust which would increase its bond capacity. It is not known how much effect this surface rust 
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would have in increasing bond resistance, or whether the effect would be significant after several 
reversed cycles of bond slip. Perhaps simple cycJic testing of the bond of rusted versus pristine 
reinforcing bars could be recommended. 
Possible Retrofit Measures 
It is unlikely that any retrofit of the subject bridge would be economically justified because the 
earthquake vulnerability of the as-built structure is low. However retrofitting could conceivably be 
justified in the following circumstances: 
(a) if the bridge is extremely important and meant to remain usable even in the largest credible 
earthquake, 
(b) for a bridge of similar details but with a lower lateral-strength/seismic-weight ratio, or 
(c) for a bridge of similar appearance to the subject bridge but with poorer detailing and, 
consequently, a lower displacement capacity. 
Three possible seismic retrofit solutions are briefly considered here. 
Retrofit of Bar Anchorage 
The first possible retrofit would be the addition of anchorage end-plates to the tops of the column-
longitudinal bars, as tested on the column/crossbeam specimen. This anchorage retrofit would improve 
the earthquake performance of the bridge, but the improvement is not likely to be dramatic. As shown 
in Figure 8.3, the anchorage retrofit improves the lateral strength of the bridge and reduces the degree 
of strength degradation. This would decrease the likelihood of collapse in a major earthquake, but the 
level of damage in any smaller earthquake would probably not be much improved. The addition of 
the anchorage end-plates to all of the column-longitudinal bars would be costly, considering the small 
improvement in seismic performance that would be expected. 
Infill Concrete Wall 
The second possible retrofit would provide a more dramatic strength increase to the bridge structure. 
This retrofit, illustrated in Figure 8.8, involves the addition of a new reinforced-concrete infill wall 
between the centre two columns of the four-column bent. It is suggested that the reinforcing for the 
infill wall makes use of diagonal bars as is done in the coupling beams of walls for multi-storey 
buildings. It is likely that such a big increase in the strength of the multi-column bent will require the 
strengthening of the foundations, including the addition of new piles and the jacket-strengthening of 
the foundation beam. However not all piers of a multi-span bridge would need to be strengthened. 
For example, strengthening two piers in each 5-span segment of the subject bridge may be adequate. 
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The infill-wall retrofit, which greatly increases the strength and stiffness of the existing bridge, is most 
appropriate if control of damage is an important retrofit g93l, rather than just the prevention of 
collapse. The retrofit would allow the bridge to respond elastically to large earthquakes. 
Added Braces and Energy-dissipation Devices 
A third possible retrofit solution would be the addition of supplemental steel braces with energy-
dissipation devices, as shown in Figure 8.9. Depending on the chosen properties of the energy-
dissipation devices, the foundation of the bridge may not need strengthening. If properly designed, 
such a retrofit could prevent serious damage to the bridge because less earthquake energy would need 
to be dissipated in the plastic-hinge regions of the concrete columns. The use of energy-dissipation 
devices 
seems particularly appropriate for structures with plain-round reinforcing (such as the subject bridge), 
because the energy-dissipation capacity in the as-built structure alone is relatively small due to the 
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INELASTIC EARTHQUAKE TIME-HISTORY ANALYSES 
In Chapter 8, the seismic performance of the 1936-designed New Zealand bridge was predicted to be 
good, due to the substantial lateral strength and displacement capacity of the structure. In this chapter 
a series of computer analyses are described which verify that prediction. The analyses also help 
quantify (a) the benefit of retrofitting bar anchorages, and (b) the effect of the pinched hysteretic 
response which is characteristic of structures with plain-round reinforcement. 
In all, twenty-four inelastic dynamic time history analyses have been run. There are three different 
structural models, each of which is subjected to eight different earthquake records. 
Modelling of Structure Behaviour 
The inelastic frame analysis program Ruaumoko [Carr 1995a] is used to model the earthquake response 
characteristics of the 1936-designed bridge. Three different structures are modelled: (a) the bridge 
in its unretrofitted condition, (b) the bridge after retrofitting with anchorage end plates at the top of 
the column bars, as described in Section 6.4, and (c) an ideal structure with the same capacity as the 
anchorage-retrofit bridge but assumed to have deformed column bars with good bond characteristics. 
General Assumptions 
As with the previous assessment and experimental studies of the subject bridge, discussed in chapters 
6, 7, and 8, only the transverse-direction response of the bridge is considered. A lumped-mass, single-
degree-of-freedom model is used, calibrated to the target values of the structural parameters shown in 
Table 9.1. The target parameters also include a matching of the hysteresis loop shapes and envelopes 
from the experimental results shown in Figures 6.7, 7.8, and 8.3. The Wayne Stewart hysteresis 
model [Carr 1995a] is used. 
The dynamic, inelastic time history analyses use the Newmark constant average acceleration method, 
and P-d effects are modelled by modifying the member stiffness, given the static dead load [Carr 
1995a]. Initial-stiffness Raleigh damping is used at a damping ratio of 2 percent of critical. 
Earthquake input is in the horizontal direction only. The Ruaumoko input data are shown in Table 9.2. 
Modelled Hysteresis Loops 
The modelled hysteresis loops for the subject bridge are shown in Figure 9.1. The loops were 
carefully matched to the experimental results and calculated and measured capacities. Figure 9. l(a) 
shows the pinched hysteresis loops used to model the unretrofitted bridge. Figure 9. l(b) shows similar 
,, 
pinched hysteresis loops, but with a lateral capacity 18 percent higher than the unretrofitted bridge and 
with a rate of strength degradation (with drift) 1.5 times lower. 
Table 9.1 Structural Modelling Parameters 
Parameter Unretrofitted Anchorage- Ideal Structure 
Bridge Retrofit Bridge 
Lateral Capacity/Seismic Weight 0.45 0.53 0.53 
Hysteresis Loop Shape Pinched Pinched Not Pinched 
Initial Stiffness 5.9 kN/mm 5.9 kN/mm 7.8 kN/mm 
Strength Degradation at 4 % Drift 21 % 14% 14% 
(not including P-.1) 
Table 9.2 Values Used for Ruaumoko Input 
Input Parameter Unretrofitted Anchorage-Retrofit Ideal Structure 
Bridge Bridge 
Member Length (shear 1.80 m 1.54 m 1.54m 
span) 
Moment of Inertia 720(10)-6 m4 450( 10)-6 m4 600(10)-6 m4 
Bi-linear Stiffness Factor 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Tri-linear Stiffness --0.030 --0.020 --0.015 
Factor 
Ultimate Moment 185 kN-m 185 kN-m 185 kN-m 
"Yield" Moment 122 kN-m 122 kN-m 122 kN-m 
Hysteresis Model Wayne Stewart Wayne Stewart Wayne Stewart 
Intercept Moment for 40 kN-m 40 kN-m 90 kN-m 
Pinching 
Pinching Factor, a 0.6 0.6 1.0 
Unloading Factor 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Factor, {J 1.09 1.09 1.09 
Strength Degradation 0.7 0.9 0.9 
Factor after 10 cycles 
Damping Ratio 2% 2% 2% 
Figure 9.l(c) represents the hysteretic behaviour of an "ideal" structure. The ideal structure has the 
same lateral strength as the anchorage-retrofit bridge but with a slightly higher initial stiffness and 
without pinched hysteresis loops. The ideal structure could be considered to be the subject bridge if 
it bad deformed column bars with hooks at each end, and assuming that the column transverse 
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(c) Ideal structure. 
Hysteresis Loops to Model Structural Behaviour. 
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would not occur and therefore the hysteretic response of the column would not be pinched. The initial 
stiffuess of the ideal structure is modelled to be 1.33 times higl!er than that of the structures with plain-
round bars. This assumption is based on the observation from the test results, discussed in Section 7 .3, 
that the stiffuess of the column specimen with plain bars degraded during the first four cycles of testing 
in each direction, prior to the yielding of the column bars. A column with well-bonded, deformed 
reinforcement would not be expected to suffer such pre-yield stiffuess degradation, therefore its initial 
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Figure 9.2 Lateral Strength Envelopes for Hysteresis Models. 
Figure 9 .2 shows the capacity envelopes of the three structural models, plotted on the same graph for 
comparison. The figure shows clearly the higher capacity of the ideal and anchorage-retrofit structures 
compared to the unretrofitted, the higher rate of strength degradation of the unretrofitted bridge, and 
the higher initial stiffness of the ideal structure. Note that the strength degradation evident in the plots 
of Figures 9.1 and 9.2 does not include a degradation of strength based on number of cycles or the 
reduction of lateral capacity due to the P-.d effect, both of which are considered in the Ruaumoko 
analysis. The strength degradation based on number of cycles was not found to be significant in the 
analysis results. 
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9.2 Earthquake Input 
Eight different earthquake records, as shown in Table 9.3, were used as input to the analysis. The 
eight records cover a wide range of earthquake characteristics. 
Selection of Earthquake Records 
The first earthquake record used in the analysis is an artificial record called Bridge:za. This record was 
created to produce a response spectrum matching that used for the seismic design of bridges in New 
Zealand's highest seismic zone. Thus, the earthquake record represents the seismic demands which 
have been considered appropriate for the design of new bridges. 
Table 9.3 Earthquake Records Used for the Analysis 
Record Filename Earthquake Direction Record Peak 
Name Date Duration Ground Accl 
(seconds (g) 
) 
Bridge:za BRIDGEZA.EQC Artificial - 20.0 0.50 
Pacioma PACMSW.EQB 9 February Sl4W 20.3 1.20 
Dam 1971 
Parkfield PARKNE.EQB 27 June 1966 N65E 21.l 0.49 
El Centro ElAONSC.EQB 18 May 1940 N-S 20.06 0.37 
Taft TAFTNW.EQB 21 July 1952 N69W 30 0.16 
Bucharest BUCHNSC.EQB 4 March N-S 16.22 0.21 
1977 
Mexico D MEXTLHDL.DQ 19 September N-S 150 0.12 
(Tlahuac C 1985 
Deportivo) 
Mexico S MEXSCTlT.EQC 19 September E-W 150 0.17 
(Sec.Com.y 1985 
T ransportes) 
The next four records of Table 9.3-Pacioma, El Centro, Parkfield and Taft-are from California 
earthquakes and have commonly been used in structural analyses. The last three records, Bucharest 
and two Mexico records, are included to consider the performance of the bridge if it were located on 
a soft-soil site. 
Naeim and Anderson (1993] provide an excellent classification and evaluation of earthquake records, 
which was used to help select the records for this study. Table 9.4 shows additional data on the six 
earthquake records used here which are covered by Naeim and Anderson. 
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The Pacoima dam record is notable for its high peak ground acceleration, velocity, and displacement. 
The Parkfield record is notable for its high incremental veloc~ty, and both the Parkfield and Pacoima 
records are among the records with the largest mean input energy in the period band from 0.5 to 0.8 
seconds [Naeim and Anderson 1993, Tables 5-1 and 6-5). The 1940 El Centro and the 1952 Taft 
records are considered notable for their reasonably long durations, but Naeim and Anderson [1993, 
page 156) note that "some of the acceleration records commonly used for earthquake resistant design, 
such as 1940 El Centro, have very limited damage potential compared to other records contained in 
the data base. • 
The Mexico D record was initially selected for the analysis to represent soft-soil earthquake input, 
however, after the analysis showed it had little effect on the subject structure (response was fully 
elastic), two other soft-soil records were run: Bucharest and Mexico S. The Mexico S record has the 
highest peak ground acceleration of any of the 1985 Mexico City records and is considered notable for 
its peak displacement and incremental velocity [Naeim and Anderson 1993). (As shown later, both 
the Mexico Sand Bucharest records also had little effect on the subject bridge.) 
Respome Spectra 
The characteristics of each of the eight earthquake records are illustrated by their response spectra, 
shown in Figures 9.3(a)-(t). The response spectra show a tremendous variation in earthquake 
characteristics amongst the different records, and compared to the code-assumed response spectrum 
approximated by the Bridgeu record of Figure 9.3(a). Only the 1940 El Centro record, Figure 9.3(c), 
even vaguely resembles the Bridgeu record. The Pacoima spectrum, Figure 9.3(b), greatly exceeds 
the Bridgeu spectrum in most period bands. The Parkfield spectrum, Figure 9.3(d), greatly exceeds 
the Bridgeu spectrum in the period range of 0.3 to 0.8 seconds, which is critical for the subject 
bridge. The Taft spectrum, Figure 9.3(e), shows that this record has much lower demands than the 
Bridgeu record. The soft soil records from Bucharest and Mexico, Figures 9.32(e) and (t), show 
extremely high demands in the period range around 2 seconds, but much lower demands in the period 
range of the response of the subject structure, 0.4 to 1.0 seconds. 
The spectra shown in Figure 9.3 are plotted on acceleration versus displacement (A-D) axes. This 
presentation allows the consideration of spectral displacements as well as accelerations. As shown in 
the figure, lines of constant period extend radially from the origin. Two lines of constant pseudo-
velocity are also shown faintly on each of the plots of Figure 9.3. The shape of these lines on the plots 
is that of an inverse function (ie, y = kx·1). 
The plotting of the spectra in A-D co-ordinates allows the structure's force-displacement response to 
be superimposed on the spectrum plot. This has been done in Figure 9.3, using the envelopes of the 
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Table 9.4 Additional Data on Earthquake Records, from Naeim and Anderson [1993, 
Table 3-1]. 
No. Year Earthquake Station D Mag PA PV PD 
Name Name 
147 1971 San Fernando Pacoima 8 6.6 1125 113.09 38.28 
Dam 
11 1940 El Centro El Centro - 12 7.0 338 36.45 10.88 
Imp Vall Irr 
Dist 
52 1966 Parkfield CA Cholame 7 6.1 466 77.59 26.74 
Shandon 
Array 2 
29 1952 Kem County Taft 42 7.4 183 17.80 7.27 
799 1985 Mexico Sec. Com. Y 400 8.1 168 60.38 20.57 
Transportes 
805 1985 Mexico Tlahuac 410 8.1 115 34.26 18.53 
Deportivo 
D = epicentral distance, km 
Mag = magnitude 
PA = peak ground acceleration, cm/sre2 
PV = peak ground velocity, cm/sre 
PD = peak ground displacement, cm 














force-displacement response for the unretrofitted bridge. Each bridge response envelope is plotted to 
the peak displacement reached in the analysis for that particular earthquake record. 
Analysis Results 
The results of the 24 computer analyses show a large variation in response depending on the earthquake 
input, and also point to some differences in seismic performance between the unretrofitted, anchorage-
retrofit, and ideal structures. 
Structure Drift and Bridge Performance Limit States 
Table 9.5 shows the peak levels of structure drift in each _direction resulting from the inelastic computer 
analyses. The structure drift is defined as in Chapters 7 and 8: equal to the lateral displacement of the 
bridge superstructure with respect to the foundation, divided by the height of 4.80 metres between the 
centerline of the foundation beam and the centerline of the crossbeam. Figure 9.4 shows a graph of 
the peak structure drift values resulting from the 24 analysis runs. 
The peak structure drift is a fairly good measure of the level of earthquake damage sustained by the 
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Figure 9.4 Peak Structure Drift Results from the Inelastic Time-History Analyses. 
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A structure drift level of 4.0 percent indicates a global displacement ductility of 6, sometimes 
considered [SANZ 1995] to be the upper limit to reliable structural ductility capacity. The level of 
· damage to the test specimen column at a structure drift of 4.0 percent is shown in the photo of Figure 
7.2(c). For a structure with deformed column bars at a drift of 4 percent, the level of deterioration 
in the column could be greater. 
Peak drift levels for the bridge could be associated with performance limit states such as those 
discussed in Section 14.5 of this report, and in Paulay and Priestley (1992). Table 9.6 outlines the 
estimated relationship of bridge performance with peak drift levels. The table is based primarily on 
the test results of Chapters 7 and 8. The table shows that below a drift of 0. 7 percent (Limit State A) 
no bridge damage or repair is expected. Between 0. 7 and 1.5 percent drift, cracking and some 
inelastic behaviour is expected but spalling of the concrete is not expected. Above 1.5 percent drift 
(Limit State B) concrete spalling is expected. 
Limit State C marks the traditional serviceability limit, beyond which a bridge will not remain fully 
functional for carrying traffic, and beyond which more serious repair or retrofit measures will be 
required. This limit state may depend more on the residual or permanent drift of the structure after 
the earthquake than on the peak drift during earthquake shaking. However, the higher the peak drift, 
the greater the chance that the structure will be left with an unacceptable level of residual drift. Also, 
a structure with deformed reinforcement, for the same peak drift, may be more likely to have an 
unacceptable level of residual drift than a structure with plain-round reinforcement. This is because 
a structure with deformed reinforcing would undergo greater levels of inelastic strain in the column 
bars. Considering these points, limit state C is estimated to be reached at a peak drift of about 2.5 
percent for the bridge with plain bars, and at a drift of about 2 percent for the bridge with deformed 
bars. 
Limit State D marks the traditional damage-control limit state, beyond which damage is not 
economically repairable. Based on the test results of Chapters 7 and 8, the subject bridge seems to 
be able to sustain very high drift levels before suffering irreparable damage. Until a drift of 6 percent 
is reached, damage consists only of cracking and spalling in the column end regions; the reinforcing 
bars do not buckle. Beyond the 6 percent drift level anchorage splitting failures could occur which 
would be difficult to repair. Thus a peak drift level of 6 percent is associated with limit state D for 
the subject bridge with plain-round bars. For the ideal bridge with deformed bars the limit state is 
estimated to occur at a drift of about 5 percent, when the column bars would be likely to buckle, as 
discussed in Section 8.3. 
Limit State E of Table 9.6 represents the traditional survival or no-collapse limit state. The test results 
show that the subject bridge with plain-round bars will not collapse even at the extreme drift levels, 
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Table 9.6 Estimated Relationship of Bridge Drift Level to Performance Limit States 
Limit Bridge Damage and Bridge Peak Structure Drift 
State Likely Repair Serviceability Corresponding to Limit State 
Unretrofitted or "Ideal" 
Anchorage- Structure 
Retrofit Bridge 
No damage, no repair No loss of bridge 
required service 
A 0.7% 0.7% 
Minor damage, epoxy 
injection of cracks 
required 
B 1.5% 1.5% 
Moderate damage, 
epoxy injection and 
patching of spalled 
concrete required 
C 2.5% ~2% 
Medium-heavy Temporary loss of 
damage. May nee.d to bridge service 
jack bridge to remove except for 
permanent lean and/or emergency traffic. 
add bracing retrofit to 
restore stiffness. Also 
patching and epoxy 
injection required. 
D 6% ~5% 
Heavy damage. Bridge unsafe even 
Column-bar buckling for emergency 
or anchorage splitting. traffic 
Not economically 
repairable. 
E > 8% Unknown 
Collapse 
Note: Only transverse-direction structural response is considered. 
about 8 percent, to which the bridge was tested. For the hypothetical bridge with defonned bars, the 
peak drift to cause collapse cannot be estimated, due to the lack of specific test results. 
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Respome for Different Earthquake Records 
Figure 9.4 clearly illustrates the large variation in structural- response depending on the earthquake 
input. The force-displacement-response envelopes for the unretrofitted bridge are also shown on the 
spectra plots of Figure 9.3. Four of the earthquake records cause little or no damage to the bridge 
models. For the two Mexico records the response is fully elastic. For the Bucharest and Taft records 
the response 
is nearly elastic. The structure drift in some cases reaches the bi-linear region of the capacity 
envelopes shown in Figure 9.2, but does not reach the tri-linear region. Thus none of the four 
records-Taft, Bucharest, Mexico S, and Mexico D-affect the structures enough to cause them to 
reach their ultimate strengths. The good lateral strength of the subject structure, as noted in Section 
8.4, prevents any damage from occurring under these four earthquake records. 
Of more interest are the Bridgez.a and El Centro earthquake results. The Bridgez.a earthquake causes 
peak structure drifts of up to l. 8 percent, while the El Centro record causes drifts of up to 1.3 percent. 
These results confirm that the performance of the modelled structures under a code-implied level of 
earthquake shaking will be good. The Bridgez.a and El Centro earthquakes impart only a limited level 
of ductility demand on the structures. The maximum displacement-ductility demand for these 
earthquake inputs is less than 3. 
The Pacoima and Parkfield earthquake records impart more extreme demands on the modelled 
structures. For the Pacoima record the peak structure drift is 3.8 percent; for the Parkfield record it 
is 5.4 percent. As previously noted, these two earthquakes have very high input energy in the period 
range of the structural response. For both of these records the earthquake energy is released in a few 
major pulses, over a duration of just a few seconds. 
Naeim (1995] has found these same characteristics in the strongest records from the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake. Such earthquake records, with a few major pulses of ground motion which greatly exceed 
code-implied earthquake demands, have also been observed in the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) 
earthquake, and in the 1992 Petrolia California earthquake. Such earthquake shaking characteristics 
tend to be found in locations "downstream• from the earthquake source; that is, in the direction of the 
fault propagation. In this direction the earthquake waves tend to stack up on each other causing larger 
pulses for shorter durations. For the 1940 El Centro record, the earthquake fault propagation was 
directed away from the recording station [Carr 1995b] causing a smaller amplitude of shaking with a 
longer duration. Seismic design codes tend to assume an El Centro type of earthquake response 
spectrum, although some engineers have proposed to account for more extreme earthquake effects using 
a near-field factor [SEAONC 1995]. 
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Respome for Different Hysteresis Models 
As well as showing a strong dependency on earthquake input, the peak displacement results of Table 
9.5 and Figure 9.4 show some consistent differences in the response of the three different hysteresis 
models. Typically, the seismic response of the anchorage-retrofit bridge is slightly improved over that 
of the unretrofitted bridge, and the response of the ideal structure is further improved over that of the 
other two models. 
For the Taft, Bucharest, and Mexico earthquake records there is, understandably, little difference in 
the peak displacement response between the three structural models. As previously noted, the 
behaviour for these earthquake inputs is elastic or nearly elastic, and therefore of little interest. 
Bridgeza and El Centro Earthquakes 
For the two earthquake records which produce moderate displacement demands, Bridgeza and El 
Centro, some differences between the three structures are evident. For the El Centro earthquake, the 
peak drift of the anchorage-retrofit bridge is 16 percent less than for the unretrofitted bridge. For the 
Bridgeza earthquake the peak drift for these two structures is about the same, but the maximum drift 
in the negative direction is reduced by about 20 percent for the anchorage-retrofit bridge. (See Tables 
9.5 and Figures 9.6a and 9.6b.) Comparing the ideal structure with the anchorage-retrofit bridge, the 
peak response for the El Centro and Bridgeza earthquakes is reduced by about 20 to 30 percent for the 
ideal structure. 
For the Bridge:za earthquake the structure drift time-histories are shown in Figure 9.5, and the force-
versus-displacement hysteresis response is shown in Figure 9.6. The figures again show (a) only a 
slight reduction in response for the anchorage-retrofit bridge over the unretrofitted, and (b) a more · 
significant reduction in response for the ideal structure over the anchorage-retrofit bridge. 
Interestingly, although a peak drift is the least for the ideal structure, the residual drift is the greatest. 
The residual drift is shown at the end of the time-history of Figure 9.5(c) to be about 0.4 percent. 
This level of residual lean in the bridge may be noticeable but would not compromise the ability of the 
structure to resist future earthquakes or its design loads. For the unretrofitted and anchorage-retrofit 
bridges the residual drift is nearly zero. 
Pacoima and Parktield Earthquakes 
For the two earthquake records which produce large displacement demands, Pacoima and Parkfield, 
the differences between the three structural models are more pronounced. Comparing the anchorage-
retrofit bridge to the unretrofitted, the results show a reduction of peak displacement by about 16 
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percent. Comparing the ideal structure with the anchorage-retrofit bridge, a reduction m peak 
displacements of about 40 percent is evident. 
For the Pacoima earthquake, structure drift time histories are shown in Figure 9. 7 and force-versus-
displacement hysteretic response plots are shown in Figure 9.8. The figures show the significant 
difference in structural response between the three models. 
Figure 9.8(a) shows that the unretrofitted bridge is subjected to most of its inelastic displacement 
demands in one pulse which pushes the structure to a drift of 3.4 percent. Figure 9.7(a) shows that 
this is the first major pulse of the Pacoima record, occurring about 3 seconds into the earthquake time 
history. A similar type of response occurs for the unretrofitted bridge due to the Parkfield earthquake. 
Naeim (1995] has noted that for such types of earthquake records damping is of little benefit, and the 
earthquake's energy must be dissipated as hysteretic energy by the structure. 
The increased strength of the anchorage-retrofit and ideal structures allows them to dissipate the 
earthquake energy of the first strong earthquake pulse with less lateral displacement, as shown in 
Figures 9.8(b) and 9.8(c). The fatter hysteresis loops of the ideal structure allow the structure to 
dissipate the input energy of the subsequent earthquake pulses with less displacement than that suffered 
by the anchorage-retrofit bridge. 
For the unretrofitted bridge, not only is the peak level of drift considerable, so is the residual drift. 
As shown in Figure 9.7(a), at the end of the Pacoima earthquake, the structure is left leaning at a drift 
of about 0.9 percent. For the anchorage-retrofit and ideal structures, the residual drift is about 0.3 
percent. 
Final Assessment 
The analysis results show that the seismic performance of the bridge depends greatly on the earthquake 
input. Because of its substantial lateral strength, the bridge is able to respond essentially elastically 
for a number of earthquake records. Earthquake records with demands similar to those assumed by 
design codes-eg, the Bridgeza and El Centro records-produce only moderate displacement demands 
on the structures. More severe earthquake records with extreme ground-motion pulses, such as 
Pacoima and Parkfield, produce higher displacement demands but do not cause bridge collapse. The 
performance of each of the three structures is summarized below for both the code-implied and severe 
earthquakes. 
Perf onnance for Code-implied Earthquake Levels 
All of the structures perform very well for code-implied earthquake levels, and the difference in 
response between the three structures is not dramatic. Considering the limit states of Table 9.6, it is 
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Figure 9.7 Structure Drift Time-History Results for the Pacoima Earthquake Record. 
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Lateral Force Versus Displacement Hysteretic Respome for the Pacoima 
Earthquake Record. 
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easily be repaired. The bridges may also be able to survive such earthquakes without loss of service 
or traffic disruption. 
The retrofitting of the column-bar end anchorages can result in a slight decrease in displacement 
response compared to the unretrofitted bridge. However, the small improvement in bridge performance 
for this level of earthquake would not justify the cost of the retrofit. 
The reduced response for the ideal structure compared to the anchorage-retrofit bridge indicates the 
better hysteretic energy-dissipating capacity of structures with deformed reinforcing. For the code-
implied earthquake level, however, the reduction in response is not dramatic. Also this benefit may 
be offset by the fact that for the same drift level, greater structural deterioration and residual drift can 
occur for structures with deformed reinforcing bars. 
Performance for Severe Earthquake Levels 
For severe earthquake inputs, the differences in structural performance for the three models become 
magnified. For the unretrofitted and anchorage-retrofit bridge, medium to heavy damage would be 
suffered and the structure is likely to be left with a noticeable residual drift and a degraded stiffness. 
Despite the extreme displacement response, the bridge would not collapse and might still be repairable, 
perhaps by using an added bracing retrofit as shown in Figure 8.9. The new braces could restore the 
degraded bridge stiffness and also be used, with jacking equipment, to straighten any residual lean in 
the structure. 
The anchorage-retrofit structure shows a consistently reduced response compared to the unretrofitted 
structure. However, the moderate level of improvement, and the low probability of such extreme 
earthquake shaking, mean that it would be difficult to justify such a retrofit. 
For the severe earthquake input the ideal structure shows a substantial reduction in seismic response. 
This shows a clear benefit in the use of deformed column bars instead of plain bars. For severe 
earthquake shaking as represented by the Parkfield and Pacoima records, the structure with deformed 




CONCLUSIONS FOR PART II 
The studies of the 1936-designed New Zealand bridge lead to several conclusions regarding the seismic 
assessment of existing reinforced-concrete structures: 
A Poor Bond Resistance of Plain Reinforcing Bars 
Compared with deformed reinforcement, plain-round reinforcement offers much poorer bond-
resistance and undergoes a more rapid degradation of bond under cyclic earthquake actions. 
The New Zealand concrete code NZS 3101 [SANZ 1982) specifies that the embedment length 
of plain-round reinforcement should be twice that required of deformed reinforcement. This 
factor of two may not be sufficient to account for the poor bond of plain-round 
reinforcement, particularly at higher ductility levels. The pending 1995 revision to NZS 
3101 prohibits the use of plain-round bars for main longitudinal reinforcement. 
B Stiffness Degradation and Hysteretic Response 
C 
D 
Structures with plain-round reinforcement suffer stiffness degradation under earthquake 
actions, and a pinching of lateral-force versus displacement hysteretic response, resulting 
from the bond-slip of the reinforcing. The stiffness degradation and pinched hysteresis loop 
shape could compromise the earthquake performance of structures with plain-round 
reinforcing bars, particularly for severe earthquake shaking characterized by a few very 
strong pulses. 
Strength, Displacement Capacity, and Seismic Perfonnance 
Despite the pinched hysteretic response, the high lateral strength and displacement capacity 
of the subject bridge result in excellent seismic performance and allow the structure to 
survive severe earthquake shaking without collapse. 
Bar-anchorage Retrofit 
If the bridge is retrofitted by welding anchorage end-plates to the tops of the column 
longitudinal bars, the peak lateral strength of the bridge increases and the degree of strength 
degradation reduces. As verified by the inelastic analyses, the anchorage retrofit would 
improve the seismic performance of the bridge. However, the amount of improvement 
probably does not justify the expense of such a retrofit. 
E Diagonal Bars 
The supplementary diagonal reinforcing bars at the .top and bottom end-flares of the bridge 
column contribute significantly to both flexural and shear strength of the critical section of 
the column. A seismic evaluation which neglected the contribution of these bars would 
under-estimate the earthquake-resisting capacity of the structure. 
F Concrete Confinement 
For columns with low axial load, the 1982 concrete code [SANZ 1982) is conservative in its 
requirements for concrete confinement. For the subject bridge this code over-estimates the 
required amount of transverse steel by a factor of 3. The 1995 draft code [SANZ 1995] has 
more accurate requirements, and is recommended as a basis for seismic assessment criteria. 
G Column-tie Spacing 
For columns with low axial load, good shear capacity, and large-diameter longitudinal 
reinforcing, the column-tie spacing requirements of the 1982 and 1995 concrete codes [SANZ 
1982 and 1995] may be conservative. A more accurate requirement, proposed by the author, 
is recommended for the seismic evaluation of such columns, except where the requirements 
of shear reinforcement result in a smaller spacing. 
H Seismic Evaluation Assumptions 
A preliminary seismic assessment of the subject bridge based on current design codes and 
practice concluded that "the pier-columns are unlikely to tolerate cyclic displacements much 
exceeding yield ... •. The laboratory testing and detailed analyses of the present study have 
shown this conclusion to be incorrect. This shows that assumptions used for the evaluation 
of existing structures often need to be more accurate than those used for the design of for 
new structures. 
I Confinement Retrofit Unwarranted 
The subject bridge is shown by the tests and the detailed evaluation not to be vulnerable to 
earthquake damage related to insufficient transverse reinforcing or shear capacity. Thus 
there would be no benefit in implementing a confinement-retrofit of the bridge columns such 
as adding a new column ties or an external column jacket. It had originally been proposed 
to test a confinement-retrofit of the column/foundation-beam specimen, but because of the 
above findings the idea was discarded. 
172 
J Research Needed for Structure with Plain Reinforcing Bars 
Concrete structures with plain-round IQngitudinal bars may require less transverse 
reinforcement than similar structures with defonned longitudinal bars. Research is needed 
on (a) bar buckling and (b) mechanisms of shear resistance for such structures. More in-
depth studies of bond-slip behavior are recommended. 
K Assumed Earthquake Input 
Inelastic time-history analyses of the subject bridge show that bridge response depends 
greatly on the earthquake input. Some earthquake records have a much higher damage 




MANAGEMENT AND PRIORITIZATION 
OF BRIDGE SEISMIC UPGRADING 

CHAPTER 11 
REVIEW OF PRIORITIZATION PROCEDURES FOR BRIDGE SEISMIC UPGRADING 
Because of the large number of bridges which need seismic upgrading and the limited resources 
available to evaluate, design, and carry out bridge retrofits, prioritization of retrofit work is vital. In 
this chapter bridge retrofit programs are discussed, and procedures for bridge-upgrade prioritization 
are critically examined. 
Prioritization procedures are evaluated in terms of the amount and type of data they consider, and the 
algorithms used for assessing the data. Proposals for improved methods of bridge upgrade 
prioritization -for example by using earthquake loss-estimations techniques-are presented. Finally 
a critique of the prioritization procedures is presented, which identifies some typical shortcomings of 
the procedures. 
11.1 Bridge Retrofit Programs and Established Prioritization Procedures 
The bridge upgrade programs in California, New Zealand, and Japan indicate that the task of 
seismically retrofitting bridges can be an enormous one. In 1986, a survey of Japan's bridges found 
that 30 percent required some form of retrofitting. A number of US states are beginning retrofitting 
programs for their bridges, and have developed prioritization procedures. 
Retrofit Programs in California and New Zealand 
California has approximately 24,500 bridges: 12,500 in the state highway system and 12,000 city and 
county-owned bridges. After preliminary screening, 7,000 of the 12,500 state highway bridges were 
identified as being potentially vulnerable to collapse due to earthquakes. On further study, many of 
these 7,000 bridges are being found to have adequate seismic resistance, so that as of May 1994 about 
3,000 state bridges were identified as vulnerable to collapse [Zelinski pers. comm. 1993, 1994]. 
Approximately 1,000 of California's state bridges have been identified as the highest priority bridges, 
because of their seismic deficiencies and importance in the transportation network. The design of 
seismic retrofits for these 1,000 bridges in California was scheduled for completion by the end of 1994. 
Construction of the projects is expected to be completed by the end of 1995. The program is expected 
to cost US $2.0 billion. In addition to the state highway bridges, 3,000 of the 12,000 city and county 
bridges are thought to be potentially vulnerable to seismic collapse, with 200 bridges being in the high-
priority category. The retrofit of the city and county bridges is expected to cost US $0.5 billion. 
Along with the above, a US $1 billion retrofit program is planned for the five large toll bridges 
crossing the San Francisco Bay. Costs for retrofitting the other five state-owned toll bridges in 
California are undetermined. The state transportation department, Caltrans, has been made responsible 
for the seismic assessment and retrofit of all public bridges in California-i.e., the city and county-
owned bridges as well as the state highway bridges [Zelinski pers. comm. 1994]. 
The New Zealand road network comprises approximately 15,500 bridges: 3,300 state highway bridges 
and 12,200 local authority bridges. The average bridge length is 39 m (130 ft) for state highway 
bridges and 17 m (56 ft) for local authority bridges. The national body Transit New Zealand is 
responsible for the state highway bridges, while approximately 50 local authorities are responsible for 
the remainder of the bridges [TNZ 1992]. Chapman [1991] estimates that nearly 80 percent of the 
state highway bridges were built before 1970; that is, before modem seismic-resistant design measures 
were in use. An overall seismic assessment of New Zealand's bridges has yet to be implemented, 
although studies of possible prioriti7.ation procedures are currently underway [Chapman pers. comm. 
1993, Chapman and Kirkcaldie 1994]. 
Established Prioritization Procedures 
Several prioriti7.ation procedures are discussed here, including the three most established procedures: 
the ATC 6-2 screening process [ATC 1983], the Caltrans procedure [Gates and Maroney 1990], and 
the Japanese Ministry of Construction procedure [Kawashima 1990). These three procedures are also 
described by Priestley et al [1992a]. A number of more recently developed procedures are also 
discussed. The procedures reviewed are listed in Table 11.1. Detailed descriptions of the procedures 
are not given here. Rather, comparisons and commentary on key aspects of the procedures are given, 
and suggestions for improved prioriti7.ation schemes are presented. 
Data Collection 
The task of prioriti7.ation can be divided into two steps: (a) collecting data on all of the bridges to be 
considered, and (b) mathematically (or subjectively) weighing and assessing the data to arrive at a 
relative priority for each bridge. In the first step of a prioriti7.ation procedure it must be decided what 
infonnation is to be collected and used for each bridge. A comparison of the data used for the three 
established prioriti7.ation schemes, Table 11.2, is revealing. 
The A TC 6-2 Procedure 
The ATC procedure [ 1983) requires the most data, but is less codified in temis of how the information 
is considered. More judgement and experience is required of the people collecting the data. In fact 
ATC recommends that "to enhance consistency it is desirable to have the rating of all bridges in one 
geographical area performed by the same personnel.• To collect all of the data recommended by ATC 
6-2, the transportation network and facilities related to each bridge must be studied. Site-specific soil 
information must be obtained, drawings must be reviewed, and the reviewer must have a good 
knowledge of seismic principles in structural engineering. The ATC procedure also requires that a 
simple calculation be made to estimate column capacities. 
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Table 11.1 Prioritization Procedur~ Reviewed 
Prioritization Approx. Number Algorithm Type Remarks 
Procedure of Data Items 
[Reference] 
Seis- lmpor- Vulner-
micity tance ability 
ATC 6-2 [1983) 1 8 20 additive, alternative subjective data used 
combinations 
Caltrans 1990 [Gates 1 4 7 additive no subjective data 
and Maroney 1990) 
Japan [Kawashima 0 0 0 mostly based on earthquake 
1990) multiplicative damage data 
Caltrans 1993 3 8 6 additive, seismicity 
[Gilbert 1993) multiplies 
Nevada [Sundstrom 1 4 6 additive 
and Maroney 1992) 
Missouri (Sundstrom 1 7 2 multiplicative and assumes bridge importance 
and Maroney 1992) additive based only on potential 
casualties 
Washington State * 7 * multiplicative and *refers to ATC 6-2 for 
[Babaei and Hawkins additive vulnerability and seismicity 
1991) ratings 
New York State 1 8 18 additive uses ATC 6-2 for 
[Buckle 1991] structural vulnerability 
rating 
New York St., GIS ? ? 14 additive used regression analysis 
method [Shinozuka et and damage data 
al 1992) 
Shelby County, 0 2 13 additive seismicity considered 
Tennessee [Pezeshk uniform 
et al 1993) 
Illinois [Cooling et al 1 5 * loss-estimation *refers to ATC 6-2 for 
1992) approach, additive structural vulnerability 
for importance 
Kentucky [Yu 1 1 8 additive importance weighted at 
Ouyang et al 1990, only 10% 
Buckle 1992) 
Oregon [CH2M Hill 1 8 8 multiplicative and Importance assessed 
1993) additive similar to Washington 
procedure 
Canada [Filiatrault et 1 5 8 additive, soil and tested procedure for 
al 1994) seismicity multiply dispersion of results and 
operator sensitivity 
Basoz and Numerous weighted additive considers fragility curves 
Kiremidjian [1995) and network analysis 
FIIW A [Buckle and 1 * 22 multiplicative, subjective data, 
Friedland 1995] additive, and *importance assessed 
nowchart qualitatively • 
New Zealand 1 7 17 additive, soil and preliminary proposal 
[Chapman and seismicity multiply 
Kirkcaldie 1994) 
Tasman District, NZ 1 3-7 10 nowchart, loss- provides for secondary 
[Maffei 1994, 1995] estimation and cost- screening 
benefit approach 
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The 1990 Caltrans Procedure 
Bridges may also be prioritized based on a more cursory collecti~n of information. The Caltrans first-level 
prioritization scheme [Gates and Maroney 1990) is based on only those factors shown in the second column of 
Table 11.2. Caltrans collects a smaller and less subjective set of information for each bridge than that 
recommended by ATC 6-2. The advantage of this approach is that the data collection can be carried out by less 
experienced engineers or non-engineers without sacrificing consistency. No structural calculations are ~uired. 
Caltrans used a survey form to solicit the information from local agencies, collecting roughly 12,000 forms from 
58 counties and 300 cities. 
Subsequent to preliminary screening, Caltrans has collected further information on some of its bridge stock using 
a "Detailed Seismic Review". The information collected for such a review, as shown in Figure l 1. 1, is more 
consistent with the ATC 6-2 recommendations. However, the detailed review data have yet to be used in an 
overall prioritization formula. 
The Japanese Procedure 
Like A TC 6-2, the Japanese procedure [Kawashima 1990) considers more information than the Caltrans procedure 
but unlike ATC 6-2 has a more codified, less subjective method of determining the numeric values relating to risk 
factors. The Japanese procedure is likely to be more accurate (and more costly to perform) than the Caltrans 
procedure. In the Japanese procedure, an assessment is made of soil and structural vulnerability only. Bridge 
importance is considered in a separate process. A seismicity variable was initially included but was dropped from 
the final version of the procedure because all areas of Japan have relatively high seismicity [Kawashima 1994). 
The Japanese procedure ~uires a few calculations (and/or engineering judgement) to complete the data on the 
expected level of damage to piers and fixed supports. 
11.J Weighing and Assessing Data 
The second step in a prioritization procedure is putting the bridge data into a formula to assess risk. For the three 
procedures discussed, numeric values are assigned in various ways to the risk factors collected. The numeric 
values are then combined in a formula to give a final rating to the bridge. For simple risk-assessment formulas, 
the factors can be combined in one of three ways: (I) alternative combination, where the worst of two or more 
factors is entered into combination with the remaining factors, (2) additive combination, where the factors are 
weighted and added, or (3) multiplicative combination. The combination selected should represent the correct 
interrelationship between the factors. 
The ATC 6-2 Procedure 
The A TC 6-2 (1983) procedure uses both alternative and additive combinations. The structural vulnerability factor 
is taken as the largest of separate vulnerability factors for movement joints, columns and footings, abutments, and 
soil liquefaction. The alternative combination is logical here because, for example, if movement joints are highly 
vulnerable then span unseating will likely preclude any other type of seismic failure. Thus if the movement joints 
are rated a 10 on the vulnerability scale of 0-10, that value governs the structural rating and it does not matter 
if the columns are rated a 2 or an 8 (until the movement joints are retrofitted, then the next highest vulnerability 
must be considered.) 
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Table 11.2 Data used for bridge prioritization. 
Type of ATC 6-2 (1993) Caltram (Gates and Maroney Japan 
Data 1990) Ministry of Construction 
(Kaw&.\hima 1990) 
Seismicity Peak Ground Acceleration Peak Ground Acceleration None (All regions have high 
seismicity) 
Importance FACTORS TO CONSIDER: FORMULA BASED ON: None (Importance 
considered in a separate 
Traffic/potential casualtie1, Route type, proce18) 
Adjacent facilities which could be Route type croued, 
damaged. Traffic, 
Population and damage Detour length 
vulnerability of neighbourhood. 
Routing of emergency traffic. 
Does bridge cal'T)' utilities? 
Evacuation route? 
Access to critical facilities. 
Length of alternate route. 
Soil FACTORS TO CONSIDER: Is bridge in a high-risk soil Soil vulnerability to 
zone? amplification. 
Liquefaction susceptibility baaed on soil Soil vulnerability to 
type, density, saturation, profile, and liquefaction. 
aite seismicity. 
Flexibility and ductility of columns for 
liquefaction induced displacemenlJI. 
Olher lllructural vulnerability to 
displacemenlJI, such as movement joint 
details. 
Structure FACTORS TO CONSIDER: FORMULA BASED ON: FORMULA BASED ON: 
(a) Movement JoinlJI Year of construction, Design specification used, 
Presence of joinlJI. Number of movement Superlllructure type, 
Abutment type. joinlJI, Superstructure material, 
Bridge 1kew. Height of bridge, Bridge 1kew or curve, 
Length to width ratio. Bridge skew, Gradient of bridge, 
Type of bearings, Presence of single-column Presence of movement-
Seat continuous transversely? bents, joint restrainers, 
Seal aupport length compared to Monolithic or seated Presence of single-column 
span length and height. abutmcnlJI. benlJI, 
Presence of shear key •. Height of bridge, 
Presence of irregular 
(b) Columns, Wall Piers and ground, 
Footings Scour at river bed, 
Column transverse reinforcing. Shear span ratio of piers, 
Column capacity. Cracking strength of 
Structural continuity. piers, 
Reinforcing llleel grade, Flexural capacity of piers, 
Presence of lap splices in hinge Column shear strength, 
regions. Abutment type, 
Foundation type, 
(c) Abutments Foundation capacity. 
Soil fill height. 
II bridge a water crossing? 
Bridge 1kew, 
Depth of abutment foundation. 
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Figure 11.1 
ILLI.AILED S E I S M I C -REVIEW DATA S H E E I 
B R I D 6 E # 
DEPARTHENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
Dlvl1lon of Structur• 1 
Sp• cl • l ProJ• ct1 Branch 
S• Js•Jc RatrofJt Progr-
y• ar dedgnad? 
SUPERSTRUCTURE DETAILS: 




011onollthic Joints Osl11ph span supports 
OP.S. concr• t • OC.R. concreta Oste• l Otl• b• r 
C-b• nts? 
any rocker bearings? 
shared colU'llns? 
supar/sub conn. type? 
•at• rial type? 
section type? CI-girder Obox-girder Oslab O• rch OT-girder Otruss Osuspenslon 
nuflber of spans? __ 
••>elat\JIII span length? __ 11inh,u• span length? __ average span lenglh? __ 
aaxinua span width? ainimu• span width? average span width? __ 
• axh1u11 skew? __ --11ini11u• skew? __ av;;:;;e skew? __ 
overall length 11easured in feet? 
curvature: 
a•allest radius in feel? arc angle Jn degrees? 
HINGE DETAILS: 
nut1ber of hinges?__ hinge seal width in inches? 
restrainers? OYES ONO 
net axt • nders? OYES ONO 
ABUTMENT DETAILS: 
abut. typa? Osnt•type Oand-dlaphrag• Cother (tied do,m) Cother (not tJ• d do,m) 
abut. seat width in inch• s? __ 
shear kays? • YES ONO • YES, but very s11all 
retrofit? • YES OHO 
COLUMN DETAILS: 
Is colU01n confined in regions of possibla yielding (can it behave In• ductile •annerl? 
OYES O?YES 0?HO ONO 
11alerial type? 01".S. concrete CC.It. concrete Oaleel Otiaber 
nu.her of colUl'lnl per bent? alnl..,_,. per bent__ ••x1""'91 per bent 
nl.ll'lber of 1lngle-colu..n bents? nuaber of 11Nlll-coluN"t bents? __ --
• axh1u. coluttns height? __ ~111v. colUW'I h• lght? __ average colVMn height'? 
transverse ralnforceMent: 0 spirals l __ bars; Inches 
0 ties l __ bars ; __ Inches 
trans. r • inf, well Into footing I superstructure? 0 YES 0110 
longitudinal relnforc• ftent: 
Ito what deg•••••• th• colu,ms rainforced?I ---> percent of longitudinal steel In coluom 
hP sllcas ln regions of possible yl • lding? • YES OHO 
FOOTING DETAILS: 
top •at of s !• el? OYES ONO 
pedestal? OYES ONO 
shaar relnforce11ent? • YES ONO • construction only 
colu.m/foottn9 connection? 0 pinned O fixed 
piles or spread footings? Opih Osprud Oshaft 
lf piles, can they carry tension? • YES ONO Otoo difficult to judge 
SOIL DATA: 
log of tut borings? • YES ONO data? 
soil typa? • sand Oclay Osllt Otoo difficult to judge. 
blow count greater than 20 at a depth of 15 feet balow th• surf• c• ? • YES ONO 
depth to rock-llke • at• rlal in feet? Otoo difficult to Judge 
depth to w•l • rllne in feet? __ date? 
if geology contacted, ARS curve? 




liqulf• ctlon pot• ntl • l? Ohlgh Clow • none 
NAHE: 
NAHE: 





R• viow• rs and checkers: List suggested ralrofit strategies on the back of this sheet. 
Caltrans "Detailed Seismic Review Data Sheet" [Gates and Maroney 1990]. 
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(Rav 6-zz.,r, 
Some interaction of factors, however, is neglected by ATC 6-2. Consider the following: ifliquefaction 
occurs, structures with poor column ductility capaciti_es or vulnerable movement joints have a greater 
risk of failure than monolithic, ductile structures, but if the liquefaction vulnerability of the site is rated 
a 10, then all types of structures on the site would be given the same vulnerability rating. Conversely, 
structures with poor column ductility capacity or deficient movement joints are even more vulnerable 
on a liquefaction-prone site than they would be on a rock site. Thus a more accurate risk formula 
would consider the interaction of liquefaction risk with structural risk, perhaps by using an additive 
or multiplicative combination. 
The final risk rating used by ATC 6-2 is calculated on the weighted additive combination of three basic 
factors: seismicity, importance, and (soil and structure) vulnerability, as shown in Figure 11.2. In 
this case the additive combination of factors does not seem to be appropriate, especially when one of 
the factors indicates low risk. Consider an important bridge in a region of high seismicity, on a rock 
site, detailed to the most recent design requirements with no seismic deficiencies. This bridge would 
be rated 10 for seismicity, 10 for importance, and 0 for vulnerability. The bridge would have final 
rating of 6.67 out of 10, despite having been designed to the current state of the art. Meanwhile a 
bridge of medium to high vulnerability, importance, and seismicity-which would benefit from seismic 
retrofitting-could end up with a lower final rating, perhaps 6 out of 10. Thus it would be more 









* Equal weighting of the three factors is recommended, 
unless different weights "are assigned by the engineer 
to reflect regional and jurisdictional needs". 
A TC 6-2 bridge prioritization approach. 
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The Caltrans Procedure 
The weightoo additive formula used by Caltrans is represented by Figure 11.3. The formula gives a 
· priority rating which can be expressed a 0-100 scale, 100 indicating the highest priority to retrofit. 
Gates and Maroney [1990] note that •Expert judgements by professionals in the field of bridge 
engineering were used to derive and calibrate a risk algorithm. The survey was used to determine 
which characteristics would have high correlations to bridge damage or cost to public transportation 
and what their relative correlations would be. This panel of experts represented hundreds of years of 
bridge experience•. The expert advice was no doubt valuable in assessing the influence of various 
factors such as year of construction and in assessing the relative importance of the risk factors. The 
bridge engineering expertise is partly wasted, though, because corresponding expertise in risk analysis 
appears not to have been used. The strictly additive combination used in the Caltrans algorithm 
hampers the accuracy and value of the prioritization effort. For example a structurally deficient bridge 
in an area with no seismicity can still be given a rating as high as 88 out of 100, while an important 
bridge in the highest seismic zone, which is vulnerable to collapse can receive a lower rating, 83 out 
of 100. This would be the case for a bridge which had severe seismic deficiencies, but which did not 
include the potential dificiencies of plan skew and single-column belts. According to Priestley et al 
[1992a] the fact that seismicity only contributes a maximum of 12 percent to the seismic hazard rating 













bents STRUCTURE 52% 
Caltrans bridge prioriti:zation rating [Gates and Maroney 1990]. 
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Recently Caltrans has revised its prioritization formula [Gilbert 1993]. The most significant changes 
are that (a) the overall seismicity variable is now a multiplicative factor, and (b) bridge importance now 
has more weight than structural vulnerability. The new Caltrans formula weights importance at 0.6 
and structure vulnerability at 0.4, adds them together and multiplies by the seismicity. Previously, 
structural vulnerability was weighted more than twice as much as importance (52 % to 24 % as shown 
in Figure 11.3). In the new formula it is weighted at only 66 % of the importance weight (0.4 to 0.6). 
Most of the same risk variables from the previous prioritization data are used in the new formula. 
However, bridge height has been eliminated as a variable, and the presence of "leased air space" under 
a bridge is now considered in the importance factor (apparently because of concern over potential 
lawsuits). Further documentation of leased air spaces for California bridges is now needed to complete 
the prioritization database. 
The Japanese Procedure 
The Japanese prioritization formula [Kawashima 1990] seems to be a significant improvement over the 
additive ATC and Caltrans equations. The procedure was formulated on the statistical analyses of 105 
bridges damaged in past earthquakes. Most of the combinations of factors are multiplicative. The 
procedure was used in 1986 to inspect about 40,000 bridges, 11,700 of which were found to require 
seismic strengthening. An example of the Caltrans and Japanese procedures, using the 1936-designed 
New Zealand bridge discussed in Part III of this report, is provided by Dekker and Park [1992]. 
Procedures Developed for Nevada, M~uri, Washington, and Canada 
Sundstrom and Maroney [ 1992] provide a useful review of prioritization procedures developed for 
Nevada, Missouri and Washington. The procedures are all simple additive and/or multiplicative 
algorithms. 
Nevada and Missouri 
The Nevada procedure is a direct simplification of the ATC 6-2 method using three additive variables. 
The seismicity variable is taken as proportional to the seismic acceleration coefficient. The importance 
variable depends mainly on an additive combination of route type and traffic volume. The structural 
vulnerability factor depends on the number of vulnerable detail types. 
The Missouri procedure is a multiplicative combination of earthquake (rock) acceleration times soil 
amplification times structure vulnerability times an importance factor. The only structural data required 
is the classification of the bridge into one of three structure types: simple span, continuous with 
movement joints, or continuous and monolithic. Thus the structural vulnerability factor can be taken 
as one of only three possible values. Unlike other prioritization methods which mostly consider the 
importance of a bridge in terms of transportation disruption, the Missouri procedure considers only the 
potential casualties. The casualties are assumed to be directly related to the number of vehicles likely 
185 
to be on the bridge, or within stopping distance of it, at the instant an earthquake strikes. This basis 
for the importance factor causes the prioritii.ation results ~to be very sensitive to bridge length 
[Sundstrom and Maroney 1992]. 
Washington Stale 
Washington [Babaei and Hawkins 1991a, 1991b uses a mostly multiplicative procedure. 
"Vulnerability" (including seismicity) is taken as the product of variables for design acceleration 
coefficient times soil amplification times structural vulnerability times remaining service life. The 
structural vulnerability factor is the sum of a vulnerability rating for substructure details plus a 
vulnerability rating for movement joints. (Note that, as previously mentioned, an allernaJive 
combination would be more appropriate here because if movement joints are likely to fail, the bridge 
vulnerability is not affected by substructure details.) 
The factor for remaining service life is unique to the Washington procedure. It reflects the de.creased 
likelihood of strong earthquakes occurring over a shorter service life. Note that remaining service life 
could also be considered in another way: if a bridge will need replacement or substantial repair soon, 
it may not make sense to seismically retrofit the structure until that time. Thus the seismic retrofit 
prioritii.ation of the bridges in a jurisdiction should (ideally) be considered in conjunction with other 
bridge upgrade, repair, and maintenance priorities. 
The Washington state procedure multiplies the vulnerability factor times a criticality (ie, importance) 
factor. The criticality factor is an additive combination of variables used for (a) the traffic importance 
of the bridge (equal to route type times traffic volume times detour length variables), plus (b) essential 
utility lines carried by the bridge, plus (c) the traffic importance of the route which is crossed, plus 
(d) a function of traffic volume times length, which apparently accounts for potential casualties. This 
formula for the criticality factor seems to be a well-considered mixing of the combination types which 
are appropriate and logical for each of the variables involved. 
Canada 
Filiatrault et al (1994] have proposed a seismic screening procedure for existing bridges in Canada. 
The procedure is an adaptation of the revised Caltrans procedure. Filiatrault et al tested their 
procedure on 17 bridges in the Montreal area, and concluded that the procedure showed a "good 
dispersion in the score obtained•, but they did not compare the scores to actual seismic vulnerability, 
such as would be determined in a detailed analysis. 
Filiatrault et al had three different operators use the procedure on their sample group of bridges, to 
show that the procedure was not sensitive to who carried out the evaluation. This consistency of 
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results by different operators is a necessary attribute of a prioritization procedure. Such consistency 
derives from (a) minimizing subjective data, and {b)-providing clear instructions for the procedure. 
Comparisons of Procedures 
Buckle (1991, 1992) has reviewed the ATC 6-2 and 1990 Caltrans methods, and the methods proposed 
for Washington, Kentucky, and Illinois, and has proposed his own additive procedure. 
Sundstrom and Maroney [ 1992] have compared the Nevada, Missouri, and Washington procedures with 
the Caltrans procedures using a sample of 100 California bridges. Their comparison shows disparities 
between the results of the different prioritization procedures, but further conclusions are not made. 
Further studies of this type would be very useful in validating or improving prioritization procedures. 
Comparisons with experts' opinions of the bridge rankings, with the results of detailed seismic 
evaluations, and with actual bridge damage data, would also be useful. 
11.4 Concepts for Improved Prioriti7.ation Methods 
The prioritization formulas discussed may each have different strengths and weaknesses. In general, 
however, the procedures seem rather arbitrary and poorly verified. None of the prioritization 
procedures reviewed above use cost-benefit analyses or take advantage of available seismic-risk analysis 
techniques. 
Besides providing better information on relative risk, a more sophisticated probability-based risk 
analysis has the benefit that overall risk and expected earthquake losses can be determined. Thus for 
a given magnitude earthquake on a given fault, an estimate of probable economic losses, transportation 
disruption, and casualties can be made. Combined with the probabilities of various levels of 
earthquakes occurring, overall risks for a jurisdiction can be determined, and the cost effectiveness of 
different bridge retrofit programs can be evaluated. Gates and Maroney (1990] state that "such 
analyses generally require vast collections of data to define statistical distributions for all, or at least 
the most important, elements of some form of analysis, design, and/or decision equations. The 
acquisition of this information can be extremely costly if obtainable at all". Priestley et al [1992a] echo 
similar doubts about the feasibility of probability-based risk analyses. These statements are not well 
founded. With proper application, probability-based risk analysis techniques can be used even with 
the most limited of data sets. In fact, if the depth of bridge data is limited, it is more important that 
they be analysed properly than if the data were extensive. 
Seismic Risk-~ent Method Proposed by Lizundia 
An example of a probability-based seismic risk analysis of a large group of structures is provided by 
Rutherford and Chekene Consulting Engineers (1990] in a study of San Francisco's unreinforced 
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masonry (URM) buildings. In this study limited data such as number of stories, plan area, building 
use, and structural irregularities were collected from each of the 2007 URM buildings in the study 
area. A probability-based procedure was used to determine, among other things: (a) the likely 
casualties and property damage losses resulting from specified scenario earthquakes (eg, magnitude 7 .0 
on the Hayward fault or magnitude 8.3 on the San Andreas fault), (b) the overall costs, damage 
savings, and casualty savings associated with three different proposed city-wide retrofit ordinances, 
considering probabilistic seismicity, and (c) the relative seismic vulnerabilities of 15 different types of 
URM buildings. 
A similar approach can be used to prioritize bridge retrofit work. The basic steps of a probability-
based seismic risk analysis of bridges could be as follows [Lizundia pers. comm. 1993): 
1 Separate the bridge structures into five to ten basic categories such as: 
• Bridges less than three spans, monolithic or with restrainers. 
• Bridges less than three spans with unrestrained movement joints. 
• Bridges ~ three spans with restrainers. 
• Bridges ~ three spans with unrestrained movement joints. 
• Bridges ~ three spans with single column bents. 
• Bridges designed after 1980. 
2 Based on damage data from past earthquakes and expert opinion, develop damage versus 
modified mercalli earthquake intensity (MMI) curves, as shown in Figures 11.4 and 11.6, 
taken from ATC 13 (1985). (Instead of using MMI, peak ground acceleration, PGA, or some 
other measure of earthquake shaking could be used.) 
3 For each bridge site determine the probable seismicity, which can be expressed as a curve of 
annual probability of exceedance versus earthquake intensity (or versus peak ground 
acceleration) as shown in Figure 11.5. The seismicity is adjusted based on the site soil 
conditions. 
4 Based on the combination of damage curves and probable seismic intensity curves, determine 
the "baseline" expected damage to each class of bridge. 
5 For each bridge, adjust the baseline damage for the individual risk factors of that bridge, such 
as skew, curvature, pier height, etc. 
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6 Over the time period of interest, say the next 30 years, compute the earthquake loss results, 
for example: final dollar loss resulting from _bridge damage, probability of loss of bridge use, 
and estimated casualties. 
7 Consider bridge importance by estimating equivalent dollar losses resulting from bridges being 
closed. Note that plots of "restoration time" versus damage state have been developed by ATC-
13 [ 1985), as shown in Figure 11. 7. Such plots can be the first step in quantifying the cost 
of losing the use of a bridge. 
8 For each bridge, add the cost of bridge damage to the cost of loss of use. The bridges with 
the highest sum of these two factors are the highest priority bridges to retrofit. 
A few points on the procedure are important to note: 
(a) In step (1) the given categories are for example only; the proper selection of categories 
involves consideration of how distinct the damage curves for each category will be. 
(b) In step (2) it should be noted that significant work on developing damage curves has already 
been done. ATC-13, Eanhquake Damage Evaluation Data for California (1985) presents such 
curves, in graphical and matrix form, for 78 different classes of structures including three 
categories of bridges. These damage curves are shown in Figure 11.5 and tabulated in Figure 
11.8. ATC-13 also describes the methodology for deriving damage curves. 
(c) As shown in step (3), with the current sophistication ofobtaining seismological data, seismicity 
need not be considered as just one factor. Site specific curves of probability versus intensity 
can be derived from identification of causative earthquake faults, probable earthquake 
magnitudes, distances to faults and attenuation relationships. In many areas of the world, 
seismological studies have been done which make this information available in the form of 
seismic haz.ard maps. 
In California such information can be obtained, and conveniently used in computer analyses, 
from computer seismicity models. One such program [Rutherford and Chekene Consulting 
Engineers 1990) uses a geometric model of all fault sources, their maximum earthquake, and 
probabilities of lesser earthquakes, to predict earthquake shaking intensity (by either MMI or 
PGA) at any given location in California. The intensity can be predicted for any given 
scenario earthquake, or a probable seismicity curve can be generated considering all possible 
faults and earthquakes. 
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(d) Although the procedure is probabilistic, expert opinion is relied upon to provide data for the 
basic assumptions in steps l, 2, 5, and 7 of the analysis (defining bridge categories, developing 
damage curves, adjusting damage for individual risk factors, and estimating the costs of bridge 
damage). The procedure is designed so that the assumptions are easily checked and calibrated; 
thus the engineering expertise is used to maximum benefit. 
(e) With little added effort, the risk analysis program can provide additional useful infonnation to 
bridge jurisdictions. For example, the annual probability of closure for any given bridge or 
the probable damage along a given route or in a given area could be determined. 
(t) The use of additional data could further increase the accuracy of the risk model. Expected 
remaining service life for a bridge could be factored into the model, adjusting the importance 
factor. A rough estimate of retrofit cost, perhaps based on bridge sire and type, could also 
be 
used as data. This would allow prioritization on a cost-benefit basis: cheaper-to-fix bridges 
would get pushed up on the priority scale. 
(g) Finally, if damage curves for post-retrofit structures are developed, the effectiveness of various 
retrofit programs could be assessed by comparing pre-retrofit and post-retrofit damage 
predictions. 
In their theoretical study of bridge-upgrade prioritization, Basoz and Kiremidjian (1995) also advocate 
the use of bridge damage curves (or fragility curves) combined with probable seismicity curves to 
estimate bridge vulnerability. Their assumption in defining damage curves, that bridge structural 
vulnerability depends mainly on construction materials and overall structure type, rather than detailing 
and the presence of specific seismic deficiencies, is, however questionable. 
Seismic Risk Suney ror Illinois 
Cooling et al (1992) have carried out a bridge seismic risk study for the Illinois Department of 
Transportation. They have used an approach based partly on risk-analysis methods which has 
similarities to several of the recommendations given in the previous section. Cooling et al summarire 
the risk-based- approach with the following formula: 
Risk = (Probability of failure) X (Consequences of failure) 
A bridge vulnerability factor is used as a measure of probability of failure, and an importance factor 
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Factor Modified Mercalli Intensity 
---------------------------------- FACILITY CLASS=24 -------------------------
VI VII VIII IX I II XII 
0.00 3.0 Ht ttt ttt Ht tit tit 
o.so 97,0 12.3 Ht Ht Ht tH Ht 
5.00 Hf 85.7 70.9 Hf Ht Ht Ht 
20.00 Hf Ht 29, 1 71.1 Ht tit tH 
45.00 Ht ttt tit 28,9 82.4 tit Ht 
80.00 Ht tit Ht Ht 16.9 100,0 Ht 
100.00 Hf Ht Ht ... tH tit 100.0 
---------------------------------- FACILITY CLASS=2S -------------------------
VI VI I VIII IX X XI XII 
-0.00 93.b 8.1 0.9 Ht Ht flt Ht 
0.50 b.4 77.B 17.6 Ht Hf ltt ltt 
5.00 ttf 14.1 78.6 56,S Hf ttt ttt 
20.00 Ht Ht 2.9 43,S LB 1,2 0.7 
4S.00 Ht Ht Ht ttt 98.2 36.B 5.7 
80.00 Hf Ht Ht ttt Ht 61,9 39,1 
100,00 ttt Hf Ht tH Ht 0.1 54.5 
---------------------------------- FACILITY CLASS=30 -------------------------
VI VII VIII IX I II II I 
o.oo 100,0 58.0 33,2 15,8 Ht ttt Ht 
o.so ttt 42.0 66.S 39,9 0.7 ttt ttt 
5.00 tit Ht 0,3 43.7 55.2 5.0 Hf 
20.00 ttt tit ... 0.6 43.4 53.0 3.6 
45.00 ttt ttt ... Ht 0.7 40.8 39.9 
80.00 ttt Ht ttt Ht Hf 1.2 56.0 
100,00 HI 1ft Ht Ht Ht Ht 0.5 
***Very small probability 
Figure 11.8 Matrix representation of probabilistic damage versus earthquake intensity (MMI) 
relationships [ATC 1985). 
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In assessing the vulnerability factor, the Illinois procedure uses a probability-based approach. In 
assessing the consequence of failure, the Illinois _procedure is somewhat more arbitrary, using 
weighted-additive combination of bridge importance variables. The variables and their weighting 
factors are as shown below: 
Traffic Volume 69% 
Emergency Route 15% 
Detour Length 10% 
Defence Route 5% 
Utilities Carried 1% 
100% 
In establishing the bridge vulnerability factor, the Illinois procedure uses a form of damage-versus-
earthquake intensity curve called a fragility curve. Peak ground acceleration is used on the horizontal 
axis as the measure of earthquake-shaking intensity; probability of failure is plotted on the vertical 
axis. Fragility curves are developed for different structural ratings and then combined with the 
probable seismicity curve for the bridge site to arrive at a structural vulnerability factor. This factor 
is meant to reflect the "probability of failure caused by shaking alone, independent of liquefaction 
failure". A second set of fragility curves is developed for different soil conditions to arrive at a ground 
vulnerability factor, which reflects the "probability of failure caused by liquefaction alone, independent 
of failure due to shaking". The structural and ground vulnerability factors are "combined according 
to the rules of probability" to give a bridge vulnerability factor. (The reference does not make clear 
what interdependence is assumed between structural and liquefaction failures.) 
The bridge vulnerability factor is multiplied by the importance factor to give the bridge priority score. 
The structural assessment procedures of the Illinois method are "based primarily on ATC 6-2". A 
structural rating is assigned, on a scale of Oto 100, by taking the worst of either the substructure or 
superstructure rating and combining it with factors related to bridge geometry, stiffness, and mass. 
Different fragility curves are assumed, based on the structural rating. 
Before carrying out any structural assessments, the Illinois bridges were preliminarily ranked based 
on (a) the importance factor, (b) expected seismic accelerations, (c) soil zone for amplification, and 
(d) soil zone for liquification. For this preliminary step, all 6,700 bridges were assumed to have the 
same structural rating. Statewide maps of expected bedrock acceleration and soil categories were 
digitized and put into the database used for bridge ranking. After this preliminary ranking, structural 
assessments were made, looking at the highest-ranked bridges first. 
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Seismic-Risk Study for the Tasman District 
Although a probabilistic risk analysis can be complex, it is not necessarily a difficult undertaking. For 
preliminary screening, the procedure should be based on a minimum amount of data from each bridge. 
Useful information already exists on damage versus intensity curves, probabilistic seismicity, and the 
costs of losing a bridge. This information can be specifically adapted to the bridge stock being 
screened. For the remainder of the procedure the computer does the work. A risk-based model of 
bridge upgrade prioritization is well within current analysis capabilities. 
In New Zealand's Tasman District, an overview seismic assessment and bridge-upgrade management 
study has been conducted by the present author [Maffei 1994). Risk analysis techniques similar to 
those described in the above sections have been used in the study. The study introduces a new method 
of (a) ranking the seismic vulnerability of bridges related to damage curves, and (b) estimating the 
likely seismic damage, the cost of damage, and benefit/cost ratios for seismic upgrading. The method 
allows the prioritization of bridge-upgrading according to the estimated benefit/cost ratio of each 
project. The Tasman study also includes a quick method of estimating the seismic vulnerability of 
typical New Zealand bridges. The method is described in Chapter 12. 
Future Developments 
Additional levels of sophistication m bridge-upgrade prioritization are also worth considering. 
Evaluation of the transportation routes using network theory-with links and nodes of the transportation 
system modelled onto computer along with bridge locations-could more accurately account for the 
importance of a particular bridge. Such an analysis could consider for example that the priority to 
retrofit bridge "A• depends partly on the seismic vulnerability of bridges "B" and •c• which are in 
series with it, and of bridges "D •, "E •, "F", etc, which may be on the potential alternate routes should 
bridge •A• collapse. Thus the interrelationship of bridge importance is considered. Network theory 
has been used to evaluate efficiencies and problem scenarios in telecommunication networks. 
However, its application to transportation networks is relatively new [Du and Nicholson 1993). 
Recently Basoz and Kiremidjian [1995) have studied highway lifeline network analysis for bridges 
damaged in earthquakes, considering both the disruption to emergency access routes occurring 
immediately following an earthquake and the longer-term transportation disruption effects. 
The developing technology called geographical information systems (GIS) may prove useful for bridge 
retrofit prioritization analysis. GIS programs are computer databases which include spatial data and 
have cartographic capabilities. They have been used for studies of land use, development planning, 
environment and wildlife, and other applications where the data is partly geographical (or spatial). 
Road networks, bridges, and associated data can be entered into, and manipulated by, GIS programs. 
For many bridge jurisdictions, it may be preferable to integrate bridge seismic retrofit programs with 
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other bridge-upgrade and maintenance programs. A GIS method may be one way to accomplish this 
overall bridge management. A preliminary effort to integrate bridge seismic risk assessment with GIS 
technology is proposed by Shinozuka et al (1992). The topic is also discussed by Bosoz and 
Kiremidjian (1995). 
The level of effort which is appropriate for the prioritization of bridge retrofitting needs to be 
considered. Some of the above suggestions might be unjustifiably complex for smaller jurisdictions. 
However, in many places the number of vulnerable bridges is substantial, and it is unlikely that all 
bridges will be retrofitted in time to escape the next damaging earthquake. California, for example, 
will spend multiple billions of dollars on bridge retrofitting in the coming decades. Even the most 
complex risk analysis would cost only a fraction of a percent of the total seismic retrofit cost. 
11.S Critique of Prioriti7.ation Procedures 
After reviewing numerous prioritization procedures, then developing the Tasman District procedures 
(see Chapters 12 and 13), and then re-examining the established prioritization procedures, the author 
bas found a number of questionable aspects in the established procedures. When tested by comparing 
the prioritization of different hypothetical bridges, the procedures can give illogical results. 
Table 11. 3 summarizes some of the major shortcomings of many of the prioritization procedures which 
have been reviewed here. As shown in the table, flaws are evident in several aspects of typical 
prioritization procedures. These aspects include (a) the assessment of structural vulnerability, (b) the 
assessment of bridge importance, (c) the overall prioritization algorithm, and (d) the verification and 
implementation of the procedures. These aspects of the prioritization procedures are considered below: 
~ent of Structural Vulnerability 
Many of the procedures reviewed here assess the structural vulnerability of bridges by using additive 
combinations of variables which each relate to vulnerable structural aspects or seismic deficiencies. 
The basic problem with this approach is that in reality bridges can be extremely vulnerable to 
earthquake damage even if they have only one type of seismic deficiency. 
For example a bridge with reinforced-concrete columns which (due to their proportions and detailing) 
are prone to brittle shear failure can be extremely vulnerable. But if the variable for column detailing 
is only one of several variables in an additive combination, such a bridge is not likely to be given a 
high priority rating. Hwang (1994] has noted that "the seismic vulnerability of a bridge is not caused 
by the summation of minor defects; instead, a single major defect may cause the bridge to fail. Thus, 
the additive form is not suitable for screening procedures". The ATC 6-2 procedure, using an 
alternative combination of three structural vulnerability ratings, is less susceptible to this problem. 
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For bridges with reinforce.d-concrete columns, a close-spacing of column ties is essential to good 
earthquake perfonnance. Prior to the early 1970s such ductil~ detailing was rarely provided in bridge 
columns. The extreme influence of this single variable is often neglected or under emphasised in 
prioritization procedures. 
Conversely, the effect of the number of columns in a bridge pier may be over-emphasised by 
prioritization procedures. Some procedures consider bridges with single-column bents to be twice as 
vulnerable as those with multiple-column bents. Past earthquakes have shown however that the 
"redundancy" of a multi-column bent is of little help if the columns are not ductile. The failure of one 
column often coincides with the failure of other columns in the pier and results in the bridge's collapse. 
In some cases multi-column piers can be more vulnerable than single-column piers because shear 
demands are higher due to double-curvature, rather than cantilever, bending. 
Prioritization procedures often consider the number of superstructure movement joints to be a 
significant variable affecting the vulnerability of a bridge to drop-type span collapses. In reality, the 
span seating length and the presence of linkage bolts or restrainers seem to be more important variables 
than the number of movement joints. A bridge with two movement joints (eg, at the abutments only) 
having poor seating and linkage is more vulnerable than a bridge with 50 movement joints having good 
seating and linkage. 
The effect of skew on seismic vulnerability is usually modelled poorly in prioritization procedures. 
For bridges with movement joints, the presence of skewed supports can greatly magnify the likelihood 
of drop-type failures, even for relatively small skew angles. By contrast, skew has little or no 
detrimental effect on monolithic bridges. None of the prioritization procedures reviewed recognise this 
distinction; the same skew rating is applied regardless of whether or not movement joints are present. 
For bridges with movement joints, the typical skew variable seems to have too little of an effect on the 
bridge priority rating. 
The more general weakness of prioritization proce.dures in assessing the structural vulnerability of a 
bridge seems to be that they are too arbitrary. Many of the specific shortcomings of proce.dures, as 
described above, could be eliminated if the assessment of structural vulnerability were derived from 
seismic damage estimates using risk analysis techniques. Such a method relates bridge seismic 
deficiencies, structural characteristics, and various combinations of deficiencies and characteristics to 
a damage versus earthquake-intensity curve, as discussed in Section 11.4, and as used in the Illinois 
procedure and the Tasman District method. (See section 12.6.) 
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Table 11.3 Typical Flaws Found in Prioritii.ation Procedures 
Component of the Typical Flaws 
Procedure 
Structural Additive combinations of variables for seismic deficiencies, can 
Vulnerability overlook bridges with a single critical deficiency. 
Underemphasis on detailing or year of construction for reinforced 
concrete columns. 
Overemphasis of single-column vulnerability compared to multi-
column. 
Emphasis on number of movement joints rather than span seating 
details or year of construction. 
Underemphasis of skew for bridges with movement joints; 
overemphasis of skew in other cases. 
Neglect seismic damage-estimation and risk analysis techniques. 
Bridge Importance Neglect expected bridge service-life variable. 
Neglect variable of whether temporary access can be provided in 
place of the bridge. 
Underemphasize traffic volume (ADT). 
Possibly unnecessary variables (eg, route-type, utilities) included. 
Additive combinations used where multiplicative are more logical 
(eg, transportation disruption should be proportional to ADT times 
detour length). 
Neglect loss-estimation and cost-benefit techniques. 
Overall Algorithm Single-formula algorithms used rather than flow-chart algorithms-do 
not allow "if-statements". 
Additive or partially additive combinations- are apparently arbitrary 
and can give illogical results. 
Over-use of step functions, rather than continuous ratings. 
Some data too subjective. 
Formulas are abstract, not transparent. 
Verification Poorly verified. Results not compared to actual bridge damage data 
or results from detailed seismic-evaluations or cost-benefit studies. 
Engineering expertise used abstractly-not used to verify results. 
Implementation Secondary screening procedures not provided. 
Procedures poorly integrated with computer-database capabilities. 
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~ent of Bridge hnportance 
Most of the prioritization procedures reviewed (the Washing.ton state procedure being an exception) 
do not consider expected bridge service life as a variable. And none of the procedures consider the 
important variable of whether temporary access can be provided in place of the bridge during its 
reconstruction after earthquake damage. This variable depends on the type of obstacle crossed by the 
bridge. Most New Zealand bridges are water crossings. Those which cross small streams would 
probably be temporarily replaced by a ford following earthquake damage. Bridges which cross large 
rivers cannot be temporarily replaced in this way and it is thus more important to protect them from 
earthquake damage. In developing the prioritization method described in Chapter 12, the service life 
and temporary-access variables were found to be significant factors in the importance of a bridge. 
Some of the prioritization procedures reviewed may underemphasise the significance of traffic volume 
(average daily traffic, ADn in the bridge importance assessment. Other, seemingly less significant 
variables are often given more prominence. It seems that a "route-type" variable should only be used 
if it is impossible to get an estimate of the ADT of the route. Route-type is a somewhat artificial 
variable, unlike ADT which for practical purposes is dire.ctly proportional to the potential 
transportation-disruption and road-user casualties due to bridge damage. Such a relationship implies 
that ADT should be a multiplicative factor. In many procedures however, the ADT variable is only 
one of a number of variables used in an additive combination; thus its significance is diminished. (The 
Illinois procedure is somewhat of an exception, with ADT weighted at 69 percent.) 
Many prioritization procedures include a variable to consider whether the bridge carries important 
utilities. This variable may be unnecessary. Compared to the cost of transportation disruption and 
structural repairs, the cost of restoring utilities across a bridge site is probably small enough that it can 
be negle.cted in a preliminary prioritization procedure. 
As with structural vulnerability, bridge importance is poorly assessed by many prioritization procedures 
because earthquake loss-estimation techniques are not used. Instead of the somewhat arbitrary 
procedures commonly proposed, the importance of a bridge could be estimated by an approximate cost-
benefit analysis, as is described in Chapter 12. 
Algorithms for Bridge-Priority Ratings 
All of the prioriti7.ation procedures reviewed use a single-formula type of algorithm to determine bridge 
priority ratings. As shown in Chapter 12, a flowchart type of algorithm could be used instead. 
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The flowchart method has the advantage of allowing "if statements" to be incorporated into the 
algorithm. For example, using a flowchart algorithm, a skew factor can be applied if the bridge has 
movement joints. If the bridge does not have movement joints the skew factor can be reduced or left 
out. Similarly, a significant year-of-construction factor can be applied if the bridge has reinforced-
concrete columns. For other pier types the year-of-construction factor can be changed. With a single-
formula algorithm, it is difficult to include such options. 
Many procedures use an additive or partially additive combination of ratings for structural 
vulnerability, bridge importance, and seismicity to arrive at a final priority rating. In Section 11.2 it 
was shown that additive combinations, used in the ATC 6-2 and 1990 Caltrans procedures, can produce 
illogical results. A revised combination is used in the 1992 Caltrans procedure and in some other 
procedures, where the priority rating is taken as the seismicity rating times the sum of 0.6 times the 
importance rating plus 0.4 times the structural vulnerability rating, as shown below (the terminology 
here is changed from that used by Caltrans): 
Priority RaJing = Seismicity x (0.6 x Importance + 0.4 x Vulnerability] 
This combination formula can also produce illogical results. Assume that the seismicity, importance, 
and vulnerability raJings range between O and 1.0 and consider the following example of two bridges: 
Bridge A is in a relatively high seismic 1.0ne, seismicity = 0.8, has a medium importance, = 0.5 and 
has extreme structural deficiencies, vulnerability = 1.0. This bridge is assigned a priority raJing of 
0.56. Bridge B has high seismicity and importance ratings, 1.0 each, but has no structural deficiencies, 
vulnerability = 0. This bridge is assigned a higher priority rating, 0.60, than the fragile Bridge A, 
despite the fact that it contains no seismic deficiencies, and its earthquake performance cannot be 
improved by seismic retrofitting. 
Comparisons between different procedures can demonstrate their arbitrary nature. In the original 
Caltrans procedures [Gates and Maroney 1990] bridge importance was weighted at 24% of the total 
additive index and had 46 % of the weight that structural vulnerability had. In the revised Caltrans 
procedure [Gilbert 1993] importance was given 150% more weight than structural vulnerability. A 
justification for this major change (from 46 to 150%) was not given. This can be compared to the 
Kentucky procedure [Yu Ouyang et al 1990] where bridge importance is only weighted at 10% of the 
total additive index, and only has one third the weight that structural vulnerability has. 
Another weakness of some prioritiz.ation procedures is that they have imposed step functions on data 
in which there is actually a gradation of conditions, for example soil-profile type or span seating 
lengths. In addition, some procedures include too much subjective data to obtain consistent results 
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from different bridge evaluators. The amount of subjective data and judgement required in preliminary 
screening procedures should be minimized. 
In general, the weakness of most prioritization algorithms is that the combination formulas are too 
arbitrarily chosen. The formulas seem like •black boxes• where basic bridge data is input and a 
priority rating is output, but where the workings in between are mysterious. Often there is no clear 
logic or rationale to the combination rules, weighting, or inclusion of the variables used. For the 
Illinois study, Cooling et al (1992] note that the ATC 6-2 and Caltrans algorithms are both •based on 
subjective weighting factors•. For their study, Cooling et al tried to avoid such subjective factors and 
instead chose •to base the systems on a set of logical defensible criteria (including soil effects), without 
presupposing the outcome•. 
Thus it is preferable to use more transparent methods, such as those proposed in Chapter 12, where 
the intermediate results, such as probability of earthquake damage or transportation-disruption cost, 
have a physical meaning are thus easier to verify. An earthquake loss-estimation approach and cost-
benefit criteria would seem to be much more direct and transparent than the abstract algorithms 
commonly used. 
Buckle [1991] has recommended weighted-additive combinations with the following explanation: 
•Multiplication, instead of addition, gives more emphasis to extreme values of each parameter, 
and this may distort the ranking procedure. It also amplifies the error or uncertainty inherent 
in each factor such that the error in the overall index is significantly higher than would 
otherwise be the case, if the same factors were added together. However, addition methods 
can be insensitive and it may be difficult to separate a large group of bridges which have 
average scores. This may be overcome to a certain extent by using unequal weighting factors.• 
The present author disagrees with the conclusion that additive procedures are preferable because they 
are less error sensitive. Procedures using multiplicative combinations may be erroneous, but it seems 
that this would only be so because the multiplicative factors themselves have been poorly chosen. 
A possible analogy (perhaps over-simplified) could be the determination of bending moment in a simply 
supported span, based on its load per length, w and its length I. The direct and transparent calculation 
of maximum bending moment is, of course, wf /8. 
Some prioritization procedures it seems, would attempt to predict this value by a weighted-additive 
combination of the two variables w and I. The weighted-additive fonnula for this problem would be: 
202 
"moment rating" = k1w + ki_l, which would be justified by the knowledge that bending moment will 
increase with increasing load and/or increasing span length. Some might even argue that the weighted 
additive calculation is preferable to the wl2/8 solution because it is less sensitive to errors in the span 
length l. 
This seems to be a fallacy. Three important conclusions are illustrated by the analogy: 
1 It can be shown that no matter what values are selected for the weighting factors k1 and ki_, the 
weighted-additive fonnula k1 w + kil can only be roughly accurate for a limited range of loads, 
w and span lengths, /. Extreme errors can result for w or l outside this range of accuracy. 
2 Even if the likely range of w and / is limited and well understood, a thorough analysis is 
required to detennine the appropriate weighting factors k1 and ki_. It would not be wise to 
choose the factors arbitrarily. Therefore, the proposed fonnula must be carefully verified for 
the entire possible ranges of the input variables w and l. 
3 To attempt to make an algorithm less error-sensitive by making it less sensitive overall does 
not improve the algorithm. At the extreme case, one could remove the variable l from the 
prediction of bending moment, (ie~ make the weighting factor ki_ = 0) so that the moment 
rating is independent of span length. While this would make the procedure insensitive to 
uncertainties in span length, it would not improve accuracy of the result. 
This is not to say that uncertainties in prioriti7.ation procedures and their input data should not be a 
concern. Such uncertainties should be investigated. The best way to do this would be by using risk-
analysis methods. 
Verification of Prioritiuttion Procedures 
Although some of the prioriti7.ation procedures reviewed here have been established for several years, 
none of the procedures seem to have been well verified. (The Japanese procedure, based on 
earthquake damage data, may be somewhat of an exception.) It is not sufficient merely to show that 
a prioriti7.Jltion procedure produces a good dispersion of results, as was done by Filiatrault et al [ 1994], 
or to compare the results of two or more procedures without a reference to which procedure is more 
accurate, as was done by Gilbert [ 1993] and Sundstrom and Maroney [ 1992]. A proper verification 
should compare the results of the prioriti7.Jltion algorithm with the results produced by detailed seismic 
evaluations and economic (eg cost-benefit) studies. The best use of engineering expertise would be 
in comparing and interpreting the results of the prioriti7.ation algorithm with those of the more detailed 
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evaluations. Similarly, a comparison of actual damage with the assessment of seismic vulnerability, 
for bridges which have been damaged in earthquakes, would !>e useful. 
hnplernentation or Prioriti;r,ation Procedures 
Most prioritization procedures are not well co-ordinated with the overall program of bridge upgrading 
for a jurisdiction. It appears that some bridge authorities may rely too heavily on the accuracy of 
initial prioritization procedures. Hwang (1994] has noted that, • An exaggerated statement about the 
usefulness of preliminary screening results may lead other persons such as emergency planners to 
misuse the screening results". Where screening procedures have been implemented (such as in 
California), the initial, approximate prioritization list generally has not been updated by secondary, 
follow-up seismic assessments. Instead, fully-detailed seismic evaluations are carried out on all bridges 
identified in the preliminary screening. The number of such evaluations required could be greatly 
reduced if a secondary screening procedure is used (as proposed in Chapter 12). 
Some bridge jurisdictions seem to ignore the "bridge-importance" variable after the preliminary 
screening stage. After preliminary screening, a bridge-retrofit program should proceed with not only 
more detailed structural evaluations of potentially vulnerable bridges, but also more detailed 
assessments of bridge importance, using better estimates of transportation-disruption effects, etc. 
Finally, attention needs to be given to integrating prioritization procedures with computer databases. 
Many authors proposing prioritization procedures have developed forms for hand-calculating priority 
ratings. These may be useful for illustration; but in practice, where authorities will be evaluating 




RECOMMENDED METHOD OF PRIORITIZING BRIDGES FOR SEISMIC UPGRADING 
To produce a more accurate and more flexible bridge screening process, the author has developed a 
method based on earthquake-loss estimation and cost-benefit criteria. The method has been 
implemented on a stock of 445 bridges in New Zealand's Tasman District [Maffei 1994). The main 
features of the new method are described in this chapter, beginning with the overall approach. 
12.1 Overall Approach to Bridge-upgrade Prioritization 
Figure 12.1 presents a diagram of the proposed method for prioritizing bridges for seismic upgrading. 
The method prioritii.es bridges according to the approximate benefit/cost ratio for upgrading. The 
methodology illustrated in the diagram applies to the initial preliminary screening step of the bridge 
upgrade process. However, the same methodology is applicable to more detailed assessments of bridge 
seismic vulnerability and importance. 
Bridge Seismic Vulnerability and Expected Damage 
The top half of the diagram of Figure 12.1 describes the engineering side of the recommended method; 
that is, the procedure for estimating the likely seismic damage to a bridge. The likely damage is a 
function of the bridge structural vulnerability and soil condition, and of the probable seismicity over 
the expected service life of the bridge. The vulnerability characteristics of the bridge can be expressed 
by a damage versus earthquake-intensity curve as was described in Figures 11.4 and 11.6. Such a 
curve shows what level of damage can be expected in a particular bridge or group of bridges, 
depending on the strength of the earthquake. 
The data for creating the damage curve could be expert judgement, earthquake damage data, or brief 
or detailed seismic assessments. As discussed in Section 11.4, damage-versus-intensity curves for 78 
different classes of structures, including 3 categories of bridges, are presented in the Applied 
Technology Council publication A TC-13 [ 1985]. The A TC-13 curves are based on expert opinion and 
are presented in both graphical and matrix fonn. For the Tasman District project, damage curves were 
developed for different values on a seismic vulnerability rating scale, which will be described in 
Section 12.3. The damage curve is combined with a probable seismicity curve, such as that shown 
in Figure 11.5, to give the expected seismic damage to a particular bridge or class of bridges. 
Bridge Importance and Asset Value 
The bottom half of the Figure 12.1 diagram describes the economic side of the method, ie, the 
estimation of bridge-asset value, which is taken as the sum of structure value plus loss-of-use value. 
Structure value equals the cost of replacing a bridge after complete -earthquake damage, and can be 
assumed to be a function of the bridge length, number of lanes, and factors to account for rough terrain 
and remote locations. Loss-of-use value of a bridge is more difficult to quantify; it should consider 
all of the additional costs to a community of losing a bridge in an earthquake, including transportation 
disruption, casualties, and lifeline dependencies such as ambulance and firefighting access. The loss-
of-use value of a bridge depends on the likely time that would be required to restore the bridge to 
service after earthquake damage. After estimating likely bridge damage and bridge-asset value, 
estimates of bridge-upgrade costs can be used to determine the benefit/cost ratio for seismic upgrading. 
The highest priority bridges to retrofit are those with the highest benefit/cost ratios. 
In the Tasman District this new prioritiz.ation method was implemented on a sample of 56 bridges 
[Maffei 1994). Each bridge was given a seismic vulnerability rating related to a damage curve, which 
was then combined with the probable seismicity in the region to calculate the expected damage for that 
bridge. A computer database was used to record the input data on seismic vulnerability and asset value 
for each bridge. The calculations of expected earthquake losses and benefit/cost ratio for upgrading 
are made within the database. 
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Figure 12.1 Diagram of the proposed prioritfaation method for bridge seismic upgrading. 
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12.2 Levels of Seismic/Structural Assessment 
To assess seismic vulnerability, a rating is assigned to each bridge based on its structural features and 
seismic deficiencies. The rating is drawn from a seismic/structural assessment at various possible 
levels of detail. 
For a first-pass identification of potentially vulnerable bridges, a brief structural assessment is usually 
appropriate. This assessment may be based on only a handful of risk factors such as year of 
construction, bridge length and skew, soil type, and seismic zone. At the other end of the spectrum, 
a detailed evaluation involving the verification of as-built conditions, dynamic analyses, and calculation 
of plastic-mechanism strengths and ductility capacities is appropriate once the actual seismic retrofit 
of the bridge is planned. In between, investigations involving, for example, only quick hand 
calculations of seismic demand and capacities, using static forces, may be required. In managing and 
prioritizing seismic upgrade work, structural assessments of low to medium detail are usually the most 
useful. 
For the first screening of a large group of bridges, a prioritization procedure should be based on a brief 
assessment of seismic vulnerability and bridge-asset value. The first screening should be accurate 
enough to identify a number of clearly non-vulnerable bridges, which can then be eliminated from 
further consideration. For subsequent screenings of bridges, more detailed assessments of both bridge 
vulnerability and asset value should be made. Thus a process of increasingly detailed seismic and value 
assessments is used to finally determine (a) which bridges should be upgraded and (b) the appropriate 
seismic retrofit level. 
According to this approach, the author has outlined four different levels of bridge seismic/structural 
assessments. These include three levels of engineering assessment: a level-one visual assessment, a 
level-two schematic assessment, and a complete level-three engineering evaluation. In addition, a 
simple preliminary screening procedure using flowcharts, called a level-zero assessment, has been 
developed. The four levels of investigation are described further in Table 12. l. Ideally, the less-
detailed investigations should yield more conservative results, and as more-detailed investigations are 
carried out, the conservative assumptions can be reviewed, and a number of bridges can be eliminated 
from further consideration. 
The recommended implementation sequence of the different levels of seismic evaluation is shown in 
Figure 12.2. The figure shows that an initial study, using level-one assessments of a sample of 
bridges, is recommended before proceeding with the level-rero preliminary screening procedure. The 
purpose of the initial study is to verify and calibrate the level-rero procedure according to the particular 
needs and characteristics of the bridge jurisdiction. 
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Table 12.1 Levels of Seismic/Structural Ass~ment 
Level of Asses.ffllent ~ent Estimated time required for 
Conducted by: investigation each bridge: 
Simple Moderately 
bridge complicated 
eg < 10 m bridge 
long eg 20-60 m 
long 
FLOWCHART LEVEL0- Engineering 5-15 minutes 10-15 minutes 
PROCEDURE FLOWCHART Technician, 
ASSESSMENT Draughtsperson, or 
Approximate procedure Student 
following simple flow 
charts 
ENGINEERING LEVEL 1 VISUAL Experienced 1/2 hr at site 1 hr at bridge 
ASSESSMENTS ASSESSMENT - Field Engineer familiar 0-1/2 hr site 
inspection and brief with research on review 1 hr to review 
review of drawings. the seismic drawings drawings 
No calculations. behaviour of 1/2-1 hr 2 hrs to write 
Consideration of bridges assessment assessment 
seismic-force path and 
likely vulnerabilities. 1-2 hrs total 4 hrs total 
Comparison to typical 
earthquake performance 
of similar structures. 
LEVEL2 - Experienced Usually not Level 1, + 1-3 
SCHEMATIC Engineer necessary days 
ASSESSMENT Level 
1 plus approximate 
calculations. Perhaps a 
further investigation of 
the soil type and 
structure condition. 
LEVELJ - Experienced Level 1, + Level 2 + 2-





analysis and material 
testing if required. 
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Figure 12.2 also shows that the actual retrofit work need not wait until all bridges have been fully 
evaluated. If the early stages of preliminary screenin.g identify bridges which are clearly vulnerable, 
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Figure 12.2 Recommended implementation sequence for a program of bridge seismic 
screening, ~ent, and retrofit. 
In the Tasman District, the initial study phase involved level-one assessments of 56 bridges. The 
results of these assessments were used to calibrate the level-zero assessment procedure, which was 
implemented on the remainder of the 445 district bridges. · 
12.3 Bridge Seismic Vulnerability Ratirn::s 
As part of the proposed method of bridge-upgrade prioritization, a system of seismic-vulnerability 
ratings has been developed. The ratings are on a scale of O to 10, similar to those of the ATC 6-2 
(1983) method, as shown in Table 12.2. The rating for a bridge can be derived from either a brief 
or detailed seismic assessment. 
The vulnerability ratings are somewhat subjective but can be quantified by the series of damage curves 
shown in Figure 12.3. The damage curves relate the vulnerability ratings to the expected bridge 
damage at different earthquake intensities. The use of the damage curves is discussed in Section 12.6. 
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Table 12.2 Seismic Vulnerability Rating 
Rating Meaning 
0 Not applicable, therefore not vulnerable 
I 




6 Medium vulnerability 
7 
8 
9 High vulnerability 
IO 
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Figure 12.3 Damage-versus-intensity curves for different seismic vulnerability ratings. 
Even for detailed structural evaluations these ratings are based partly on subjective engineering 
judgement. To reflect the appropriate uncertainty, the seismic vulnerability ratings should not be 
reported to more than one decimal place. (For example, if V = 6. 73 results from one of the 
vulnerability formulas given below it should be rounded to V = 6. 7.) 
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Component Vulnerability Ratings 
For brief (level-one or level-zero) seismic assessments, separate structural vulnerability ratings are 
determined in three areas of potential seismic deficiency: (a) superstructure movement joints, bearings, 
and support seats, (b) substructure columns or pier-walls, and (c) foundations and abutments. The 
worst of these three ratings is taken as the overall structure vulnerability rating as shown in the 
following formula: 
VSTI!UCT = MAX rvw, Vcw, VF,J 
where: 
VSTI!UCT = Structure vulnerability rating. 
V.w = Vulnerability rating for superstructure movement joints and related seismic 
deficiencies. 
Vcw = Vulnerability rating for substructure columns, pierwalls, or other type of 
intermediate supports. 
VFA = Vulnerability rating for foundations and abutments. 
The alternative combination-ie, taking only the largest of the three factors and ignoring the other 
two-is used because if a bridge fails in one of these areas, that weak area generally governs the 
overall capacity of the bridge, and the bridge's capacity in the other two areas is somewhat irrelevant. 
This is similar to the combination used in ATC 6-2 (1983). 
Considering the uncertainties in the brief seismic assessments, and the potential for partial damage in 
different areas of the same structure, a more sophisticated combination formula of the three separate 
vulnerabilities could also be considered. 
Soil Effects 
In addition to structural deficiencies, soil conditions influence seismic vulnerability. A factor to 
consider soil-profile type and liquefaction vulnerability is defined based on Uniform Building Code 
(UBC) [ICBO 1994) soil types. The soil factor ranges from 1.0 for firm or rock soil profiles to 2.0 
for deep soft clays, as shown in Table 12.3. The soil profile definitions of the New Zealand code 
[SANZ 1992) differ from those of the UBC, but can be interpolated between the UBC values as shown 
in the table. 
Liquefaction potential is not strictly related to soil type, but should be included by increasing the soil 
factor where liquefaction is possible. 
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The soil factor is combined with the structural vulnerability rating to give an overall seismic 
vulnerability rating. The following formula is recommended~ 
V = (V mwcnJR£ x soil factor)°·15 
Table 12.3 Soil Risk Factor 
Soil Factor Description 
1.0 UBC soil type S1 or NZS 4203 Soil A (firm or rock-
like) 
1.2 UBC soil type S2 
1.4 NZS 4203 Soil B 
1.5 UBC soil type S, or unknown soil or medium 
liquefaction potential 
1.8 NZS 4203 Soil C 
2.0 UBC soil type S4 (very deep clay) or high liquefaction 
potential 
The 0.85 exponent is used to bring the VsEJSMIC rating into line with the vulnerability definitions of 
Table 12.2. A structure on a type S3 soil profile or an unknown soil profile will have an overall 
vulnerability rating equal to or slightly higher than its structural vulnerability rating. On more 
competent soil profiles (Type S1 and SJ the overall vulnerability rating is less than the structural 
vulnerability rating. On deep clays or liquefiable sites, the vulnerability is increased, sometimes to a 
result greater than 10. As this would happen only for highly deficient structures on highly vulnerable 
sites, the meanings given for the 0-10 scale are still valid. Conceivably though (and deservedly) an 
extremely vulnerable bridge could be rated an 11 or 12 out of 10. Sample results of the formula are 
given in Table 12.4. 
Orthogonal Combination Formula 
Separate vulnerability factors may be assigned for transverse-direction and longitudinal-direction 
earthquake shaking, with respect to the bridge axis. The two vulnerability ratings can be combined 
using the following formula, developed by the author: 
V 
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Where V1 is the larger of the vulnerability ratings V1 and V2 which have been assigned to the two 
orthogonal directions. The formula recogni:res thaLthe final vulnerability for a bridge is dominated 
by its "weaker" direction, but that the vulnerability in the "stronger" direction should also have an 
effect on the overall rating. Sample results of this formula are given in Table 12.5. 
Table 12.4 Sample Results of the Soil Factor Combination Formula 
V Structure Soil Factor V 
9 1.5 9.1 
9 1.2 7.6 
9 1.0 6.5 
5 1.5 5.5 
2 1.5 2.5 
9 2.0 11. 7 
Table 12.5 Sample Results of the Orthogonal Risk Combination Formula 
Transverse Longitudinal V 
Vulnerability Rating Vulnerability Rating 
9 9 9 
9 3 8.4 
3 9 8.4 
9 7 8.8 
8 8 8 
2 l 1.7 
12.4 Level-One Visual Seismic Assessment Method 
The level-one visual assessment procedure requires a brief site inspection and review of the bridge 
drawings by an experienced engineer. In the Tasman District, a bridge maintenance inspection was 
carried out at the same time that the seismic-risk data were collected. 
A one-page, double-sided form was used to collect data from the bridge site and drawings. The front 
side of the form is a modification of the Transit New Zealand Bridge Inspection Report [TNZ 1991a]. 
It records information on the bridge condition and recommended maintenance, and is discussed in 
Section 13. 5. 
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The overleaf of the form, shown in Figure 12.4, is designed to record the level-one seismic evaluation 
data. Since information on bridge identification, location, and geometry is recorded on the 
maintenance-inspection side of the form, it is not repeated on the seismic-evaluation side shown in 
Figure 12.4. The seismic-risk data include year of construction, structure type, and movement-joint 
(span seating) and load-path descriptions. 
The structure type is described using a multiple-choice table defining the construction type of six basic 
components of the bridge. The six data items allow a great number of possible bridge-structure types 
to be concisely described. The structure-type information can be used in the database not only for 
bridge seismic-risk assessments but also for bridge maintenance and inspection purposes. 
If there are movement joints in the bridge structure, a sketch of the support conditions at the movement 
joints, and measurements of the support overlap lengths are recorded. If bearings are present the type 
of bearing and the bearing overlap lengths are recorded. The definitions of support and bearing overlap 
distances at the movement joints are taken from the Transit New Zealand Bridge Manual [TNZ 1991b]. 
The seismic-force path of the bridge in the transverse and longitudinal directions is outlined 
diagrammatically on the seismic evaluation form. The force-path description should draw the attention 
of the engineer to the likely mechanism of seismic response for the bridge, and help him or her identify 
any potential seismic deficiencies in the structure. The approach of first describing the seismic-force 
path is taken from the evaluation procedure contained in the NEHRP Seismic Evaluation Handbook/or 
Buildings (14). 
Based on the seismic-force path, observed deficiencies, and the judgements of the structural engineer 
assessing the bridge, the seismic vulnerability ratings for movement joints, columns or walls, and 
foundations or abutments are assigned. These ratings are assigned separately for longitudinal- and 
transverse-direction earthquake effects. 
At the bottom of the fonn for seismic evaluation data, the engineer can calculate the final vulnerability 
rating. This is done by first taking the maximum of the component vulnerability ratings in each 
direction, then by applying the soil factor, and then by applying the orthogonal combination formula. 
When conducting level-one evaluations on a large number of bridges, these calculations can be carried 
out by the computer database program. 
At the bottom of the data fonn, the engineer can also record preliminary suggestions for seismic 
retrofitting. Finally, the engineer should make a recommendation as to whether a more detailed (level-
two or level-three) investigation of the bridge is warranted. 
214 
LEVEL 1 Seismic Enluatloa Data 
Bridge No ••••• ~ l5. . . . . . . Y car o{ ConstnlCtion. ••• Ii? 7 .... 
MOYCmcot Joints. ••••• ~<? ••..••••...•.•••••••.•••••••.• 
Longihldin.al 
Support Overlap Length •••••••••••••••••• 
Bearing 0vcr1ap Length • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• -1 • .•... ; . • · · · · · · • · 
Restraint • .. • . .. .. . . . . . . • ........... J. ............... . 
Sketch: 
5Pt>N l..E1'l(,TH::> 
45• - m· x.· 
1}7,., · 5e,.5 ... 11-0 "' 
Seismic Load Pa th and Snspected Critic.a I Elements 
LoogitudioaJ· 
VELK -,... Pl~ wAU.> -+- Ft>N::> 
'-..., "-811.TMl:!Ji} 
Traruv l&.ngi! 
MOYCment Joint Risk Factor ••• -~ ~? .... , ~- .... 1: -~, ••• , 
,-4 I 2.·"> Column or Wall Risk Factor ••••••••..•••.••••.••••••• 
. 4- I ~ -~ Fein or Abutment Risk Factor •••••..••••...•••.•••••••• 
· 1 • I 4 
Structure Rislc Factor ••••••••...•. l .•.••••••••• 






Bc&m.Ordu/1",- • Nooe (Le. dab oolJ) 
•Pt.>pdcn 
• Mooolidu,:R.(;Bu.. 
• R,(; Arel, 
• SledBuao 
a ,_ 





• R,(; alaoplo-o:>lu&a beall 
• Oilier 
Oolouull'la- • """'"(Le. aiop, ..,..) 
Poudatioa • R.(;,pc-tloolmp 
• R,(; .,..sen (CJ') 
• P.Cpiol 
• 5...apiol 
···-~ • U..it-a 





Al,,,tmea1 • R,(; Im: cuwat 






. Dnwiq Nao Utod: 95 ~T 2 
Soil Profile Type ••••• 
Soil Facior ••• ; • .zone Factor Z. • ! -:Z: 
Structure Factor ••• 6.·f>. 
Fm.al Vulncnbility Rating ••••••• 
fu.o> : I. '7 
X,t".>PEN5101J ~gioe,e::s AA£. 'NPlttV.. -f OOT IUC..ML'f 
~ Qu_p.tq;_'} . ~ fl-IE. ~ c.c,t,lQ1(10N 
\JU~ TO 
11-1£ ~t'f-i'.) 6£1!¥, M1'>~IN{, ~K~ 1\-lc 
WA!J\/Ell.!,E. S 1-tAKINC, . 
Of" WE ~0<,E ~ 
6'2.106t ~ \)((LfJERAClc TO 
~Sl6Lt ~~ w1nt •~-, ,,.a_. r 
...,,"'-t STA'{!, \/JI'"° <'.of..>O rnot-J «PC.12AD c . ft,l 
Further Evaluation Rcoommendcd: NooeEJ Level 3 Full Evaluation and Upgrade 
Figure 12.4 Bridge seismic-~ent and condition-inspection field form, side two, with the 
level-one ~ent of the Peninsula Bridge. 
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12.S Level-Zero Method of Seismic Assessment 
After conducting numerous level-one visual assessments in the Tasman District, the author recognii.ed 
the possibility and need for developing an even simpler procedure for bridge seismic assessments. A 
level-zero procedure was devised to approximate, on the conservative side, the results of the level-one 
assessment. The goal of the procedure is for a quick first-pass screening to identify bridges for further 
prioritization. 
The procedure follows a series of flowcharts, so that the assessment does not need to be performed by 
an engineer. An engineering technician or drafter would have the necessary skills to collect the 
required data from the drawings and calculate the bridge vulnerability ratings. If drawings or photos 
of the bridge are available, a site visit is not needed. 
The procedure follows the vulnerability-rating scale described in Section 12.3. As explained in that 
section, the structural vulnerability is taken as the worst of three vulnerability ratings: that for 
movement-joint failures, that for column or pier wall failures, and that for foundation or abutment 
failures. 
The level-zero procedure uses three flowcharts as shown in Figures 12.5, 12.6, and 12.7, one each for 
the vulnerability ratings of (a) movement joints or support seats, (b) columns or pier-walls, and (c) 
foundations and abutments. The procedure is specifically derived for the types of bridges prevalent 
in rural New Zealand. For application to different bridge stocks, the factors in the flowcharts can be 
adjusted. 
Movement-Joint Vulnerability 
The first step in the simplified assessment procedure is to determine the seismic vulnerability rating 
for the bridge superstructure movement joints. The flowchart in Figure 12.5 describes the procedure. 
Structures with no movement joints (ie, those with monolithic, integral superstructures) are given a 
vulnerability rating V MJ of z.ero. For bridges with movement joints, the technician then looks at the 
seating conditions for the superstructure spans. 
For bridges with movement joints, Figure 12.5 shows that the movement-joint vulnerability rating is 
based on a multiplication of factors to account for superstructure seating length (fsEAT), the presence 
of earthquake linkage bolts (fuNK), bridge skew (fsirnw), and construction type (precast concrete or 
steel). 
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Superstructure Seating Length 
The seating length factor is based on the ratio of actual seating length N, to the ideal seating length N0 , 
which, as a minimum, should be taken as that recommended in the Transit New Zealand Bridge 
Manual [TNZ 1991b] or in ATC 6-2 (1983]. The following formula is used: 
N 
ND 
The factor is limited to a maximum value of 1.0 for structures with poor seating conditions, ie, short 
seating lengths, and can be limited to a minimum value of 0.4 for structures with satisfactory seating 
lengths. Where support overlap lengths vary among different girders or span ends of the same bridge, 
the worst condition should be selected. 
A conservative approximation of the ideal support overlap length, N0 , could be defined as 500 mm + 
3 x L, where L is the bridge length in metres. N0 need not be assumed greater than 800 mm. This 
seat-length criterion, tentatively proposed by the present author, is more stringent than that which is 
recommended by the Transit New Zealand Bridge Bridge Manual [TNZ 1991] or by ATC 6-2 (1983]. 
The criterion is based on the observation that in recent moderate earthquakes large displacements have 
occurred at bridge movement joints. It seems that more research is necessary to establish a reliable 
formulation for satisfactory bridge seating lengths. 
If the support overlap length, N, cannot be established or estimated from the drawings and has not been 
me.asured from a site visit-or if a quick assessment needs to be done without gaining this 
information-the seat factor can be based simply on the year of bridge construction. New Zealand 
bridges constructed before 1973 tend to have shorter seat lengths and the factor is set at 1.0. Bridges 
constructed after 1973 have somewhat longer seat lengths and the factor is set at 0.8. 
Superstructure Linkages 
Bridges that have horizontal earthquake-linkage bolts or cable restrainers are expected to perform better 
in earthquakes and be less likely to suffer movement-joint support failures. The linkage bolts reduce 
the risk of superstructure collapses during an earthquake. . Accordingly, the movement-joint 
vulnerability rating is reduced by a factor, fUNK, equal to 0.8 when linkage bolts or restrainers are 
present. For structures without horizontal linkage bolts or restrainers, fUNK is set equal to 1.0. 
Note that the presence of hold-down bolts has not been included in the assessment of bridge movement-
joint vulnerability. Although it is likely that hold-down bolts increase a bridge's chance of surviving 
an earthquake without movement-joint failures, many hold-down bolts for typical New Zealand bridges 
have only a small capacity to resist lateral earthquake forces. Such bolts will likely fail early in the 
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sequence of earthquake shaking so that the bridge structure will still need to rely on adequate seat-
support length or horizontal linkage bolts or restrainers. 
Skewed Supports 
The factor fSKEW describes the increased risk of seismic collapse for skew bridges. The factor is l.0 
for a bridge with no skew and increases to a factor of2.0 for bridges with vulnerable skew geometries. 
Evidence from past earthquakes justifies the assumption that skewed bridges can be twice as vulnerable 
to movement joint-failures as right-angle bridges. The skew factor is calculated from the following 
formula: 
!SKEW = 1 + 2 cos 8 sin 8, for O S 8 S 45° 
= 2.0 , for 8 ~ 45° 
where 8 = the skew angle for the bridge. 
The formula for skew factor is based loosely on a geometrical study of the likelihood of span drop-off 
for different skew angles. The skew factor has a significant effect on the vulnerability rating even for 
relatively small skew angles. For example, fSKEW = 1.5 for 8 = 15°. 
Calcula.lion of V w 
The final vulnerability rating for movement joints then depends on the multiplication of three factors 
fsEAT x fUNK x fSKEW. The first two factors fsEAT and fuNJC are set at 1.0 for the most vulnerable case 
and are less than 1.0 for situations with reduced vulnerability. The skew factor is 1.0 for the least 
vulnerable situation and is larger for more vulnerable geometries. 
The last factor in the flowchart of Figure 12.5 is spe.cific to the common bridge types prevalent in New 
Zealand. It is based on the observation, from the seismic assessments of the Tasman District bridges, 
that precast-concrete-girder bridges in New Zealand tend to have reasonably long seat lengths and 
substantial horizontal earthquake-linkage bolts compared to typical steel-beam bridges. The final value 
for V MJ need not be taken greater than 10. 
A possible modification to the procedure could be made to consider more distinctly the span seating 
and linkage characteristics related to transverse-direction earthquake effects. This would require 
additional data and factors in the movement-joint vulnerability flowchart. To avoid over-complication, 
such a modification has not been attempted. 
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Column/Pier Wall Vulnerability 
As shown in Figure 12.6, the procedure for determining column or pier wall vulnerability rating is the 
simplest of the three flowcharts. For single-span bridges there would be no intermediate column or 
pier wall supports so this vulnerability rating would be rero. 
For multi-span bridges, the algorithm recognises that older non-ductile concrete columns are a clear 
seismic deficiency. Bridges with pre-1973 reinforced concrete columns are assigned the maximum 
vulnerability rating of 10. This reflects the experience of past earthquakes where reinforced-concrete 
columns with non-ductile detailing have resulted in a number of catastrophic bridge collapses. 
Conversely, post-1973 columns generally perform well in earthquakes due to detailing for ductile 
response. These columns are assigned a low vulnerability rating, V cw = 3. 
Other types of intermediate supports used in New Ze.aland, principally reinforced-concrete pier walls 
and occasionally timber-pile bents, are assumed to have medium to low seismic vulnerability, V cw = 
5. The seismic capacity of concrete pier walls or other types of intermediate supports with high lateral 
strength is often determined by the foundations. This is accounted for with a separate vulnerability 
factor, VFA> as discussed below. 
Foundation/ Abubnent Vulnerability 
As shown in Figure 12.7 the vulnerability rating for foundations and abutments depends largely on 
whether or not there has been erosion or scour at the foundations. This assumption is particularly 
applicable to New Ze.aland bridges, which commonly cross granular river or stream beds. An example 
of erosion seriously compromising the seismic resistance of a bridge would be a reinforced-concrete 
pier wall founded on pile foundations for which the supporting soil has been eroded. If a large enough 
length of the piles has been exposed, then the piles become the weak link in the lateral-force resistance 
of the structure. 
As shown in Figure 12. 7, the principal variable in the assessment of foundation or abutment seismic 
vulnerability is the erosion factor, fERos• As shown in the figure, this factor ranges from 1.0 for 
bridges not susceptible to erosion or scour to 2.0 to 2.5 for cases where erosion has seriously 
compromised the ability of the foundations to resist lateral earthquake forces. The foundation/abutment 
vulnerability rating, V FA> is taken as 4 times the erosion factor for multi-span bridges, 3 times the 
erosion factor for single-span bridges more than 5 metres long, and 2 times the erosion factor for 
shorter single-span bridges. 
Unless there has been serious erosion, the foundation/abutment rating will not indicate a high 
vulnerability in this area. Thus, for many bridges, the foundation/abutment vulnerability rating may 
be unlikely to govern over the ratings for superstructure movement joints or columns/pier walls. 
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Figure 12.S 
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Level-zero seismic-~ent flowchart for movement-joint vulnerability rating, 
VMJ. 
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Figure 12.6 uvel-uro seismic ~ent flowchart for column or pier wall vulnerability, 
Vcw, 









Erosion/scour of foundations not noted or expected 
Some erosion, or unknown 
Serious erosion/scour of foundations observed 
Extreme erosion/scour of foundations 
NO 
YES 
Figure 12.7 Level-zero seismic ~ment flowchart for foundation and abubnent 







The foundation-risk algorithm is based on conclusions and judgements drawn from the level-one 
assessments in the Tasman District, many of which were for_ small bridges. Single-span bridges are 
assumed to be less vulnerable than multiple-span bridges, for which the foundations of the intermediate 
supports provide an additional source of seismic vulnerability. For single-span bridges, short bridges 
tend to have better integral connections with the supporting soil, and there will be less seismic-force 
demand at the foundations of shorter bridges. 
12.6 Expected Seismic Damage as a Function of Vulnerability Rating and Seismicity 
In Section 12.3, it was proposed that the seismic vulnerability ratings can be associated with damage 
versus earthquake-intensity curves as shown in Figure 12.3. The horizontal axis for the damage curves 
is the earthquake intensity from the Modified Mercali scale. The vertical axis indicates the percent of 
damage to the bridges. 
The percent damage can be interpreted in two ways. For a single structure it can be assumed that with 
increasing earthquake intensity an increasing level of damage would occur to the bridge, and that the 
damage can be expressed as a percentage of the replacement cost of the bridge, so that a bridge with 
20 percent damage requires 20 percent of the replacement cost of the bridge to repair that earthquake 
damage. A bridge with 100 percent earthquake damage is judged to be non-repairable. Alternatively, 
when a number of bridges are being considered, the damage curve gives an indication of the percentage 
of bridges which will be seriously damaged. 
Figure 12.3 gives damage curves for bridges with vulnerability ratings of 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2. The curve 
for vulnerability rating 8, for example, indicates that no damage is expected for earthquakes of intensity 
less than 6.5. For an earthquake of intensity 7.5, twenty percent damage is expected. At earthquake 
intensity 8, eighty percent damage is expected, and at earthquake intensity 10, total damage is 
expected. 
The information on expected damage as a function of bridge vulnerability can be combined with 
information on expected seismicity to predict earthquake losses over a given time interval. As shown 
in the top half of the diagram of Figure 12.1, the damage curve can be combined with a probable 
seismicity curve to give the expected damage to a given class of bridge over a given time interval. 
From seismological estimates of the return period of different levels of earthquake intensity, the 
probability of those earthquake intensities occurring over the lifespan of a bridge can be calculated. 
For two different bridge lifespans, 65 years and 100 years, Figure 12.8 shows the probabilities of 
different levels of earthquake intensities occurring, based on assumed return periods. This probable 
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seismicity curve can then be combined with the damage curves for different vulnerability ratings, 
shown in Figure 12.3. 
Figure 12.9 shows the relationship of expected bridge damage as a function of seismic vulnerability. 
This curve is derived from Figures 12.3 and 12.8 by numerically integrating the probability versus 
earthquake-intensity curve times each damage versus earthquake-intensity curve. 
This curve of damage versus vulnerability rating, Figure 12.9, indicates for each vulnerability level 
the amount of damage that can be expected. The curve for"a 65 year bridge service life is closely 
approximated by the quadratic function 0.01 * (V- 1.5j. In the vulnerability range of 2-3 almost no 
damage is expected. In the vulnerability range of 3-4, only 4 % of the value of bridges in that category 
is expected to be damaged. For vulnerability 5-6, 16 % damage is expected; for vulnerability 6-7, 25 % 
damage; for vulnerability 7-8, 36% damage; for vulnerability 8-9, 49% damage; and for vulnerability 
9-10, 64% damage. 
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Estimated probability of a given-interuity earthquake occurring during a typical 
65-or 100-year bridge service life. 
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The Modified Mercali index is used as the measure of earthquake intensity because it is the parameter 
that correlates best with damage to structures. Although it _is a subjective parameter rather than a 
measured parameter from seismographic records, it is a valuable index for seismic damage estimation. 
Measured parameters such as peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration, could also be used at 
the measure of earthquake level, however, these parameters have been shown not to correlate well with 
earthquake damage. [Naeim and Andersen 1993]. 
The earthquake-intensity scale for both the damage-versus intensity curves and the retum-period-versus-
intensity curve assume a structure situated on an average soil profile. Structures on a very stiff or 
rock-like soil profiles tend to experience lower earthquake intensities. Structures situated on deeper 
and softer soil profiles experience a higher earthquake intensity, often on the order of one intensity-
level higher, due to the amplification of ground motion in the soil. Since the seismic vulnerability 
rating already takes into account the factor for soil profile, the earthquake intensity of the damage 
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Figure 12.9 Expected bridge damage based on probable seismicity and bridge-vulnerability 
characteristics. 
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12.7 Bridge Asset Value 
As shown in Figure 12.1, the expected level of damage to the bridge can be combined with an estimate 
of bridge asset value to predict the monetary value of earthquake losses for a group of bridges. 
Typically, a computer database would be used to record the seismic vulnerability ratings for each 
bridge along with other basic bridge infonnation such as length, number of lanes, detour length, and 
traffic volume. Given this data, bridge asset values and benefit/cost ratios for seismic upgrading can 
be automatically calculated. 
As shown in the bottom half of the Figure 12.1 diagram, a bridge's value can be considered as the sum 
of: 
(a) Its structural value (or replacement cost)-ie, the cost to construct a new bridge in its place, 
and 
(b) Its loss-of-use value, ie, the total cost that would be suffered by bridge users during the time 
that it takes to rebuild the bridge. 
The loss-of-use costs result primarily from transportation disruption, but can include other factors such 
as casualties resulting from bridge collapse. 
Bridge Structure Value 
The structure value (replacement cost) of a rural New Zealand bridge can be estimated as a function 
of its length, L, and number of lanes, according to the following formulas: 
Struct. value 
Struct. value 
$15,000 + $5,500/m*L 
for one-lane bridges 
$20,000 + $8,000/m*L 
for two-lane bridges 
The formulas are based on a linear-regression analysis of construction costs (in 1994 dollars) for 69 
bridges built in the Tasman District between 1975 and 1993. Sample results of the formulas are shown 
in Table 12.6. 
The bridge replacement cost is calculated without reference to the type or cost of construction of the 
existing bridge. The reason for this approach is that if a bridge is destroyed by an earthquake, it is 
unlikely that the bridge will be rebuilt in the same structural form in which it was originally built. 
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Regression Analysis 
The regression analysis of construction costs for two-lane bridges used a sample of 33 bridges varying 
in length from 2 metres to 190 metres. The sample for one-lane bridges included 36 bridges varying 
in length from 5 metres to 110 metres. As can be seen from Table 12.6, a one-lane bridge is projected 
to cost approximately 70 % of the cost of a two lane bridge of the same length. 
Table 12.6 &timated Bridge ReplaCffllent Costs 
BRIDGE LENGTH ONE LANE BRIDGE TWO LANE BRIDGE RATIO 
C = 15,000+5,500 L C = 20,000+8,000 L one lane 
two lane 
Sm $42,500 $60,000 0.71 
tom 70,000 100,000 0.70 
20 m 125,000 180,000 0.69 
50 m 290,000 420,000 0.69 
100m 565,000 820,000 0.69 
There is a significant amount of scatter in the cost data used for the regression analysis. A major 
source of the scatter is that the construction of new bridges involves different levels of re-use of 
existing bridge components. For example, some of the bridges in the cost study made use of existing 
bridge substructures and simply added a new superstructure to the existing abutments or piers, or 
perhaps strengthened the existing abutments or piers. In other cases the construction of the new bridge 
required the demolition of the old bridge with no re-use of the substructure, and thus was more 
expensive. 
After an earthquake, a similar uncertainty in bridge reconstruction costs is likely, since for some 
bridges only the superstructure may be damaged, and the piles, piers, and abutments can be reused; 
whereas for other bridges the earthquake damage may require that the' bridge be entirely replaced 
including the substructures and foundations. Thus the bridge cost formulas developed here are not 
necessarily accurate on a bridge-by-bridge basis but are meant to be accurate when considering a group 
of bridges that have suffered damage due to an earthquake. 
The bridge costs are intended to be on the slightly conservative side to reflect that in the period after 
a damaging earthquake there is a much greater demand for construction equipment and labour so that 
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construction costs will be higher. The costs are meant to include design and inspection costs as well 
as construction costs. 
Terrain and Location Factors 
The estimate of bridge structure value based on only two variables, bridge length and number of lanes, 
may be sufficiently accurate for preliminary seismic screening. If a more refined estimate of bridge 
value is wanted, two additional factors can be used to adjust the value. The first is a terrain factor 
which accounts for bridges which must cross difficult obstacles, for example a wide river where 
intermediate piers would be required, or a steep ravine where construction would be difficult. The 
second is a location factor which reflects the fact that it is more expensive to build a bridge in a remote 
location than it would be to build the same bridge in an easily accessible location. 
Thus, the bridge costs calculated by the cost-versus-length formulas can be subsequently multiplied by 
a terrain factor, which is 1.0 for typical terrain such a short stream crossings, and increases to perhaps 
1.2 to 1.3 for more difficult terrain, eg, multiple-span bridges or deep ravines; then multiplied by a 
location factor, which is 1.0 for easy-access locations close to major towns and construction facilities, 
and increases to perhaps 1.3 for remote sites for which construction is more expensive. 
Bridge ~-of-Use Value 
Bridge Replacement Time 
The first step in determining the loss-of-use costs due to transportation disruption is to estimate the time 
that it would take to replace the bridge structure if it has been damaged or it has collapsed in an 
earthquake. This bridge replacement time is estimated to vary in a linear relationship with the 
replacement cost of the bridge. Since the formula for replacement cost includes number of lanes, 
bridge length, and terrain and location factors, the replacement time for the bridge depends on these 
factors as well. Replacement time is calculated to be 7 weeks plus 1 additional week for every $40,000 
of bridge construction (ie, replacement) cost, as shown below: 
Struct. Value Repl. Ttme = 1 weeks + -,-----,----
$40,000/week 
Sample results of this formula are shown in Table 12. 7. 
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Table 12. 7 Estimated Bridge Loss-of-Use Times 
-
BRIDGE REPLACEMENT COST BRIDGE REPLACEMENT TIME 
$40,000 8 weeks 
$100,000 9.5 weeks 
$200,000 12 weeks 
$500,000 19.5 weeks 
$1,000,000 32 weeks 
Transportation Disruption Costs 
For the sparsely populated Tasman district, transportation disruption was considered to be the main 
component of loss-of-use cost. It was assumed to depend on traffic volume, detour length, bridge 
reconstruction time, and the feasibility of providing a temporary detour such as ford. Loss-of-use costs 
were estimated according to the formulas shown in Table 12.8. 
Table 12.8 Formulas for Calculating Loss-of-Use Costs 
SCENARIO ITEM FORMULA 
Detour all traffic to Detouring costs = (Replacement time for bridge) x 
alternate route (ADT x 7 days/weeks) x (Detour 
length x 0. 7) x $0.60/km 
No alternate route Ferrying or other costs = (Replacement time for bridge) x 
(ADT x 7) x $100 
Build a ford during Cost to build ford = ($4,000 + $200/m x L) x f .. ,,2 
bridge replacement 
Cost to maintain = (Replacement time for bridge, 
weeks) X ($300 + $4/m X L) f..n 
Time to build ford 
= 0.5 weeks+ cost-to-build 
$7 ,0000/week 
Detouring costs when = (Time to build x (ADT x 7) x 
building ford (Det. length x 0. 7) x $0.60/km 
Vehicle costs to negotiate = (Replacement time for bridge x 
ford (ADT x 7)x $0.50/crossing 
where ADT = Average daily traffic 
L = Bridge Length 
f1en = Terrain factor, typically between 1.0 and 1.2 
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The costs of transportation are considered according to two possible scenarios. The first scenario 
assumes that until the bridge has been reconstructed all traffic must be detoured to the shortest alternate 
route. The second scenario assumes that a ford or other temporary access can be built in the location 
of the bridge, and be used by all traffic during the bridge reconstruction. 
The cost of talcing a detour is calculated based on the following assumptions. 
(a) That the typical traveller needs to increase bis driving distance by 70 percent of the full-
circular detour length, which is recorded for all bridges. (The full-circular detour length is 
the distance from one bridge end to the other, travelling along the shortest route if the bridge 
itself cannot be crossed.) This factor of 0. 7 in actuality depends on the intended route of the 
traveller. Several bridge-detour routes were reviewed in comparison to the intended routes 
for most of the traffic over the bridge. From this review it was found that the average detour 
for a traveller was about 0.5 to 0. 7 times the full circular detour length. 
(b) That the cost to the road user is 60¢ per km of additional travel distance. This number 
should account for both vehicle costs-fuel usage, vehicle maintenance, etc-plus the value 
of the time spent by the driver and passengers of the vehicle. The second factor of the 
traveller's time value is difficult to assess. The order of magnitude can be estimated; 
however, by considering that if a vehicle travels at 60km/hr and contains one person whose 
time is worth $10/hr, then the value of that extra time is calculated to be 17¢/k:m. 
The figure of 60¢/k:m can be compared to values from the Transit New Ze.aland method for 
estimating benefit/cost ratios. That method indicates that $1.25 is the cost in 1991.dollars of 
operating a Class l heavy vehicle at 70 km/hr for one km, and that $1.61 is the cost in 1991 
dollars of operating a Class 2 heavy vehicle at 70km/hr for one km. 
The disruption cost for the present study is then calculated as 60¢/k:m x 0. 7 x detour length x the 
number of vehicles which must be detoured around the bridge during the time that it takes to 
reconstruct the bridge. 
For several of the roads of the Tasman District there is no alternative route for possitlle detour. In 
such a case, disruption costs can be taken as some fixed amount, say $100, per every vehicle that 
would have used the bridge. This could be considered as the cost of making other transportation 
arrangements for essential trips across the river (or other obstacle). 
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Temporary Access (ford} in Place of the Bridge 
The second scenario for considering disruption costs is to assume that a ford is built across the river. 
For most obstacles where it is possible to build a ford, the savings in transportation-disruption costs 
more than balance the cost of building and maintaining the ford for the time that it takes to build the 
bridge. The loss-of-use cost for the build-a-ford scenario considers four separate costs. The first is 
the initial construction cost for the ford which is assumed to be a function of the bridge length and the 
terrain factor. The variation of construction cost of the ford with bridge length is assumed to be linear 
and is taken as $4,000 plus $200 per metre of bridge length. The cost is then adjusted to account for 
site conditions using the terrain factor discussed in the previous section. The terrain factor for most 
bridges is 1.0 causing no adjustment. For bridges with difficult crossing conditions such as steep 
ravines the terrain factor is increased to a value of perhaps 1.2. The ford construction cost is adjusted 
by the terrain factor squared. This reflects that the cost of building a ford is affected more by terrain 
than is the cost of building a bridge. 
The second cost component is the cost to maintain the ford. Again a linear relationship with length 
is assumed, the weekly maintenance cost being $300 plus $4 per metre of bridge length. This cost is 
then multiplied by the terrain factor. These formulas are shown in Table 12.8. 
The third component of costs associated with loss of use of the bridge and construction of a ford is the 
cost of detouring traffic during the time that it takes to build the ford. This cost is calculated in the 
same way as the detour costs previously described. In the case of constructing a ford, the time 
required to build the ford is estimated to be a linear relationship with the cost to build the ford, and 
is taken as 0.5 weeks + 1 week for every $1,000 of construction cost. The cost for detouring traffic 
for the time that it takes to build the ford then is equal to that time in weeks times the detour length, 
adjusted by the 0. 7 factor, times 60¢/km, times the weekly traffic volume. 
The fourth and final component of the cost to build a ford is the transportation disruption caused by 
vehicles having to slow down to negotiate the ford (and to wait for opposing traffic). This cost is 
assumed equal to 50¢ per crossing per vehicle. This fourth component of loss-of-use cost is then equal 
to the average daily traffic x 7 days per week x the num!>er of weeks required to replace the bridge 
x 50¢. The 50¢ per crossing per vehicle is meant to be an average for all vehicles and can be 
compared to the figure of $1.70 (in 1991 dollars) per Class l heavy vehicle, and $1.93 (in 1991 
dollars) per Class 2 heavy vehicle, assumed in the Transit New Zealand cost-benefit method. 
Thus for each bridge there are two options for calculating the loss-of-use cost. One is to assume that 
a ford or other temporary access is built and the other is to assume that all traffic must be routed over 
the detour route for the whole time that it takes to reconstruct the bridge. The benefit/cost ratio of 
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building a ford then can be calculated as the cost of detouring traffic divided by the total cost of having 
a ford, both costs calculated for the duration of the_ time that it takes to reconstruct the bridge after 
earthquake damage. For the pilot study sample of 56 bridges it was found that it makes economic 
sense to build the ford in all situations where it is physically possible to do so. Typically the 
benefit/cost ratio (calculated as indicated above) of building a ford is between 3 and 7. 
The loss-of-use value of the bridge then is taken as the lowest cost of the two options, detour or build-
a-ford. 
Additional Considerations 
The formulas given above for estimating bridge structure value and loss-of-use value are intended as 
guidelines only. The procedures were developed for the sparsely populated Tasman District, where 
most bridges carry low traffic volumes and cross streams or rivers. The procedures can still be used 
for different types of bridge jurisdictions, but in some cases the formulas may need to be adjusted, or 
additional factors may need to be considered. 
Although no specific guidelines are given here for estimating potential losses due to earthquake 
casualties, such losses should be considered. Typically, casualties can be assumed proportional to the 
traffic volume, ADT, carried by the bridge. For bridges with roadways passing underneath, the ADT 
under the bridge should be included. For bridges which have buildings, parking, or other uses 
underneath, the replacement cost and potential casualties related to the facilities under the bridge should 
be estimated. 
Benefit/Cost Ratio for Seismic Upgrading 
Using the computer database, bridge-upgrading can be prioritized based on calculations of the bridge 
asset value and benefit/cost ratio for upgrading. The highest priority bridges to retrofit are those with 
the highest benefit/cost ratio. 
The calculation of benefit/cost ratio requires an estimate of the cost of seismic retrofitting for each 
bridge. For preliminary screening, an approximate estimate-for example a proportion of bridge 
structure value-may be used. 
It may also be possible to roughly estimate the cost of retrofitting based on the nature of the seismic 
deficiencies, as indicated by the relative value of the component vulnerability ratings for superstructure 
movement joints, columns or pier walls, or foundations or abutments. For example, retrofitting cost 
can be estimated at 15 percent of structure value for bridges in which the seismic vulnerability rating 
is governed by the rating for superstructure movement joints, and estimated at 25 percent of structure 
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value for all other bridges. This would reflect that movement joint seismic deficiencies are generally 
easier to retrofit than substructure seismic deficiencies. 




= {Losses, No Retro.fit) - (Losses, After Retro.fit) 
Retrofit Cost 
The losses after retrofit can be calculated by estimating what the vulnerability rati~g of the bridge will 
be after retrofitting. If retrofits are done to a high standard of earthquake performance, eg, to the 
same criteria as for new bridges, this term could be neglected. More typically, however, a retrofit 
programme may be carried out only to address the worst seismic deficiencies, so that a less stringent 
earthquake performance criteria is used compared to that for new bridges. For example, a bridge with 
a high vulnerability rating of9.5 may, after retrofitting, still have a medium vulnerability rating of 5.5. 
For this bridge, the benefit/cost ratio is based on the difference between losses calculated for V = 9.5 
and those calculated for V = 5.5. 
In calculating benefit/cost ratios, three additional points should be noted: 
l The expected seismic losses are calculated over the estimated remaining service life for the 
bridge. The time value of money should be accounted for in the calculations of benefit/cost 
ratio, so that the present worth of the benefits is compared with the present worth of costs. 
2 The benefits calculated are the expected value of benefits. Clearly there is a tremendous 
possible range of the actual value of benefits for any given bridge, depending on what level 
of earthquake, if any, actually occurs, and on numerous uncertainties in damage estimation 
and asset value determinations. 
3 Part of the benefits of retrofitting come from avoiding the costs of bridge repair or 
replacement due to earthquake damage. As shown in Figure 12. l, this portion of the benefits 
is derived from the structure value portion of bridge asset value. Another possible 
formulation of benefit/cost ratio would consider the avoided costs of bridge repair as negative 





Expected User Losses 
No Retrofit 
Expected User Losses 
After Retrofit = ___ ......_ _ ~ _____ _,__ _ '-:----:-----------~ 
Refrofit Cost + [ Expected Repair Costs ] _ [ Expected Repair Costs ] 
After Retrofit No Retrofit 
Applicarion of Cost-benefit Results 
The benefit/cost ratios calculated above can be used as a relative measure to compare retrofit options. 
As previously emphasized, the ratios are only approximate. If they are to be considered as an absolute 
measure of the worth of retrofitting, several cautions must be observed: 
• Not all of the benefits of seismic retrofitting can be easily quantified. For example, a major 
benefit of retrofitting might be to avoid the bad publicity and loss of public confidence in the 
transportation authority, such as occurred in Cali fomia after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. 
• Numerous assumptions and uncertainties are inherent in estimating benefit/cost ratios, 
including probabilities of earthquake occurrence, estimated damage at different earthquake 
levels, loss-of-service times, costs of disruption, and probabilities of collapse, injuries, 
fatalities, and associated costs. Different assumptions can result in significant differences in 
the computed benefit/cost ratios. However if the assumptions are made consistently for all 
bridges evaluated, the benefit/cost ratio will still be an accurate measure for the prioritimtion 
for seismic upgrading within the group of bridges. 
Simplified Prioriti7,ation Formula 
It is also possible for the preliminary screening stage, to use a single prioritimtion formula instead of 
explicit calculations of benefit/cost ratio. The recommended formula is based on the seismic 






[ ADT(DET * K + 5)] B/C = (V - 1.5)2 0.1 + FORD 
500,000 
Approximate Benefit/Cost Ratio for Upgrade. 
Seismic Vulnerability Rating, 2-10. 
Average Daily Traffic (Vehicles/Day). 
Detour Length (1cm). 
1 if it is possible to construct a temporary ford in place of the bridge; 5 = 
otherwise 
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The formula was developed by the author to approximate the cost-benefit results which were calculated 
for 56 bridges in the Tasman district. The term (V - 1.5)2 reflects the likely amount of bridge damage 
due to an earthquake, as shown in Figure 12.9. The term 0.1 reflects the structure-value portion of 
bridge-asset value; it is a constant because retrofit costs are assumed proportional to structure value. 
The remaining term reflects the loss-of-use value of the bridge, which is proportional to ADT. Within 
this term, the quantity DET*KFoRD reflects the loss-of-use costs coming from transportation disruption, 
while the constant 5 reflects the costs of casualties or other losses. 
The formula assumes all bridges are in the same seismic zone. When applied to a group of bridges 
in different seismic zones, the formula should be modified. This can be done by multiplying the 
vulnerability rating, V, by a seismicity factor. For New Zealand's seismic zones, the formula can be 
assumed applicable to the highest seismic zone, Z = 1.2. For other seismic zones V should be 
multiplied by Z/1.2, where Z is the seismic zone coefficient for structural design [SANZ 1992]. 
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CHAPTER 13 
BRIDGE SEISMIC RISK AND UPGRADE MANAGEMENT RESULTS FOR NEW ZEALAND'S 
TASMAN DISTRICT 
This chapter presents selected results from the seismic risk and bridge asset management study 
conducted for New Zealand's Tasman District [Maffei 1994). The purpose of the chapter is to show 
some of the applications of the recommended evaluation and prioritization methods described in 
Chapter 12. 
In the Tasman District, a pilot-study sample of 56 bridges was evaluated with a visual structural 
assessment and an approximate cost-benefit analysis. The seismic vulnerability results for these bridges 
are presented in Section 13.1. In Section 13.2 the results are extrapolated so that the vulnerability of 
the entire stock of 445 bridges is considered. Sections 13.3 and 13.4 use the results to assess, in 
economic tenns, different possible bridge-upgrade programs. 
An important part of implementing a seismic evaluation and upgrade program in a bridge jurisdiction 
is a computer database for bridge information. Section 13.5 presents several recommendations for 
bridge databases. 
The results presented in this chapter are meant to be illustrative only; in some cases they are based 
only on preliminary findings from the Tasman District. The benefit/cost ratios presented should be 
considered as an approximate and relative measure of the worth or seismic upgrading, rather than as 
an absolute economic indicator. 
Vulnerability Rating Results 
For the Tasman District, each of the 56 pilot-study bridges was seismically evaluated with a level-one 
assessment, and a vulnerability rating on the 0-10 scale was assigned to each structure. The rating 
scale and procedure for these evaluations is described in Sections 12.3 and 12.4. For most of the 
bridges the soil profile condition was not studied, so final vulnerability ratings have not been used; 
rather the structural-vulnerability rating has been used. 
Figure 13.1, graph (a), shows the distribution of results of the seismic assessments of the pilot study 
bridges. The structural vulnerability ratings for these 56 bridges fall between the values of 1 and 10, 
with many bridges having vulnerabilities in the range of 2 to 4, and a number of more vulnerable 
bridges having ratings in the range of 5 to 9. The mean vulnerability rating is 4.8; the median rating 
is 3.8. 
Bridge structural vulnerability was found to vary with bridge length. Figure 13.2 shows a plot of 
structural vulnerability rating versus bridge length. It can be seen that nearly all of the bridges with 
low vulnerability ratings of 2 or 3 are less than 15 m in length, and that as bridges get longer, 
particularly in the 30-50 m range, bridge seismic vulnerability tends to be higher. This is not to say 
that short bridges cannot be also be vulnerable. There are a-few short bridges which were found to 
have high seismic vulnerability. 
The association of seismic vulnerability with bridge length is important for two reasons. The first is 
that the value of a bridge greatly increases with bridge length, so that even though the number of 
vulnerable bridges may be low the asset value of those bridges can still be significant. Second, the 
typical length of the pilot-study bridges is greater than that of the overall bridge stock for the Tasman 
District so that the vulnerability characteristics of the pilot study need to be adjusted somewhat to be 
representative of the entire bridge stock. 
The distribution of bridge asset value as a function of seismic vulnerability rating is shown in Figure 
13. l, graph (b). In comparison with Figure 13. l(a), Figure 13. l(b) demonstrates that a substantial 
portion of the asset value of the Tasman District bridges fall within the medium to high seismic 
vulnerability range. The mean structural-vulnerability rating of the bridges based on asset value is 5. 7, 
significantly higher than the mean based on number of bridges. The median vulnerability based on 
asset value is approximately 5.9 (ie, 50 percent of the asset value of the pilot study bridges have a 
vulnerability greater than 5.9). 
13.2 Extrapolation to the Entire Bridi?e Sample 
Before extrapolating the results for the pilot study bridges to the total Tasman District bridge stock, 
the variables characterising the two bridge samples were studied. The most important of these 
variables are listed in Table l 3.1. There are 56 bridges in the pilot study and 445 bridges total in the 
district. The average bridge length is 24.3 m for the pilot-study bridges and 15. 7 m for the total bridge 
stock. The pilot study bridges include several long crossings of the Motueka river which push up the 
average bridge length. The median bridge length for the pilot study is also higher than that for the 
total bridge stock. The percentage of one lane bridges is smaller for the pilot-study bridges than for 
the total bridge stock. Of the pilot-study bridges 48 percent are one-lane bridges, while of all of the 
district bridges, 65 percent are one-lane bridges. 
Bridge Structure Value 
The structural value of the pilot-study bridges, calculated as described in Section 4.2, averages 
$200,000 per bridge, giving a total value of $11.2 million for the 56 pilot-study bridges. The 
structural value per metre of length of the pilot study bridges is $8,240. To estimate the structural 
value of the entire bridge stock, it is necessary to account for (a) the shorter average bridge length, 
and (b) the greater predominance of one-lane bridges amongst the entire bridge stock. Assuming that 
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of one-lane bridges is 70 percent of that of two-lane bridges, a linear interpolation is used to calculate 
an average structural value per length for the entire bridge _stock. The result of this interpolation 
calculation is $7,750 per metre of bridge length. This value is multiplied by the total bridge length 
for the Tasman District to give a structural value of $54.2 million for the district bridges. 
Bridge ~-of-Use Value 
The loss-of-use value of the bridges is calculated according to the method described in Section 12. 7. 
For the pilot-study bridges the average loss-of-use value was found to be $177,000 per bridge (in 1994 
dollars), giving a total loss-of-use value for the 56 pilot-study bridges of $9.9 million. The ratio of 
loss-of-use value to structural value for the bridges is 0.88. This ratio is thought to be roughly 
independent of bridge length, number of lanes, or any other variables which differ between the pilot-
study bridge sample and the entire bridge stock. Therefore the ratio 0.88 is used to estimate the loss-
of-use value for the entire bridge stock. The resulting loss-of-use value for all of the Tasman District 
bridges is $48 million. The resulting total asset value of the Tasman District bridges then is $54.2 
million structural value plus $48 million loss-of-use value, equal to $ 102 million asset value. The 
estimate of bridge loss-of-use value can depend greatly on the discount factor assumed in converting 
future values into present worths. The results given here assume a relatively low discount factor. 
Seismic Vulnerability Ratings 
As discussed in the previous section, the distribution of bridge vulnerability is expected to be slightly 
different for the entire bridge stock than it is for the pilot-study bridges due to the predominance of 
longer bridges in the pilot-study sample. The distribution of vulnerability ratings for the pilot-study 
bridges shown in Figure 13 .1 shows a significant amount of unevenness, due to the small sample size 
of 56 bridges. For a larger sample of bridges, a smoother distribution of seismic vulnerability ratings 
would be expected. 
To estimate a realistic distribution of the asset-value versus vulnerability rating for the entire stock of 
445 bridges, a two-step process was used. 
The distribution of Figure 13 .1 (b) was simplified to a smoother distribution with approximately 
the same mean and median values. 
2 The distribution was shifted towa(ds a lower mean and median vulnerability, to account for 
the greater predominance of shorter bridges in the 445-bridge sample compared to the 56-
bridge sample. The shift of mean vulnerability was calculated to roughly correspond to the 
shift of mean bridge length between the pilot-study and total bridge sample considering the 
vulnerability-versus-length regression line shown in Figure 13.2. 
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Table 13.1 Comparison Of Pilot-study Bridge Sample With Total Bridge Stock 
Category Item Pilot-study All Bridges 
Bridges 
Basic Data Number of bridges 56 445 
(12.2%) 
Bridge Length Average 24.3 m 15.7 m 
Median 10.4 m 9.0m 
Total Length 1360 6990 
(19.5%) 
Percentage one lane bridges 48.2% 65.4% 
Asset Value Average Traffic AADT 349 vpd Unknown 
Average Terrain Factor 1.06 Unknown 
Average Location Factor 1.08 Unknown 
Average Bridge Replacement Time 12.0 weeks Unknown 
Average Benefit/Cost to build 3.9 Unknown 
Ford during bridge replacement 
Structure Value Average $199,700 $122,000 * 
Total $11,200,000 $54,200,000 * 
Value/Length $8,240/m $7,750/m * . 
Loss-of-use Value Average $177,000 $108,000 * 
Total $9,910,000 $48,000,000 * 
Loss-of-use Value + Structure Value 0.88 0.88 * 
Total Asset Value Average $377,000 $230,000 
Total $2,100,000 $102,000,000 
(20.7%) 
Seismic Structural Vulnerability Rating: 
Vulnerability Average by number of bridges 4.8 4.4 * 
Median by number of bridges 3.8 3.5 * 
Average by Asset Value 5.7 5.4 * 
Median by Asset Value 5.9 5.2 * 
* Extrapolated from pilot-study sample. 
For simplification, the minimum vulnerability rating was taken as 2.0. 
The resulting distribution of asset value versus seismic-vulnerability rating is shown in Figure 13.3, 
graph (a). This distribution indicates that 35 % of the bridges have low seismic vulnerabilities between 
2 and 4, and that 65 % of the bridges have moderate to high seismic vulnerabilities, with ratings 
between 4 and 10. 
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13.3 Expected Seismic Damage and Effect of Upgradity? 
The seismic vulnerability distribution as shown in Figure 13._3{a) for the Tasman District bridges is 
used to give an estimate of the likely earthquake damage to district bridges over the next 65 years. 
The 65-year period is equal to the assumed average remaining service life of the bridges in the district. 
The typical lifespan of a bridge is assumed to be 100 years, according to Transit New Zealand 
guidelines. Among the pilot-study bridges the average bridge age is approximately 35 years. Thus 
on average, the Tasman District bridges could be expected to have 65 years of service life remaining. 
The expected seismic damage is calculated by combining the distribution of asset value versus seismic 
vulnerability, Figure 13.3(a), with the expected bridge damage versus vulnerability curve shown in 
Figure 12.9. The combination of these damage estimates with the asset value of the bridges in each 
vulnerability category indicates an earthquake loss of 20. 3 % of the bridge asset value over the next 65 
years. This equates to a loss of $20. 7 million in bridge reconstruction costs and disruption costs to 
the bridge users. 
Effect of Seismic Upgrading 
Three possible levels of seismic-upgrade programs are considered here for illustration. A stage-one 
program which retrofits the most critical 19% of bridge-asset value, a stage-two program which 
retrofits an additional 14% of the bridge-asset value, and a hypothetical stage-three seismic upgrade 
program which retrofits all bridges with vulnerability ratings above 4. The benefit of implementing 
a bridge seismic upgrade program is considered by adjusting the bridge asset value versus vulnerability 
distribution to account for seismic upgrades which would be carried out. This is illustrated in Figure 
13.3. 
It is expected that the seismic retrofit criteria for an upgrading program would be flexible, allowing 
different retrofit options to be considered for each bridge. (See Chapter 14 for re.commended methods 
of deciding between various retrofit options). A complete retrofit - ie, to a seismic performance level 
equivalent to that of a new bridge - would reduce the vulnerability rating of a bridge to around 2. A 
minimal seismic retrofit, addressing only the worst seismic deficiencies, would reduce the vulnerability 
rating of a bridge to perhaps 5. In the stage-one and stage-two retrofit programs, it is assumed that 
bridges would be retrofitted to somewhere between these two standards. 
Stage-one Retrofit Program 
Figure 13.3(b) shows a plot of the new asset value versus vulnerability distribution upon completion 
of a "stage-one" seismic upgrade program which retrofits the most critical 19% of the bridge asset 
value. The most critical bridges would be those with the worst combination of high vulnerability 
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considered individually using structural and economic evaluations. After completion of the evaluations 
and stage-one seismic upgrading it is expected that most of the bridges in vulnerability categories from 
8-10 would be upgraded and a few bridges in vulnerability category 7-8 would be upgraded. After 
upgrading, these bridges would have an improved seismic vulnerability rating, in the range of 2-5 for 
typical seismic-retrofit criteria. Thus the distribution of asset value versus vulnerability is shifted, with 
a portion of the asset value coming from the rating levels 7-10 and being moved down to the rating 
levels 2-5. The assumed vulnerability distribution after such an upgrade program is shown in Figure 
13.3(b). 
Having postulated this new vulnerability distribution, the expected earthquake losses over the n~xt 65 
years are calculated in the same manner as before. The expected earthquake losses after stage-one 
upgrading are 11.6 % of the bridge asset value or $11.8 million. Compared to the earthquake losses 
with no upgrading, $8.8 million is saved in earthquake damage costs. 
Stage-two Retrofit Program 
If further seismic upgrading is contemplated, additional vulnerable bridges can be seismically 
retrofitted. It can be assumed that in the second stage of upgrading a number of the bridges with 
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vulnerability ratings from 6-8 will be seismically retrofitted and that the asset-value versus vulnerability 
distribution will be shifted to an even more favourable distribution as shown in Figure 13.3(c). This 
stage-two program would seismically upgrade an additional 14 % of the bridge asset value. Assuming 
such a vulnerability distribution after stage-two upgrading, the predicted earthquake losses are again 
calculated. The results indicate that after a stage-two upgrading only 7. 7 % of the bridge asset value 
will be lost due to earthquake damage over the next 65 years. This equates to a loss of $7. 8 million. 
Stage-three Retrofit Program 
A hypothetical stage-three upgrading program is also considered, Figure 13.3(d), where all bridges 
with structural vulnerability ratings above 4 were seismically retrofitted. Such an extensive retrofitting 
program generally would not be economically justified, however it is considered here for illustration. 
As a result of this complete upgrading of district bridges, the expected seismic loss to the Tasman 
District bridges over the next 65 years would be only 2.5 % of the bridge asset value, or $2.5 million. 
ru Benefit/Cost Ratios for· Seismic Upgrading. 
Estimates of benefit and cost have been calculated for the three possible seismic upgrading programs 
described in Figure 13.3. The benefit of each stage of seismic upgrading is calculated as an 
incremental benefit equal to the savings in seismic damage due to carrying out that stage of the upgrade 
program. 
For the stage-one upgrade program, addressing the most vulnerable bridges, it is estimated that seismic 
upgrading will cost on average, 20 percent of the structural value (or replacement cost) of each 
upgraded bridge. For some bridges the cost of upgrading will be less because perhaps only 
superstructure restrainers or hold-down devices would need to be added to the structure, however for 
other bridges the cost of upgrade could be more than 20 percent of replacement value. This may be 
the case if column jacketing or foundation strengthening were required. Based on the 20 percent of 
replacement-cost figure, the cost of the stage-one seismic upgrade program is estimated to be $2.6 
million. The benefit of the stage-one upgrading program is calculated to be the earthquake losses with 
no upgrading, $20. 7 million, minus the earthquake losses assuming the upgrading has been carried out, 
$11. 8 million. The difference, equal to the savings in earthquake losses, is $8. 8 million. This number 
divi4ed by the cost of the upgrading program gives the benefit/cost ratio of 4.3 for carrying out the 
seismic upgrading of these bridges. 
For the stage-two seismic upgrading program it is assumed that the cost of upgrading is somewhat 
higher per bridge than for the stage-one seismic upgrading. This is because in the stage-one program 
some of the more vulnerable details are the easier-to-fix details, the restraint and hold-down of bridge 
movement joints for example. It is estimated that for the stage 2 upgrading, the average upgrade cost 
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would be 35 % of the replacement cost of each upgraded bridge. This results in a cost of $2. 7 million 
for the stage-two seismic upgrading program. 
In calculating the potential benefit of the stage-two seismic upgrade program, it is assumed that the 
stage-one upgrading has been completely carried out, so that if no further upgrading is done earthquake 
losses of $11. 8 million are anticipated. If the additional bridges of stage-two are upgraded, then the 
expected earthquake losses will reduce to $7.8 million. Thus the incremental benefit is the difference 
between $11.8 million and $7.8 million, equal to $4.0 million. The benefit/cost ratio, then, of the 
stage-two upgrading is equal to $4.0 million divided by $2. 7 million, and is equal to 1.5. 
For illustrative purposes the benefit/cost ratio for an idealistic stage-three seismic upgrade program is 
calculated. The costs of such a complete seismic upgrading is estimated to be 50 % of the replacement 
cost of each bridge, resulting in an upgrade cost of $10. 8 million. The incremental benefit of such an 
upgrade program, equal to the savings in damage over that already achieved in the stage-one and stage-
two seismic upgrade programs, is calculated to be $5.3 million. This yields a benefit/cost ratio of0.61. 
These calculations confirm that it would not be economically justified to carry out such an extensive 
bridge-seismic upgrade program. 
The cost-benefit results of the three seismic-upgrade scenarios are each plotted as a point in Figure 
13.4. In the figure, a line is drawn through the three points to show the estimated distribution of the 
benefit/cost ratios for the seismic upgrading of the Tasman District bridges. Note that this distribution 
is based on rough extrapolations from the pilot-study brid~e sample. As the bridge database input and 
preliminary screening program is completed, benefit/cost ratios for each bridge can be calculated and 
a better estimate of the distribution of the benefit/cost ratios can be made. 
The distribution of Figure 13.4 indicates that 45 percent of the district's bridge assets have a 
benefit/cost ratio for seismic upgrading which is greater than one. The figure shows that 15 percent 
of the bridge-asset value is vulnerable enough to have a benefit/cost ratio for seismic upgrading greater 
than 5. 
As emphasised in Section 12. 7, the benefit/cost ratios should not be interpreted as an absolute measure 
of the worth of seismic retrofitting, because the values of the benefit/cost ratios can be significantly 
changed by changing the assumptions used in the bridge evaluation. The benefit/cost ratio is however 
very useful as a relative measure, and although the actual values of the ratios could be debated, the 
shape of the distribution shown in Figure 13.4 is thought to be illustrative of the typical economic 
characteristics of bridge seismic upgrading. 
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Figure 13.4 Estimated distribution among the Tasman District bridges of benefiUcost ratio for 
seismic upgrade. 
13.5 The Bridge Database 
An important component of implementing a bridge seismic-retrofit program is to establish a system for 
the bridge inventory or database. The bridge database for many jurisdictions can be used for more 
than just seismic-assessment data. This was the case in the Tasman District where it was requested 
that the database be designed to eventually contain all of the information necessary for calculating 
bridge-asset values, determining and recording bridge seismic risk and flood risk, recording vehicle 
load ratings and speed and safety ratings, and finally, recording bridge condition data including 
inspection records and maintenance records. 
This section describes the objectives and recommended content and organization of such a database, 
and also briefly outlines an improved inspection procedure for bridges. 
Objectives of the Database 
The bridge database for a jurisdiction should be designed to (I) contain all of the important information 
for each bridge, (2) provide the capability to analyze the data to determine results such as asset values, 
benefit/cost ratios of upgrades, and seismic vulnerability ratings, and (3) be flexible so that it can be 
revised and built upon in the future. The database should also be organi:r.ed for ease of use. 
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In the Tasman District, the bridge inventory and database is designed to record and save important data 
on: 
(a) factors related to the asset value of the bridge, such as daily traffic (ADT) and structural 
replacement cost, 
(b) condition records and maintenance requirements for each bridge, 
(c) seismic assessment variables, such as structural features, year of construction, and seismic 
assessment results and vulnerability ratings, 
(d) vehicle-load ratings so that applications for overweight permits can be quickly checked, 
(e) an assessment of the speed and safety condition of the bridge, and 
(t) variables and assessment results associated with flood risk to a bridge. 
Much of this data is used for the bridge asset-value determinations, as discussed in Section 12. 7, and 
for the management of bridge maintenance and upgrade work. 
As shown in item (b) above, part of the Tasman District Council bridge database involves bridge 
maintenance. A study1 of bridge maintenance management has been carried out in New Zealand by J 
H Wood [1993). The study concisely defines the goals of a bridge maintenance management system, 
and considers more specifically eighteen capabilities that can be provided in a bridge maintenance-
management system. 
Content and Organisation of the Database 
As part of the bridge seismic-risk and asset-management study for the Tasman District [Maffei 1994), 
recommendations have been made for the content and organization of the bridge computer database. 
Some of the recommendations for bridge databases are summariz.ed here. The recommendations are 
intended as guidelines only, realizing that different bridge jurisdictions will use their databases in 
different ways, and will use different computer software. 
The lists of data items given below are intended to be neither completely exhaustive, nor minimiz.ed. 
In many cases more data items are listed than would be recommended to use for a specific purpose 
(such as calculating a seismic vulnerability rating). This is because often it is worthwhile to include 
extra data items which require little additional effort to record but which may tum out to be useful. 
Bridge data items can be organiz.ed by either the purpose or the source of the data: 
Organization by Purpose of the Data 
When reviewing bridge inventory information, it is best to have the information grouped according to 
the purpose of the data. Tables 13.2 through 13.5 show some of the data items that may be needed 
for purposes such as asset value determination and seismic risk assessment. 
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I OF DATA 
Identification and Location Bridge File No Input 
Bridge Name Input 
Old Bridge No Input 
Name of Road Input 
Obstacles crossed Input 
Route Point of: 
Bridge Input Meters 
Start Segment Input Meters 
Finish Segment Input Meters 
Drawing Nos and Input 
No of drawing sheets 
Notes Input 
Geometry No Lanes Input 
Length Input Meters 
No Spans Input 
Span Length Input Meters 
Width - kerb Input Meters 
Width - from RAMM Input Meters 
Structure Structure type: See table of 
Deck Input structure types. 
Beamffruss Input 
Column/Pier Input 




Year of construction Input 
Year of major upgrade Input 
Structure description Input 
The last column in each of the Tables 13.2 through 13.5 is titled "Notes" and describes some of the details of 
data items which are not self explanatory. In some cases the notes indicate the possible range of values assigned 
to data items, or formulas used to calculate asset values, vulnerability ratings, or costs and benefits of upgrade 
proposals. 
The basic bridge data shown in Table 13.2 contains information to identify the bridge and its location, data on 
the geometry of the bridge such as number of lanes and length, and data on the structure of the bridge, which 
includes the year of construction and the categories of structure type as described in Section 12.4. 
The asset value data shown in Table 13.3 includes information relating to the replacement cost of the bridge, 
to the importance of the bridge as a transportation link, and consequently to the loss-of-use value of the bridge 
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Table 13.3 A~ Value Data 
CATEGORY DATA ITEM SOURCE NOTES 
OF DATA 
Structure Value Length Prev. Input 
No Lanes Prev. Input 
Terrain Factor Input 1.0 avg Terrain, > 1.0 difficult. 
Location Factor Input 1.0 accessible, > 1.0 remote. 
Replacement Cost Calculate Function of length, lanes, terrain, 
location. 
Route ADT Input 
Importance Route Hierarchy Input 5 = Arterial, 3 = Collector, 
1 = Access 
% Heavy Vehicles Calculate Depends on route hierarchy. 
Detour Length Input Complete length from one side of 
the bridge to the other. 
Detour Routes Input 
Detour Route Hierarchy Input 
Detour Cost Factor Calculate 
Possibility of Temporary Input 
Access (eg ford) 
Utilities Carried Input Yes, No, type of utilities. 
Utilities Factor Input 1.0 = no utility, 1.05-1.2 utility 
Access to Critical Input Type of facilities 
Facilities 
Critical Access Factor Input LO= nocrit.fac 1.1-2.0crit.fac 
Loss-of-use Replacement Time, weeks Calculate Linear function of cost. 
Value Disruption Cost 
Calculate Function of ADT, % heavy veh, 
detour costs. 
Total Value Total Value Calculate Replacement + Disruption cost. 
Construction Year of Construction Prev. Input 
Cost Data Cost of Construction Input 
CCI in year built Input 
Cost per Current CCI Input 
Compare cost to Calculate 
replacement 
cost 
as described in Section 12. 7 of this report. The total value of the bridge is considered to be the sum of the 
structure value (or replacement cost) of the bridge plus the loss-of-use value (or disruption cost) of the bridge. 
The seismic risk assessment data is outlined in Table 13.4. These data include the seismic vulnerability ratings 
which are described in Section 12.3, and information OD the seismicity and soil profile at the site. The database 
can automatically calculate a final seismic vulnerability rating based OD formulas presented in Chapter 12. 
Additionally, the database can use the total bridge value, previously calculated, in an estimate of the benefit/cost 
ratio of proposed seismic upgrading. 
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Table 13.4 Seismic Risk Data 
CATEGORY DATA ITEM SOURCE NOTES 
OF DATA 
Structure Risk Structure type Prev. Input 
No Lanes Prev. Input 
Length Prev. Input 
No Spans Prev. Input 
Span Lengths Prev. Input 
Year of construction Prev. Input 
Year of major upgrade Input 
Structure description Input 
Presence of movement joints Input Yes, no, restrained. 
Support lengths Input mm 
Movement joint risk factor Input 0 = no movement joints, 
10 = vulnerable. 
Column/wall risk factor Input 0 = not vulnerable, 
10 = vulnerable. 
Foundation/abutment risk Input 0 = not vulnerable, 
factor 10 = vulnerable. 
Structure risk factor Calculate Highest of above 3 factors. 
Soil and seismicity Soil Profile type Input 1,2,3, or 4 corresponding 
to UBC. 
Liquefaction potential Input No, maybe, yes, high. 
Soil factor Input 1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 2.0 per 
UBC, also high liquefaction 
Seismic rone coefficient Input = 2.0. 
Seismicity factor Calculate From NZS 4203 1992. 
= rone coefficient + 1.2 
Seismic Risk Rating Rating Calculate = (structure x soil x 
seismicity)°'ss 
Recommended Upgrade Measure Input 
Upgrade Estimated cost Input 
Total value of bridge Prev. Input 
Seismic damage probability Calculate Based on seismic risk 
rating. 
Estimated benefit Calculate Based on damage 




Table 13.S Condition and Maintenance Data 
CATEGORY DATA ITEM SOURCE NOTES 
OF DATA 
Structure Structure Type Prev. Input 
Year of Construction Prev. Input 
Year of major upgrade Prev. Input 
Structure description Prev. Input 
Inspection Date of last Gen.Inspection. Input 
Record Findings. Input 
Date of last Detailed Inspn. Input 
Findings. Input 
Maintenance Date of Maintenance Input 
Record Description of Maintenance Input 
Estimated vs Actual costs, unit Input 
costs 
Recommended Condition Summary Input 
Maintenance Vulnerability to Scour Input None, low, medium, high. 
Recom maintenance Items Input 
Date by which maintenance Input 
item should be completed 
Est remaining Serv.Life Input Assuming Maintn is carried 
Est costs of maintenance Input out $/year 
Est benefit of maintenance Input In years of increased 
service life provided. 
Total asset value of bridge Prev. Input 
Calculate 
Est $ benefit of maintenance $ based on asset value 
depreciation and increase 
service life. 
Benefit/cost Calculate 
As shown in Table 13.5, a fourth category of data can be defined, relating to the condition and 
maintenance of each bridge. Such data would include information from the inspection and maintenance 
records of each bridge, and calculated benefits and costs of specific proposed maintenance measures. 
Additional blocks of data which relate to different specific purposes can also be included in the 
database. For example, vehicle overweight load ratings can be input into the database along with the 
source and date of the vehicle-load rating information. Information on the flood potential at the bridge 
site, and information on safe crossing speed and records of accidents, could also be included. 
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Organisation by Source o(Data 
The items of the bridge database can also be grouped according to the source of the data. It is 
recommended that data items be grouped in this way for the input to the database. For some computer 
database programs input forms which are structured by data source can be created, while output forms 
can be structured around the purpose of the data. The sources of bridge data for the Tasman District 
were the following: 
1 bridge drawings, 
2 bridge files, 
3 topographic maps of bridge locations and terrain, 
4 field inspection reports, and 
5 the road-analysis computer program RAMM which provides traffic data. 
Data items coming from the drawings include: drawing numbers, number of drawing sheets, which 
drawings are structural drawings, number of lanes, bridge length, number of spans, span length, bridge 
width, structure type, year of construction, year of major upgrades, structural details, soil-profile type, 
and information regarding seismic risk variables. The terrain factor for asset value can also be 
estimated from the drawings. 
Input from bridge files includes dates of inspections and findings, and dates of maintenance carried out 
and associated costs and descriptions of maintenance. The presence of structural calculations in the 
files should also be noted in the database. 
Input from map data includes the name of the waterway or other obstacle which is crossed by the 
bridge, the location factor for bridge cost, and the detour length for the bridge. (Note that detour 
length is computed as the complete circular length from one side of the bridge to the other when the 
bridge itself cannot be crossed. In this way, detour length is computed consistently for all bridges and 
does not vary depending on the intended route or destination of the traveller). Names of the routes 
making up the detour length are also input to the database. Often it can be judged from a topographic 
map whether a bridge can be replaced by a temporary ford during construction. If the bridge provides 
access to a critical facility such as a hospital or police station, that can also be recorded with the map 
data. 
The bridge inventory and database relies on the RAMM output for the average daily traffic estimate 
(ADT) for each bridge, for the hierarchy of the bridge route, and for the hierarchy of the detour 
route. There are five route hierarchies used by the Tasman District Council. In the database the 
hierarchies are given numbers from one to five so that route hierarchy can be mathematically related 
to the percentage of heavy vehicles on the route, and to the cost to bridge users of having to take the 
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detour route. The five route hierarchies are: arterial = 5, main distributor = 4, collector = 3, 
access/collector = 2, and access = 1. 
Data from the site inspection of the bridge can be used to fill in the gaps in the bridge inventory, 
particularly if drawings for the bridges are not available as is the case with a number of the Tasman 
District bridges. 
Bridge Inspection Data and Procedure 
As part of the study for the Tasman District, the form used to record bridge-inspection results was 
reviewed. From this review and the experience of inspecting the 56 pilot-study bridges, a new version 
of the bridge inspection data sheet and report form was recommended. 
The recommended form is taken from the Transit New Zealand Bridge Maintenance and Inspection 
Manual [1991), with some modifications for the data specifically required by the Tasman District 
Council. 
The new form is less ambiguous than the form used previously and is easier to complete, with less 
additional writing and less subjective judgements necessary. In the Transit New Zealand form the 
inspection items of the bridge should be marked either "satisfactory,• "routine maintenance required,• 
or "urgent maintenance required.• In customizing the form, an intermediate marking has been added 




EVALUATION OF SEISMIC RETROFIT OPTIONS FOR THE THORNDON BRIDGE 
Chapter 13 showed the application of the recommended methods of bridge-upgrade management to a 
large group of bridges, based on a minimum level of evaluation; this chapter illustrates the application 
of the methods to a single major bridge, based on in-depth structural and economic evaluations. The 
study of retrofit concepts for the Thomdon bridge [BCHF 1994b] provides a unique example of the 
assessment of various seismic retrofit options for a major structure. To the author's knowledge, no 
other bridge retrofit project has used the in-depth evaluation methods summarized here. 
This chapter shows the application of some of the general methods described in Chapter 12, such as 
the use of a probable seismicity curve combined with damage curves to estimate earthquake losses, and 
ultimately benefit/cost ratios for seismic upgrading. A probabilistic analysis of earthquake performance 
with respect to limit states is also presented. Such methods provide valuable information for choosing 
between different retrofit options. 
This chapter focuses on those aspects of the Thomdon bridge study [BCHF 1994b] which were 
developed and proposed by the present author. These aspects include (a) the presentation of probable 
seismicity results and the need to separate Wellington fault seismicity from the seismicity from other 
sources, (b) the derivation of damage curves (and tables) from seismic evaluation results, (c) the 
consideration of seismic performance in terms of limit states, (d) the probabilistic assessment of limit-
state performance, and (e) the presentation of economic analysis results. 
Although these aspects of the Thorndon bridge study were conceived by the present author, the study 
of retrofit concepts was a team effort by BCHF consulting engineers, as indicated in the 
acknowledgements. 
14.1 Background 
A description of the structural features of the Thomdon bridge was given in Chapter 4, along with 
descriptions of some of the proposed retrofit measures. There are other important features of the 
bridge and its environment which affect the possible seismic retrofit options for the bridge, and the 
evaluation of the retrofit options, which are presented in this section. 
Four basic retrofit options were defined for the bridge, as discussed in Section 14.3. The retrofit 
options range from a minimal scheme which addresses only the most vulnerable structural details, to 
extensive retrofit schemes which bring the bridge up to standards similar to those for new construction. 
A major passenger ferry terminal and its parking lot are located near to and partially underneath the 
bridge. At certain times, a large number of ferry passengers could be under the bridge and would be 
at physical risk if the bridge were to collapse. In addition, railway yards are located near to and 
underneath the bridge. Regular passenger and freight trains pass under the bridge, and two busy urban 
streets also cross under the bridge. 
The main bridge structure and the bridge off-ramp cross the Wellington fault. Because the fault offset 
can cause additional structural damage, the study of probable seismicity discussed in Section 14.2 
considers the Wellington fault separately from other potential earthquake sources. 
Since the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the general principles and methods of evaluating 
different seismic retrofit options, not all aspects of the detailed study of retrofit concepts done by 
BCHF (1994b] are presented here. Some simplifications have been made. The retrofit costs and 
seismic performance discussed in Sections 14.3 and 14.5 are for the main bridge and on-ramp only, 
and exclude the off-ramp. The damage estimates and economic analyses of Sections 14.4 and 14.6, 
however, include the off-ramp. 
14.2 Probable Seismicity 
The seismic assessment of the Thomdon bridge [BCHF 1994a] included a detailed study of the 
seismicity at the bridge site. The study identified the known earthquake faults that could affect the 
bridge and used attenuation relationships and a probabilistic analysis to calculate return periods for 
different levels of earthquake shaking at the site. The return periods can be converted into probabilities 
of exceedance over any given interval, for example 50 years. Although the contributions of a number 
of earthquake faults were combined in the probabilistic seismicity analysis, it was found that the higher 
levels of earthquake accelerations were most likely to come from the Wellington fault, which crosses 
directly underneath a section of the bridge. 
Earthquake damage to the Thomdon bridge can be caused by (1) the level of ground shaking, which 
can cause both structural failure and ground liquefaction, and (2) the permanent movement (up to a 
five-meter offset) of the Wellington fault, which is crossed by both the main structure and the off-
ramp. The first effect, ground shaking, occurs for all possible earthquake sources, while the second 
effect, fault offset, occurs at the bridge only for a Wellington fault earthquake. Thus various levels 
of earthquake accelerations can occur with or without fault offset occurring. 
To estimate the probability of a given level of damage to the bridge, then, the probabilities of 
Wellington fault ground shaking must be separated from the probabilities of distant-fault ground 
shaking. (Note that the relative term "distant-fault" is used in this chapter to denote all known 
earthquake sources other than the Wellington fault; some of these sources are within 20 or 30 km of 
the Thorndon bridge). Table 14.1 shows the approximate probabilities of different levels of ground 
shaking occurring from either the Wellington fault or distant faults. The dominance of the Wellington 
fault for the higher acceleration levels is evident from the last column of the table. The probabilities 
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of· exceedance can be plotted versus the level of earthquake spectral acceleration, as shown in 
Figure 14.1. This is similar to the probabilistic seismicity curves described in Figures 11.5 and 12. 8. 
Table 14.1 Probabilities of Various Earthquake Levels [BCHF 1994b] 
Probability 
Probability of Exceedance in 50 Years, of the that if given 
Spectral Spectral Acceleration acceleration is 
Acceleration at exceeded it will 
T = 1.0 s All Earthquake Wellington Distant Faults be due to 
Sources Fault Only Only Wgtn Fault 
0.34 g 24% 11 % 15% 42% 
0.50 g 19% 11 % 9.5% 54% 
0.84 g 13% 9% 4.5% 67% 
1.3 g 10% 7% 3% 70% 
2.0 g 6% 5% 1% 83% 
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Figure 14.1 Probable seismicity curve for the Thorndon bridge. 
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14.3 Proposed Retrofit Options 
Four different retrofit options were proposed for the Thomdon bridge, based roughly on different 
design earthquake levels [BCHF 1994b]. The four retrofit options are described in Table 14.2. 
Table 14.2 Retrofit Options for the Thomdon Bridge 
Retrofit Option Cost Description of Retrofit Measures 
A $2.6M Jacket columns at 15 % of piers, strengthen pilecaps 
at 20% of piers 
B $4.6M Retrofit superstructure linkages at 30 % of piers, 
jacket columns at 40% of piers, strengthen pilecaps 
at 45 % of piers 
C $14M Retrofit superstructure linkages at all piers, add 
support frames for Wellington fault offset, jacket 
columns at 60 % of piers, strengthen pilecaps at 
80 % of piers. 
D $54M Same as option C, but strengthen ground against 
liquefaction with stone columns (vibro-replacement) 
and jet grouting. 
Retrofit Option A is a minimal or interim retrofit scheme designed for an earthquake shaking level with 
a 200-year return period. Thus, this option addresses only those areas of the bridge which are 
susceptible to damage in moderate ground shaking. Retrofit Option B is an intermediate level of 
strengthening, and Retrofit Option C is a relatively complete retrofit of the structure, which includes 
measures to prevent the collapse of spans due to the potential 5-meter offset of the Wellington fault. 
Retrofit Option D includes the structural retrofit measures of Option C, plus expensive measures to 
improve the soil at the site to resist liquefaction. 
Some of the individual retrofit measures for the Thomdon Bridge are discussed in Chapter 4. As 
shown in Table 14.2, the major difference between the different retrofit options is that for the more 
extensive retrofit schemes, the retrofit measures are applied to more of the piers. Typically there is 
little difference in the retrofit measures themselves for the different retrofit schemes. For example the 
steel column jackets used for Retrofit Option A would be similar in design to those used for Retrofit 
Option D. Conceivably, though, a thinner steel jacket might be justified for Option A compared to 
Option D because the column ductility demands will be less for the design earthquake level of Option 
A. 
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14.4 Expected Seismic Dam112e 
For each of the different retrofit options, and for the unretrofitted bridge, the expected damage to the 
structure for various earthquake levels has been estiDlJlted. The level of damage is represented by the 
earthquake repair costs and loss of use times shown in Tables 14.3 and 14.4. In the evaluation of 
retrofit options for the Thomdon bridge [BCHF 1994b], tables such as these were used as input for 
the assessment of (a) bridge functionality and safety, (b) earthquake fatalities and economic losses, and 
(c) the cost-benefit characteristics of retrofitting. 
In Tables 14.3 and 14.4, eight earthquake scenarios are considered, which correspond to the spectral 
acceleration levels of Table 14. l. AB shown in Table 14.1, there are five acceleration levels that have 
been considered for both Wellington fault and distant-fault earthquake scenarios. However, one 
acceleration level for each scenario can be eliminated from consideration. For distant-fault earthquakes 
the 2.0g acceleration need not be considered because its probability of exceedance is low; for the 
Wellington fault earthquake, the 0.34g acceleration need not be considered because accelerations at the 
sate are almost certain to exceed 0.50g for the characteristic earthquake on this fault. 
Thus, Table 14.3 shows a matrix of 5 retrofit possibilities (4 retrofit schemes plus unretrofitted) times 
4 acceleration levels for the Wellington fault earthquake. Table 14.4 shows a similar matrix, of 5 
retrofit possibilities times 4 acceleration levels, for distant-fault earthquakes. The earthquake repair 
costs in each cell of the tables are derived from a consideration of the likely damage to different areas 
of the bridge under the scenario represented by that cell. 
For example, for the scenario of a distant-fault earthquake causing an 0.84g acceleration for the 
unretrofitted bridge, it is estimated that extensive pile-cap damage would occur in several areas of the 
bridge, spans would collapse in one area of the bridge, and ramps to the bridge would collapse. For 
this damage scenario, a structural repair cost of $37 million is estimated to be needed to bring the 
bridge back to its original state. This value is shown in the relevant row and column of Table 14.4. 
The loss-of-service time for the bridge is also estimated, based on the predicted damage and the time 
required for repair and rebuilding. For the example scenario, the loss of service time is estimated as 
30 months, as shown in Table 14.4 [BCHF 1994b]. 
The Wellington-fault earthquake scenarios need to be considered separately from distant-fault 
earthquakes because the Wellington-fault ground displacement-the potential five-meter fault offset 
-causes damage in addition to that caused by ground shaking. For the Wellington-fault earthquake, 
additional damage or span collapses will generally occur in the area of the bridge that crosses the fault. 
Thus, for the same level of spectral acceleration, greater earthquake losses will occur if that 
acceleration comes from the Wellington fault rather than a distant fault. This can be seen by 
comparing the repair costs and loss-of-service times of Table 14.3 with those of Table 14.4. For the 
same acceleration level, particularly at 0.50 and 0.84g, the values of Table 14.3 are higher than those 
of Table 14.4. 
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Table 14.3 Estimated Earthquake Repair Costs and ~-of-Service Times, Due to a Wellington-
fault Earthquake [BCHF 1994b]. 
Earthquake Earthquake Repair costs -and Loss of Service Times 
Spectral 
Acceleration 
(at T = 1.0 u nretrofitted Retrofit Retrofit Retrofit C 
second§) A B 
0.50 g $27M $ISM $10M $7M 
20 months 12 months 12 months 9 months 
0.84 g $44M $24M $17M $SM 
30 months 14 months 14 months 9 months 
1.3 g $55M $55M $55M $55M 
42 months 42 months 42 months 42 months 
2.0 g $55M $55M $55M $55M 
42 months 42 months 42 months 42 months 
Table 14.4 Estimated Earthquake Repair Costs and ~-of-Use Times, Due to a 
Distant-fault Earthquake [BCHF 1994b]. 
Earthquake Earthquake Repair costs and Loss of Service 1imes 
Spectral 
Acceleration 
(at T = 1.0 Unretrofitted Retrofit Retrofit Retrofit C 
second§) A B 
0.34 g $3 $0 $0 $0 
9 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 
0.50 g $20 $6M $1M $0 
12 months 4 months 0 months 0 months 
0.84 g $37M $15M $SM $1M 
21 months 6 months 6 months 0 months 
1.3 g $55M $55M $55M $55M 






















The values of earthquake repair costs in Table 14.3 and 14.4 can be used to create a series of damage 
versus earthquake acceleration curves, as shown in Figure 14.2. Such curves are similar to those 
described in the previous chapters, and shown in Figure 11.4 and 12.3. 
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14.S Limit States for Seismic Performance 
Besides earthquake damage costs, another way to quantify seismic performance is by defining limit 
states. For important, heavily trafficked bridges the loss of service of the bridge is likely to be a more 
significant consequence of an earthquake tpan the actual structural damage. Limit states are a 
customary way to consider consequences such as loss-of-service. 
Definition of Three Performance Levels 
For the seismic performance of buildings, three limit states have traditionally been defined: the 
serviceability limit state, the damage-control limit state, and the survival (or no-collapse) limit state. 
A good explanation of these limit states is given by Paulay and Priestley [1992]. 
The limit state criteria for bridges can be slightly different from that for buildings. Three limit states 
were defined for the Thomdon bridge, which are labelled as: 
Fully serviceable 
2 Can restore limited service, and 
3 No collapse 
In the study of the Thomdon bridge [BCHF 1994b], the performance requirements were defined for 
each of the above limit states as follows: 
"the bridge structures are to be capable of remaining fully serviceable with only minor 
repairs being necessitated", 
2 "the bridge structures are to be capable of being brought back into service (albeit at a 
reduced level) a short time after the event, and capable thereafter of being repaired to a full 
level of service•, and 
3 "the response of the bridge structures shall be investigated and measures that may 
significantly improve their performance and reduce the risk to human life on and adjacent 
to the bridge are to be investigated•. 
Note that the definition of the second limit state includes two different criteria: capable of being 
quickly broughl back into service, and capable of being fully repaired. For buildings, only the second 
criteria is traditionally used to define the "damage-control" limit state. According to Paulay and 
Priestley [1992], the second limit state "may be defined [to mark] the boundary between economically 
repairable damage and damage that is irreparable or which cannot be repaired economically". For 
bridges the ability to quickly bring a structure back into service, particularly for emergency vehicles, 
is crucial. For most bridge structures this criterion would be more stringent than the repairability 
criterion. In other words the restore limited service criterion would be exceeded at a lower level of 
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earthquake damage than the repairability criterion. Thus for the Thomdon bridge the restore limited 
service criterion is assumed to govern limit state 2. (Note that the repairability criterion could be made 
as an additional limit state for the Thomdon bridge,_ between limit states 2 and 3). 
For the third limit state, the goal is to minimise the risk to human life. This is typically interpreted 
to mean that collapse of the structure is to be prevented. This interpretation was used for the 
assessment of the Thomdon bridge. 
Seismic performance at Different Earthquake Accelerations 
Based on the seismic damage and loss-of-service estimates which were summarised in Section 14.4, 
an assessment of bridge performance has been made with respect to the defined limit states. Figure 
14.3 shows the expected limit-state performance for various spectral acceleration levels for each of the 
retrofit options. As was the case in Section 14.4, the seismic performance will depend on whether the 
earthquake accelerations are produced by the Wellington fault or distant faults. Performance for the 
Wellington fault earthquake will be worse, due to increased damage at the section of the bridge which 
crosses the fault. 
Figure 14.3 considers only the main bridge structure and on-ramp for the Thomdon bridge. The off-
ramp of the bridge requires a separate assessment, and for simplification is excluded from consideration 
here. 
Figure 14.J(a) shows that for a Wellington fault earthquake, collapse will occur at all acceleration 
levels for the unretrofitted bridge, and for the bridge retrofitted according to Options A and B. Note 
that the collapse limit state is considered to be exceeded even if only one or two spans collapse. For 
the bridge retrofitted to Option C, at an acceleration of 0.50 to 0.84g there is expected to be damage 
which requires a temporary or partial shut down of bridge traffic, but limited service to the bridge can 
soon be restored. At an acceleration level of 1.3g there will be more severe damage. This damage 
would prevent a restoration of limited service; however, the damage would not cause collapse of the 
bridge and the risk to human life would still be minimised. At an acceleration of 2.0g collapse has 
occurred. For retrofit Option D, limited service can be restored to the bridge for accelerations up to 
1.3g, and collapse is prevented even at 2.0g. 
Figure 14.3(b) shows the limit-state performance for distant-fault earthquakes. For the unretrofitted 
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0.50g and higher. The benefit of Retrofit A is that is allows the bridge to remain fully serviceable for 
the 0.34g earthquake, but collapse is still expected for higher acceleration levels. The bridge with 
Retrofit Bis expected to remain fully serviceable at 0.50g and below and collapse at 0.84g and above. 
The bridge with Retrofit C will remain fully serviceable at 0.84g and below, and at 1.3g will suffer 
severe damage but not collapse. The bridge with Retrofit D is expected to remain fully serviceable 
for all likely levels of acceleration from distant-faults. 
Probability-Based ~ent 
Combining the limit-state versus acceleration curves of Figure 14.3 with the probable seismicity curves 
of Figure 14.1 allows a calculation of the probability of exceedance of the defined limit states over the 
expected life of the bridge. The results of these calculations are shown in Figure 14.4. The figure 
presents the probability of exceedance, over 50 years, of the defined perfonnance levels. The 50 year 
period approximates the estimated remaining service life of the bridge. 
This figure provides a clear basis for understanding and comparing the expected seismic performance 
of the various retrofit options. The figures shows for example, that for Retrofit Option C, it is 
expected that retrofitting the main bridge and on-ramp will cost $14 million. If the retrofitting has 
been carried out, the following seismic performance over the next 50 years can be expected [BCHF 
1994b]: 
• There is a 15% chance that an earthquake will occur which exceeds the Full-service level. That 
is, after the earthquake at least some of the traffic-carrying capacity of the bridge must be shut 
down. 
• There is a 10 % chance that an earthquake will occur which exceeds the Limited-service level. That 
is, after the earthquake no traffic can pass over the bridge, not even temporary or emergency 
traffic. 
• There is a 5 % chance that some portion of the bridge will collapse. 
Conclusions 
Based on the results presented in Figure 14.4 the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
functio~ality and safety perfonnance of the proposed retrofit options for the main bridge [BCHF 
1994b]: 
• Retrofit Scheme A provides little benefit over the option of not retrofitting the bridge. 
• Retrofit Scheme B provides some improvement in bridge performance: the probability of collapse 
over 50 years is reduced from 20 to 15%. The probability of loss of service is similarly reduced. 
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• Retrofit Scheme C provides a dramatic improvement in bridge safety and a substantial improvement 
in functionality. The probability of collapse over 50 years is reduced to 5 % • 
• Retrofit Scheme D which includes extensive ground strengthening, further reduces the probability 
of collapse and the probability of loss of service. 
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Figure 14.4 Probabilities or exceedance or bridge performance limit states [BCHF 1994b]. 
14.6 Economic Analysis 
The benefits of seismic retrofitting for the Thomdon Overbridge can be quantified in more specific 
tenns than the performance levels discussed in the previous section. Using a probabilistic simulation 
analysis, estimates of potential earthquake injuries, fatalities, and economic losses can be made for each 
of the different retrofit options. 
The methodology and some of the most illustrative results of the economic analysis are briefly 
discussed here, summarised from the detailed report by BCHF consulting engineers [BCHF 1994b]. 
It should be remembered that a large number of assumptions are necessary for the analysis and there 
are many ways in which the probabilities of coincident events can affect the economic loss outcome. 
However, the analysis gives a good comparison of the retrofit schemes. 
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Methodology 
The economic analysis of retrofit options for the Tbomdon bridge is based on a probabilistic computer 
simulation of outcomes. The analysis was 
"carried out using a Lotus 123 spreadsheet and proprietary risk analysis software add-in 
@RISK. This allowed a Monte Carlo simulation to be carried out for a large number of 
calculations taking account of the following probabilities of occurrence: 
• the probability of an earthquake occurring in any one year and the acceleration level of 
that earthquake; distant and Wellington fault earthquakes are modelled. separately; 
• given that an earthquake occurs, the probability that it strikes in morning or evening peak, 
interpeak, evening, night time or weekend [for both road and rail traffic]; 
• given that an earthquake occurs, the probability that it occurs in the season of peak Cook 
Straight ferry traffic and whether it occurs at a peak arrival time for ferry passengers, on 
the shoulder of the peak arrival, or at a time away from the ferry arrival; 
• given that an earthquake occurs of sufficient magnitude to dislodge one span on each of 
the east and west side viaduct in areas 9 and 10 (includes piers 24-34 & 61-71), the 
probability that any particular span is dislodged - this is needed as the damage outcome 
varies depending on which spans fall; and 
• the probability that passenger and/or freight trains are passing under the bridge at the time 
of the earthquake; the [two principal railway] lines being considered independently" 
[BCHF 1994b]. 
The economic analysis was used to give (a) estimates of damage costs for different scenarios of 
earthquakes and retrofit levels, and (b) cost-benefit results for each of the different retrofit options in 
comparison to the unretrofitted bridge. 
The earthquake damage costs were considered to come from: 
• "initial damage and personal injury costs to vehicles, rolling stock, 
buildings, trackwork and personnel at the time of the earthquake; and 
• road traffic delays ensuing during the period of reinstatement of the 
viaduct" [BCHF 1994b]. 
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In calculating benefit/cost ratios, benefits were taken as the damage costs avoided by retrofitting; costs 
were taken as the retrofit construction costs minus the expected savings between the earthquake repair 
costs for an unretrofitted bridge and a retrofitted bridge. As_ discussed in Section 12. 7, it could be 
debated whether the expected repair cost savings should be treated as a project cost (denominator of 
the benefit/cost ratio) or as a project benefit (numerator of the benefit/cost ratio). 
Results 
The probabilistic analysis of outcomes for the Thomdon bridge produces predictions of earthquake 
fatalities and the economic consequences for the different seismic retrofit options. 
Fatalities 
One of the principal reasons to retrofit the Thomdon bridge is to protect against injuries and fatalities 
that could result from the bridge's collapse. In the study of retrofit options [BCHF 1994b], worst-case 
type scenarios for earthquake fatalities have been estimated. 
Time of day has a great influence on the expected number of casualties. The worst time for a 
damaging earthquake to occur would be during peak traffic hours and during the peak arrival time for 
ferry passengers. If the same earthquake were to occur during interpeak traffic levels and during 
medium ferry activity, the expected earthquake fatalities due to bridge collapse would be about a third 
of the number for the worst time, and if the earthquake were to occur at night during low ferry 
activity, the expected earthquake fatalities would be less than a tenth the number for the worst time. 





















Time of Earthquake Occurance with respect to 
Road, Rail, and Ferry Activity 
Fatalities resulting from bridge collapse versus time of earthquake occurrence 
[BCHF 1994b]. 
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To effectively reduce the risk of earthquake casualties for the Thomdon bridge, one of the more 
extensive retrofit options, C or D, must be chosen. As was shown in Figure 14.4, only these options 
greatly reduce the probability of collapse of the bridg~. The point is also made evident by considering 
the expected value of earthquake fatalities, as shown in Figure 14.6. This figure shows the expected 
values of earthquake fatalities over 50 years for the unretrofitted bridge and each of the four retrofit 
options. The expected value (EV) of fatalities can be a deceptively low number because of the high 
probability that no strong earthquake will occur in the next 50 years, or that it will occur at night or 
when few people are near or under the bridge. Nevertheless, Figure 14.6 shows that Retrofit Schemes 
C and D reduce the EV of fatalities due to earthquakes at the Thomdon bridge by more than 90 % • 
Schemes A and B provide only a small reduction in the expected fatalities [BCHF 1994b). 
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Figure 14.6 Expected value of earthquake fatalities [BCHF 1994b). 
Economic Losses and Benefit/Cost Ratios 
If the Thomdon bridge is damaged in an earthquake, economic losses could occur due to the disruption 
to road, rail, and ferry traffic, fatalities, injuries, or other effects. Using the probabilistic analysis, 
the expected value of these economic losses has been approximately quantified. 
For each retrofit option, the avoided losses can be calculated as the difference between the losses which 
would occur for the unretrofitted bridge and those for the retrofitted bridge. Figure 14. 7(a) shows the 
expected value of avoided losses for each of the four retrofit schemes, considered over a 25 year 







































Expected benefits, costs, and benefit/cost ratios of retrofit options for the 
Thomdon bridge [BCHF 1994b]. 
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three times those of Retrofits A or B; the expected benefits of Retrofit D are approximately six times 
those of Retrofits A or B. 
Figure 14. 7(a) also shows that the benefits of retrofitting lie primarily in avoiding losses due to 
transportation disruption and casualties, rather than in avoiding the costs of repairing the earthquake 
damage to the bridge. The repair cost savings are only a small fraction of the avoided losses. 
Although 50 years is a better estimate of the remaining service life of the bridge, 25 years is used in 
the economic analysis. Due to the discounted value of money beyond 25 years there is little difference 
between results over a 25 year period and over a 50 year period. 
By comparing the expected value of benefits, shown in Figure 14. 7(a), with the estimated retrofit costs, 
shown in Figure 14.7(b), benefit/cost ratios for the various retrofit options can be calculated. The 
benefit/cost ratios are shown in Figure 14.7(c). Note that the repair cost savings of Figure 14.7(a) 
were considered as negative costs rather than positive benefits, as previously discussed. Figure 14. 7(c) 
shows that Retrofit Scheme C is estimated to have the highest benefit/cost ratio. 
While the benefit/cost ratio provides useful information for bridge-upgrade decision-making, it should 
not be used as the sole criteria, or even the main criteria, for such decisions. As noted in Section 
12. 7, it is impossible to completely quantify all of the benefits of seismic retrofitting. One somewhat 
questionable and simplistic aspect of cost-benefit analyses is that a dollar value is assigned to each 
expected earthquake fatality. The Thomdon bridge study noted that •society seems to be much less 
tolerant of risk [of loss of life] from engineered structures than from other documented involuntary 
risks•. lo recommending a retrofit scheme for the Thomdon bridge, the study considered the 
customarily accepted levels of earthquake performance defined in the design codes and retrofit policies 




CONCLUSIONS FOR PART III 
Chapters 11 through 14 represent an in-depth study of methods for the management and prioritization 
of bridge seismic upgrading work. The following conclusions can be drawn from the study: 
A. Importance of Prioritizing Bridge-retrofit Work 
Bridge seismic evaluation studies and retrofit programmes in California, New Zealand, and Japan 
indicate that the task of upgrading seismically deficient bridges represents an enormous undertaking. 
In Japan, 30 percent of bridges required some form of retrofitting. In California, a similar 
percentage of bridges is being retrofitted, at a total cost which is likely to exceed US $4 billion. 
In New Zealand, nearly 80 percent of the state-highway bridges were built before 1970-ie, before 
the use of modem seismic-resistant design practices. Because of the large number of bridges which 
need retrofitting, and the limited funds available, the prioritization and management of bridge-
upgrade work is vital. 
B. Limitations of Previous Prioritization Procedure 
Procedures used to date for prioritizing bridges for seismic retrofitting have been of limited 
accuracy and usefulness. Critical examination of these procedures reveals a great many 
questionable aspects, such as the use of additive combinations, the poor representation of column 
structural vulnerabilities, and the underemphasis of traffic volume, bridge service life, and the 
possibility of temporary access in place of an earthquake-damaged bridge. None of the procedures 
used to date have been verified for accuracy. 
C. Advantages of Proposed Prioritization Method 
Bridge-upgrade prioritization methods based on earthquake loss-estimation techniques would offer 
a more rational and verifiable means of screening bridges. Such an approach was used by the 
author to develop a new prioritization method. There are several advantages to the new method: 
• Different levels of seismic evaluation are defined, including a simple flow-chart procedure 
for the preliminary screening of bridges. 
• A system of seismic vulnerability ratings is defined and correlated to earthquake damage 
curves. 
• Formulas are given for estimating the economic impact of earthquake damage to bridges. 
• After preliminary screening, secondary seismic assessments are used to refine the priority 
ratings for borderline bridges and reduce the number of detailed seismic assessments 
necessary. 
• In the level-zero preliminary screening procedure, the amount of data-particularly 
subjective data-is minimized, resulting in a more consistent and cost-efficient procedure. 
• Although the amount of data is limited, it is analysed in a thorough and relatively 
transparent manner. All variables and intermediate results relate to a physical meaning·, 
such as probability of earthquake damage or transportation-disruption cost, so that the 
accuracy of the method's assumptions can be judged at each step of the procedure. This 
should make the procedure more accurate and verifiable than previous methods. 
• The method is flexible and can be modified for regions with different bridge 
characteristics, seismicity, or retrofit priorities. 
D. Application of Recommended Method Using Minimal Data 
The recommended approach for bridge-upgrade management and prioritization can be applied 
to the study of a large group of bridges based on a minimum of data. The recommended 
methods have been successfully implemented on a stock of 445 bridges in New Zealand's 
Tasman district. Structural evaluations of 56 bridges, and basic data on all bridges, were 
used to draw conclusions about the distribution of seismic vulnerability, the expected seismic 
damage, and the benefits and costs of seismic upgrading for the district's bridges. 
E. Application of Recommended Concepts Using In-depth Data 
The recommended approach for bridge-upgrade management can also be applied to in-depth 
studies of a single seismic-retrofit project. The recommended methods were used for the 
detailed evaluation of retrofit options for a major elevated highway structure, the Thomdon 
bridge in Wellington. The evaluation used the results of a probabilistic seismicity study and 
estimated damage curves for different retrofit options. Seismic perfonnance was considered 
in terms of structural behaviour limit states, expected fatalities, and expected economic losses 
due to bridge damage. 
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ADDENDUM TO PART ill 
TESTING OF THE RECOMMENDED BRIDGE-UPGRADE PRIORITIZATION METHOD 
BY COMPARISON TO THE 1993 CALTRANS PROCEDURE 
Summary of Addendum 
This addendum describes a comparison of the recommended method of prioritizing bridges for seismic 
upgrading, the Tasman District method, with the 1993 Caltrans procedure. The comparison is made 
by considering a number of examples for each of the five main component areas of the prioritization 
procedures: structural vulnerability, seismicity, soil type, bridge importance, and the overall 
formulation of the priority rating. 
The comparison shows great differences between the two procedures, but reveals no erroneous aspects 
or unintended results in the Tasman District method. The comparison also shows that the Tasman 
District method is more easily modified than other additive-type procedures, and reinforces several of 
the conclusions made in Chapter 15. 
Introduction 
Part III of this report reviews procedures which have been used for the prioritization of bridges for 
seismic retrofitting and proposes a new method, which has been applied in New Zealand's Tasman 
District [Maffei 1994]. In Part III, several features of existing procedures and the new method are 
discussed. To make these features and their possible advantages more apparent, the Tasman District 
procedure is applied here to a number of example bridges and conditions. 
For the purposes of comparison, the 1993 Caltrans procedure [Gilbert 1993) is applied to the same 
examples. The Cal trans procedure has been selected because it has been one of the more influential of 
the prioritization procedures, and it has been considered for application in New Zealand [Chapman 
and Kircaldie 1994). 
Objectives 
The objectives of this addendum are to: 
A. Further illustrate the main features of the Tasman District method through comparison to the 
l 993 Caltrans procedure, and to establish the extent of the differences between the 
procedures. 
B. Look for areas in which the Tasman District method might produce erroneous or unintended 
results. 
C. Comment on the relative advantages of either of the two procedures. 
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Organization 
Section A2 of this addendum covers the methodology used in the comparison of prioritization 
procedures. Sections A3 through A7 cover, respectively, comparisons of structural vulnerability, 
seismicity, soil type, bridge importance, and the overall formulation of the priority rating. Section A8 
presents the conclusions for the addendum. 
Methodology 
Several possible methodologies were considered for the testing of the recommended prioritization 
procedure. The methodology used is described below, followed by additional considerations and 
possible alternate methodologies which could be used for testing prioritization procedures. 
Methodology Used 
The Tasman District method and the Caltrans procedure are each applied to a set of example bridges 
and conditions. The comparisons are made in five component areas of the prioritization procedures: 
structural vulnerability, seismicity, soil type, bridge importance, and the overall formulation of the 
priority rating. Examining the prioritization procedures component by component allows specific 
conclusions to be drawn about the strengths and weaknesses of different parts of the procedures. 
Assessment of Structural Vulnerability 
In comparing the assessment of structural vulnerability, 12 example bridges are considered. The 
examples were selected to give the best illustration of the differences between the two procedures. The 
structural vulnerability results of the two procedures are compared not only to each other, but also to a 
"judgement-based" vulnerability rating, which is taken as a benchmark. The judgement-based rating 
has been assigned to each bridge by the author based on his experience as a structural engineer and on 
his research into bridge seismic deficiencies and observed earthquake damage. 
There is the potential for an unintended bias in this aspect of the comparison methodology, because 
the same author's judgement which was used to develop the Tasman district procedure is also used to 
define the benchmark. However it is not expected that other experienced engineers or researchers 
would disagree markedly with the judgement-based vulnerability levels assigned in Section A3. 
As discussed later, it might be preferable for future comparison studies to have detailed 
seismic/structural evaluations of actual bridges as a benchmark, or to use a consensus ranking from a 
number of engineers and researchers. It might also be preferable to use bridges from an actual 
jurisdiction. Two problems with this approach would be (a) the likelihood that not all of the data 
required by both procedures would already by collected for the bridge sample (since different 
prioritization procedures tend to require different data), and (b) that a larger bridge sample would be 
required to cover the extremes of the ranges of the significant variables involved. 
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Assessment of Other Components o{the Prioritization Procedures 
For the assessment of seismicity, soil type, bridge importance, and overall formulation of the priority 
rating, many additional examples of bridge conditions are considered. Comparisons between the two 
procedures are focused on determining where differences arise. Then brief comments are made on the 
implications of these differences. 
Alternate Methodologies of Testing Prioritization Procedures 
Section l l.5 discusses the issue of the verification of prioritization procedures. Ideally, any 
prioritization procedure, before being applied, would be tested by comparing the results of the 
prioritization with those produced by detailed seismic/structural evaluations and economic (cost-
benefit) studies. Preferably, the procedure would be tested on actual bridges within the jurisdiction 
where the procedure is proposed to be applied. The sample of bridges in such a case should attempt to 
include the widest possible variety of conditions, eg, the extreme categories of seismic zone and soil 
profile type, high and low traffic volumes and detour lengths, and bridges which represent all 
prominent structural characteristics. 
Point-by-point Comparisons versus Final-result Comparisons 
The component-by-component comparison of prioritization procedures used in this addendum offers 
the advantage of clearly identifying which parts of a prioritization procedure may result in 
discrepancies or be in need of improvement. The effects of specific variables are also more easily 
seen. The disadvantage of a component-by-component comparison is that some prioritization 
procedures differ from others in their form, so that in order to make direct comparisons a number of 
assumptions must be made for one or both of the procedures being compared. 
An alternative might be to compare only of the final priority results rather comparing procedures point 
by point. In using such a methodology several recommendations should be followed: 
1. A relatively large sample of bridges must be considered in order to cover as many different 
conditions and combinations of conditions as possible. Otherwise the comparison will not be 
as comprehensive as a component-by-component comparison. (As an illustration, the 12 
example bridges, 8 seismicity examples, and 4 soil types considered in this addendum imply 
384 possible combinations of conditions, before even considering different conditions related 
to bridge importance.) 
2. The comparison of final priority ratings should be supplemented with studies of the effects of 
individual variables and assumptions. Otherwise, little insight will be gained into the reasons 
for differences or agreements between results. For instance, it is possible that the final 
priority rating may be considered correct, but only because two or more major sources of error 
cancel each other out. 
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3. Priority-rating results should be compared to an accurate benchmark of what the correct 
prioritization is considered to be. Preferably - this would be based on detailed 
seismic/structural evaluations and cost-benefit studies and would make use of a consensus of 
expert judgements in the areas of structural engineering, seismology, geotechnical 
engineering, economics, and risk analysis. 
Verification o(the Explicit Cost-benefit Procedure 
For consideration of the bridge-importance component of the Tasman District method, the simplified 
prioritization formula of Section 12.8 was used. This makes possible a more direct comparison 
between the Tasman District method and the Caltrans procedure. If a final-result type of comparison 
were to be conducted instead, the method of explicitly calculating benefit/cost ratios could be tested. 
This would be advantageous, since the author recommends the use of the explicit method over the 
simplified formula. Such an exercise would also allow the testing of some of the assumptions of the 
cost-benefit procedure. As emphasised in Section 12.7, these assumptions are numerous; however, the 
same assumptions are applied to each bridge and thus their effect on the relative priority ranking is 
probably not critical. 
This is illustrated by the simplified formula itself which requires only 3 variables related to bridge 
importance. Any additional variables and assumptions tend to cancel each other out and do not have a 
large effect on a bridge's priority rating. It should also be noted that a testing of the explicit cost-
benefit method could not easily be done in a comparative way to another prioritization procedure. 
Nevertheless, testing of the explicit cost-benefit method would be useful and could be recommended as 
part of future verification studies. 
Comparison of Structural Vulnerability Ratings 
One of the marked differences between the Tasman District method of prioritizing bridges and the 
Caltrans procedure is in the assessment of structural vulnerability. The differences between the two 
procedures can be explored by considering a number of example bridges. 
Tasman District Method 
As discussed in Section 12.3, the Tasman District method assesses structural vulnerability on a scale 
of zero to ten. In Section 12.5, a level-zero flowchart procedure is proposed for quickly assigning a 




The Caltrans procedure uses an additive combination of 6 variables to arrive at a structural 
vulnerability rating, which theoretically could range between O and 1.0. The six variables and the 
corresponding weighting factors are shown in Figure Al. 
Example Bridges 
Twelve example bridges have been selected by the author. The bridges were chosen to: 
I. represent a range of structural vulnerability levels from high to low, 
2. cover a variety of structural features and combinations of structural features, 
3. be representative of real bridges, including those which have been damaged in earthquakes, 
and 
4. illustrate several of the differences between the Tasman District method and the Caltrans 
procedure. 
For each of the example bridges, the seismic/structural vulnerability is assessed (a) by the judgement 
of the author, (b) by the level-zero flowchart procedure of the Tasman District method, and (c) by the 
1993 Caltrans seismic prioritization procedure. 
Descriptions of each Example Bridge 
The data and brief descriptions for each of the example bridges are listed in Table A I. A further 
description of each example bridge is given below: 
• Example Bridge 1 is a multi-column reinforced-concrete bridge with a monolithic 
superstructure, built in 1955. The seismic deficiency which governs the structure's 
vulnerability is the poor detailing of the columns. The columns are susceptible to shear 
failures because of an inadequate amount of transverse reinforcement. 
This bridge is representative of a great number of structures which have collapsed because of 
shear failures in their columns. These include four major bridges which completely or 
partially collapsed in the 1994 Northridge California earthquake: the Mission-Gothic, 
LaCienega-Venice, and Fairfax-Washington undercrossing bridges, and the Bull Creek 
Canyon Channel bridge [Caltrans 1994]. The last of these bridges had a monolithic 
superstructure, as in the example bridge. 
The author judges the vulnerability of Example Bridge I to be high. 
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Peak Rock Acceleration 
Seismic Duration 
IMPACT CRITERION 
ADT on Structure 
ADT Under/Over Strucrure 
Detour Length 
Leased Air Space 
(Residential, Office) 
Leased Air Space 
(Parking, Storage) 




Year Designed (Constructed) 
Hinges (Drop Type Failure) 




l .00*(0.25=low;0.50=moderate; 0. 7 5=active; 
l.OO=high) 
0.33*(1=high risk zone; else 0) 
0.38*(linear, normalized to 0.7g) 
0.29*(0.5=shon;O. 7 5=intermediate; 1 =long) 
0.28*(parabola for a max ADT of 200000) 
0.12*(see ADT above) 
O.Vt-*(linear, normalized to 100 miles) 
0.15*(1=present; else 0) 
0.07*(1=present; else 0) 
0.07*(1.0=interstate; 0.8=US , ST ne, or 
stream; 0.7=RR; 0.5=fed funded Co 
ne or city str; 0.2=nonfed funded Co 
ne of city srr; O.O=fed land, ST land, 
other) 
O. lO*(l=present; else 0) 
0.07*(see Rte Type on Bridge) 
0.25*(0.5=yr<1946; l.0=1946~¢1971; 
0.25=1972~¢1979; O.O=yr>l979) 
0.165*(0.0=no hinge; 0.5=1 hinge; 1.0=2 or 
more hinges) 
0.22*(l=present, else 0) 
0.165*(0.0=no col.;0.25=pier walls;0.5 
multi-col bents;l.O=single col bents) 
0.12*(linear, normalized to 90) 
0.08*(0=monolithic; l=nonmonolithic) 
Figure Al Variables and weighting factors for the Caltrans prioritization procedure 
[Gilbert I 993]. 
278 
Table Al Data and vulnerability ratings for example bridges. 
Bridge Example Number: 1 2 
Description: Multicolumn r/c Multicolumn r/c 




Governing Deficiency: Shear failure in Shear failure in 
r/c columns. r/c columns. 
Judgement-based vulnerability: High High 
Data Item Tas. 1 Cal.2 
Year of Construction ✓ ✓ 1955 1955 
Number of Soans ✓ multiole multiole 
RIC Columns Present ✓ ✓ ves ves 
Movement Joints ✓ ✓ no yes 
Present 
Seat Lenirth ✓3 n/a 500mm 
Ideal Seat Lenirth ✓3 n/a 500mm 
Linka2e Bolts Present ✓3 n/a ves 
Skew Angle at ✓3 ✓ 0 0 
Sunnorts 
Girders with Typically ✓3 n/a yes 
Good Linkae:es 
Erosion Factor ✓ 1.0 1.0 
Span Lenirth >>5 m >>5 m 
Number of In-span ✓ 0 ~2 
Movement Joints 
Outrigger or Shared ✓ no no 
Column Present 
Number of Columns ✓ 2 2 
per Pier 
Movement Joints at ✓ no yes 
Abutments 
Vulnerabilitv Ratine:s for Tasman District Method fMaffei 19941 
V MOVEMENT JOINT 0 2.9 
VcoLUMNIWALL IO IO 
V FOUNDA TION/ABUfMENT 4 4 
VsTRUCT 10 10 
Vulnerability Ratin2s for Caltrans Procedure [Gilbert 1993] 
3.41 (year) 0.25 0.25 
a42 (hinges) 0 0.165 
a43 (outrigger col.) 0 0 
a44 (redundancy) 0.082 0.082 
3..!s (skew) 0 0 
a46 (abutment tvoe) 0 0.08 
C4 0.33 0.58 
Notes: 1 Indicates data items used in the Tasman District method [Maffei 1994). 
2Indicates data items used in the Caltrans procedure [Gilbert 1993). 
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Table Al Continued 
Bridge Example Number: 4 5 6 
Description: Single-span River crossing Multicolumn, 
bridge with with r/c pier-walls monolithic 
vulnerable with pile bridge, having 
movement joints. foundation vulnerable 
suffering severe outrigger 
erosion. columns. 
Governing Deficiency: Unseating at Shear failure of Outrigger column 
movement joints foundation piles. joint failure 
(at abutments). 
Judgement-based vulnerability: High High Medium-high 
Data Item Tas. 1 Cal.2 
Year of Construction ✓ ✓ 1977 1935 1984 
Number of Soans ✓ 1 multiple multiple 
RIC Columns Present ✓ ✓ no no yes 
Movement Joints ✓ ✓ yes no no 
Present 
Seat Leneth ✓3 300mm n/a n/a 
Ideal Seat Leneth ✓3 500mm n/a n/a 
Linkage Bolts Present ✓3 yes n/a n/a 
Skew Angle at ✓3 ✓ 22° 0 0 
Supports 
Girders with Typically ✓3 no n/a n/a 
Good Linkages 
Erosion Factor ✓ 1.0 2.0 2.0 
Span Leneth >>5 m >>5 m >>5 m 
Number of In-span ✓ 0 0 0 
Movement Joints 
Outrigger or Shared ✓ no no yes 
Column Present 
Number of Columns ✓ 0 pier-wall 2 
per Pier 
Movement Joints at ✓ yes no no 
Abutments 
Vulnerability Ratings for Tasman District Method rMaffei 19941 
V MOVEMENT JOINT 8.6 0 0 
V COLUMN/WALL 0 5 3 
V FOUNDATION/ ABUTh!ENT 4 8 4 
VsTRUCT 8.6 8 4 
Vulnerabilitv Ratings for Caltrans Procedure f Gilbert 1993 
li41 (year) 0.062 0.125 0 
a42 (hinges) 0 0 0 
a43 (outrigger col.) 0 0 0.22 
li44 (redundancy) 0 0.041 0.082 
li45 (skew) 0.03 0 0 
li46 (abutment type) 0.08 0 0 
C4 0.17 0.17 0.32 
See first page of table for notes. 
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Table Al Continued 
Bridge Example Number: 7 8 9 
Description: New multicolumn Single-span new Pier-wall bridge 
bridge with large bridge with large with monolithic 
skew and skew and superstructure 
movement joints, movement joints. and large skew. 
having outrigger 
columns. 
Governing Vulnerability: Unseating at Unseating at --
movement joints. movement joints 
(at abutments). 
Judgement-based vulnerability: Medium Medium-low Medium-low 
Data Item Tas. 1 Cal.2 
Year of Construction ✓ ✓ 1992 1992 1965 
Number of Soans ✓ multiple l multiple 
RIC Columns Present ✓ ✓ yes yes no 
Movement Joints ✓ ✓ yes yes no 
Present 
Seat Length ✓3 500 mm 500mm n/a 
Ideal Seat Length ✓3 500mm 500mm n/a 
Linkage Bolts Present ✓3 yes yes n/a 
Skew Angle at ✓3 ✓ 45° 45° 45° 
Suooorts 
Girders with Typically ✓3 no no n/a 
Good Linka2es 
Erosion Factor ✓ l.O l.O 1.0 
Span Length >>5 m >>Sm >>Sm 
Number of In-span ✓ ~2 0 0 
Movement Joints 
Outrigger or Shared ✓ yes yes no 
Column Present 
Number of Columns ✓ ~2 0 0 
per Pier 
Movement Joints at ✓ yes yes no 
Abutments 
Vulnerability Ratin2s for Tasman District Method fMaffei l 9941 
V MOVEMENT JOINT 6.4 6.4 0 
V COLUMN/WALL 3 3 5 
V l'OUNDA TIONI ABlITMENT 4 3 4 
Vsmucr 6.4 6.4 5 
Vulnerability Ratings for Caltrans Procedure [Gilbert l 993] 
:i.11 (year) 0 0 0.25 
a42 (hinges) 0.165 0 0 
a43 (outrigger col.) 0.22 0 0 
a44 (redundancy) 0.082 0 0.041 
a4s (skew) 0.06 0.06 0.06 
3.16 (abutment type) 0.08 0.08 0 
C4 0.61 0.14 0.35 
See first page of table for notes. 
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Table Al Continued 
Bridge Example Number: 10 11 12 
Description: New bridge with Monolithic Small culvert-
movement joints, single-span type monolithic 
zero skew, and bridge with a single-span 
single-column- large skew at bridge with a 
piers, except for abutments large skew at 
one outril1"11"er pier. abutments 
Governing Deficiency: -- -- --
Judgement-based vulnerability: Low Low Low 
Data Item Tas. 1 Cal.2 
Year of Construction ✓ ✓ 1992 1965 1965 
Number of Soans ✓ multiole l l 
RIC Columns Present ✓ ✓ ves no no 
Movement Joints ✓ ✓ yes no no 
Present 
Seat Lenl!th ✓3 500mm n/a n/a 
Ideal Seat Lenl!th ✓3 500mm n/a n/a 
Linka2e Bolts Present ✓3 yes n/a n/a 
Skew Angle at ✓3 ✓ 45° 45° 45° 
Sunnorts 
Girders with Typically ✓3 no n/a n/a 
Good Linka2es 
Erosion Factor ✓ 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Span Leni!th >> 5m >>5 m 4m 
Number of In-span ✓ ~2 0 0 
Movement Joints 
Outrigger or Shared ✓ yes no no 
Column Present 
Number of Columns ✓ land 2 0 0 
per Pier 
Movement Joints at ✓ yes no no 
Abutments 
Vulnerabilitv Ratin2s for Tasman District Method !Maffei 19941 
V MOVEMENT JOINT 3.2 0 0 
V COLUMN/WALL 3 0 0 
V FOUND A TIONI ABUTMENT 4 3 2 
VsTRucr 4 3 2 
Vulnerability Ratin2s for Caltrans Procedure rGilbert 19931 
a41 (year) 0 0.25 .0.25 
342 (hinges) 0.165 0 0 
343 (outrigger col.) 0.22 0 0 
344 (redundancy) 0.165 0 0 
34s (skew) 0 0.06 0.06 
346 (abutment type) 0.08 0 0 
C4 0.63 0.31 0.31 
See first page of table for notes. 
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• Example Bridge 2 is similar to Example Bridge l except that it does not have a continuous, 
monolithic superstructure. Instead it has movement joints in the superstructure, which are 
well designed with good seating lengths, no skew angle, and competent linkages. The 
seismic deficiency which governs the structure's vulnerability is the same as for Example 
Bridge l: poor detailing of the columns which are prone to shear failure. The movement 
joints of Example Bridge 2 represent significantly less seismic vulnerability than the 
columns. 
The bridge is representative of several bridge structures found in New Zealand and 
California. In California, bridges similar to this example can have much shorter seating 
lengths, and can therefore be possibly vulnerable in their superstructures as well as in their 
columns. However, most such bridges in California have had their movement joints 
retrofitted with cable restrainers or other linkages. This was the case for the Mission-Gothic, 
LaCienega-Venice, and Fairfax-Washington undercrossing bridges which suffered 
catastrophic column shear failures in the Northridge earthquake [Caltrans 1994). 
The vulnerability of Example Bridge 2 is judged to be high, generally the same as that for 
Example Bridge 1. 
• Example Bridge 3 has vulnerable details at the superstructure movement joints, but columns 
which were designed after early 1970s and are thus well reinforced for confinement and shear 
strength. The movement joints are vulnerable because of short seating lengths, moderate 
skew angle, and questionable linkage strength and details. 
The example is representative of a bridge which has cable restrainers or other linkages at its 
movement joints, which were designed for a much lower strength criteria than is considered 
appropriate by today's standards. This has been a common situation with California bridges. 
The performance of Example Bridge 3 would be similar to that of the Gavin Canyon 
undercrossing bridge which collapsed in the 1994 Northridge California Earthquake. As 
with Example Bridge 3, the Gavin Canyon bridge had skewed supports, short 200 mm (8-
inch) support seats, and reinforced-concrete columns in which the column strength or 
ductility were not factors in the bridge's earthquake vulnerability. The Gavin Canyon bridge 
also had cable restrainers at the movement joints of the superstructure, and these restrainers 
failed to prevent the unseating of the superstructure spans which resulted in the bridge's 
collapse. 
The vulnerability of Example Bridge 3 is judged to be high. 
• Example Bridge 4 is similar to Example Bridge 3 except that it is a single-span bridge, with 
its superstructure movement joints at the abutments instead of within the bridge spans. A 300 
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mm (12-inch) seating length is assumed rather than 200 mm (8 inches), since seating lengths 
at abutments are typically somewhat longer than at in--span movement joints. 
The vulnerability of Example Bridge 4 is judged to be high, only slightly less than that for 
Example Bridge 3. 
• Example Bridge 5 is a reinforced-concrete bridge with pier-wall intermediate supports, which 
are supported on driven foundation piles. The bridge crosses a river which has caused severe 
erosion and scour around the pile foundations, so that the weak link to the seismic resistance 
of the structure is in the pile foundation. 
Example Bridge 5 is typical of many bridges in New Zealand, and is based on one of the 
Tasman District bridges. The vulnerability of Example Bridge 5 is judged to be high. 
• Example Bridge 6 is a multi-column, monolithic bridge which has outrigger columns. The 
outrigger columns represent the governing seismic deficiency of the structure. As discussed 
in Section 2.2, outrigger columns were shown to be a vulnerable structural feature in bridges 
affected by the 1989 Loma Prieta California earthquake. The date of construction of Example 
Bridge 6, 1984, is taken to be the same as that for the 1-980 bridge structure in Oakland 
California, which was shown by the Loma Prieta earthquake to have vulnerable outrigger 
column details. 
Outrigger columns are relatively common in California bridges but are rare in New Zealand. 
None of the 445 bridges in New Zealand's Tasman district have outrigger columns. 
The vulnerability of Example Bridge 6 is judged to be medium-high. 
• Example Bridge 7 is a new multi-column bridge with a large skew angle at supports and 
movement joints within the bridge superstructure and at the abutments. The bridge also has 
outrigger columns, but they do not represent a seismic deficiency because of the late 
construction date. Although the length of the support seat meets code requirements and some 
type of linkages are provided, unseating of the superstructure spans is considered to be the 
governing seismic deficiency for this bridge. 
Although such a bridge would probably meet the letter of current bridge design codes, the use 
of movement joints in a bridge with large skew is not recommended by the author. Thus, the 
vulnerability of Example Bridge 6 is judged to be medium 
• Example Bridge 8 is similar to Example Bridge 7 except that it is a single-span bridge. Thus, 
the only movement joints are at the abutments, and there are no outrigger columns. 
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Movement joints at abutments may be somewhat less vulnerable than similar movement joint 
details within a bridge span, because relative earthquake displacements could be less. Thus 
the vulnerability of Example Bridge 8 is judged to be medium-low, slightly less than the 
vulnerability of Example Bridge 7. 
• Example Bridge 9 has reinforced-concrete pier-walls and a monolithic superstructure with a 
large skew angle. The bridge has no clear seismic deficiencies, and its response is likely to be 
governed by rocking at the foundations of the pier-walls. Because the superstructure is 
monolithic, the skew of the supports is not a significant factor in the structure's vulnerability. 
The bridge is typical of many older bridges in New Zealand and elsewhere. 
The bridge is judged to have a medium-low seismic vulnerability. 
• Example Bridge 10 is a new bridge with movement joints, zero skew, and single-column 
piers with one multi-column outrigger pier. It is similar to Example Bridge 7, except for the 
single-column piers and zero skew at the movement joints. The bridge has no clear seismic 
deficiencies, despite having some features which might be suspect if they were in an older 
bridge. Unseating of the movementjoints for Example Bridge 10 is much less likely than for 
Example Bridge 7 which has a 45° skew angle at the span supports. 
• 
The vulnerability of Example Bridge 10 is judged to be low. 
Example Bridge 11 is a monolithic single span bridge with a large skew at the abutments . 
The example represents a common type of bridge which is generally not vulnerable to 
earthquake damage. As with Example Bridge 9, the skew of the supports is not a significant 
factor in the structure's vulnerability because the superstructure is monolithic. 
The vulnerability of this bridge is judged to be low. 
• Example Bridge 12 is similar to Example Bridge 11 except that its span is shorter. It is a 
culvert-type bridge with a span of 4 meters (13 feet). Such bridges are common in New 
Zealand. 
The vulnerability of Example Bridge 12 is judged to be low, even lower than that of Bridge 
11. 
Vulnerability Rating Results 
Table A I shows the results of the calculated vulnerability ratings, including some of the intermediate 
values calculated. Figure A2 shows the results for each example bridge on a bar chart. The results 
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Vulnerability Rating 
Figure A2(a) shows the judgement-based vulnerability for each example bridge. Figure A2(b) shows 
the structural vulnerability ratings assigned by the Tasman District method. These ratings correspond 
closely to the judgement-based vulnerability. Except for Example Bridge 6, the bridges are put in the 
same order of structural vulnerability. For the Tasman District method, the mean value of structural 
vulnerability rating for the 12 example bridges is 6.4; the median rating is also 6.4. 
Figure A2(c) shows the ratings assigned by the Caltrans procedure. The ratings do not correlate well 
with the judgement-based vulnerability shown in Figure A2(c). The order of ranking for the Caltrans 
procedure is very different from that based on the author's judgment or that given by the Tasman 
District method. The mean Caltrans rating for the 12 bridge sample is 0.36; the median rating is 
0.32. 
Discussion of Results for Each Example Bridge 
The vulnerability ratings calculated for the example bridges illustrate several important points. The 
results for each bridge are discussed below: 
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Example Bridges 1 and 2 
The vulnerability rating of IO assigned by the Tasman District method for each of these bridges 
reflects the high seismic vulnerability of bridges which are prone to column shear failures. 
The Caltrans procedure applies a relatively high rating, 0.58, to Bridge 2 only, and applies an average 
rating, 0.33, to Bridge l. Thus the vulnerability of Bridge l seems to be under-predicted by the 
Caltrans procedure. The vulnerability of Bridge 2 seems to be more accurately predicted, but only 
because the bridge happens to have some potentially vulnerable features which are in fact unrelated to 
its governing seismic deficiency. This illustrates three points which were made in Section l l. 5: 
l. The under-influence of variables related to the non-ductile failure of concrete columns allows 
some prioritization procedures to overlook clearly vulnerable bridges. 
2. Some additive prioritization procedures implicitly assume that the vulnerability of a bridge is 
caused by the summation of several minor defects, where in reality a single major defect can 
cause a bridge to fail. 
3. The effect of the number of columns per pier (or bent) may be overemphasized in many 
procedures. 
Example Bridges 3 and 4 
The Tasman District method assigns a vulnerability rating of 10 to Bridge 3, and a rating of 8.6 to 
Bridge 4. The ratings reflect the high vulnerability for these bridges of span unseating at the 
superstructure movement joints. 
The Caltrans procedure applies an average rating, 0.34, to Bridge 3, and a below-average rating, 0.24, 
to Bridge 4. This again seems to be an under-prediction of the actual vulnerability of these two 
structures, and further illustrates point 2 above, that many prioritization procedures tend to under-
emphasize the vulnerability of bridges with a single major type of seismic deficiency. 
Example Bridge 5 
The Tasman District method assigns a vulnerability rating of 8 to Bridge 5. This reflects the high 
susceptibility to collapse from pile shear failure for this bridge. 
The Caltrans procedure assigns a low rating, 0.17, to Example Bridge 5 and under-predicts the actual 
vulnerability of the structure. This under-prediction occurs because the Caltrans procedure does not 
consider seismic deficiencies in foundations, foundation erosion, or river scour. The Caltrans 
procedure seems to be derived more for freeway overcrossing and undercrossing bridges than for river-
crossing bridges. Nevertheless there may be bridges in California which are susceptible to shear 
failures in foundation piles. 
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Example Bridge 6 
The Tasman District method assigns a vulnerability rating o(4 to Bridge 6. This under-predicts the 
actual vulnerability of the bridge. The reason for the under-prediction is that outrigger columns are 
not considered in the Tasman District method. None of the bridges in the Tasman District have 
outrigger columns. 
This illustrates the point made in Section 12.2 that before applying the Tasman District method to a 
new jurisdiction, the level-zero procedure should be calibrated using a brief initial study. This initial 
study should reveal any bridge characteristics or other issues which are particular to the new 
jurisdiction. 
Possible Modification of the Tasman District Level-zero Procedure 
For application in a jurisdiction such as California, the Tasman District method can easily be modified 
to include outrigger columns. This can be accomplished by changing the flowchart of Figure 12.6 to 
that of Figure A3. As can be seen by comparing the two figures, outrigger columns are covered by 
adding two question boxes to the flowchart. 
For non-outrigger columns, those constructed after the early 1970s are markedly better than those 
constructed before. For outrigger columns, deficiencies persist even for construction through the 
1980s. The flowchart in Figure A3 indicates that a separate cut-off date, 1992, is used for outrigger 
columns, while for all other columns the cut-off date remains 1973. 
Ca/trans Procedure 
The Caltrans procedure also under-predicts the vulnerability of Example Bridge 6, assigning an 
average rating of 0.32. This again illustrates the point that additive prioritization procedures often 
underestimate the vulnerability of a bridge which has a single major type of seismic deficiency. 
Another reason that the Caltrans procedure under-predicts the vulnerability of Example Bridge 6 is 
that the year of construction variable is not as appropriate to outrigger columns as it is to other seismic 
deficiencies. Compared to the Tasman District method, the Caltrans procedure cannot be as easily 
modified to consider a separate cut-off date for outrigger columns. If the weighting factors of the 
additive Caltrans procedure are modified in an attempt to account for this issue, the prioritization 
rating given to all other bridges can be affected. 
Example Bridges 7 and 8 
The Tasman District method assigns a vulnerability rating of 6.4 to each of these bridges, indicating a 
medium vulnerability. The rating is considered appropriate for Bridge 7 and somewhat conservative 
for the single-span Bridge 8. 
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COLUMN I WALL - VULNERABILITY RATING 
MODIFIED TO INCLUDE OUTRIGGER COLUMNS 
YES YES YES 
>--------iVcw = 10 
NO NO 
Vcw = O Vcw = 5 
YES 
Figure A3 Level-zero seismic assessment flowchart for column or pier-wall vulnerability, V cw, 
modified to account for outrigger columns. 
Conservatism Related to Superstructure Deficiencies 
There is an intentional conservatism in the Tasman District method related to superstructure 
movement joints. The conservatism is based on the following issues: 
• The procedures which have customarily been used for calculating the force and displacement 
demands at superstructure movement joints may be inadequate (as mentioned in Section 2.3 
and Chapter S). Therefore, even new bridges may have shorter seating lengths than would be 
desirable. 
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• Related to the above issue, linkages or cable restrainers may not have adequate strength, and 
could fracture in earthquake shaking and become ineffective. 
• Procedures used for designing new bridges typically do not contain any formal provisions for 
increasing seating lengths where supports are skewed. 
Note that these example bridges have superstructure linkages but they are not necessarily assumed to 
have good linkage details or linkage strength. If the bridges were of a construction type which can be 
correlated with good linkage details, the Tasman District vulnerability rating of the bridge would be 
reduced by the last factor shown in Figure 12.5. To include this factor, the construction would have to 
be of a type which could be easily identified by the inexperienced technicians conducting the level-
zero procedure. 
Additionally, the Tasman District procedure does not distinguish between movement joints at 
abutments and movement joints within the bridge span. This is done for simplicity. If the distinction 
were considered important for a bridge jurisdiction, the vulnerability rating could be refined by adding 
an additional step to the Figure 12.5 flowchart. 
Ca/trans Procedure 
The Cal trans procedure gives a high rating of 0.6 l to Example Bridge 7, which seems to over-predict 
the actual vulnerability. The procedure gives an extremely low rating of 0.14 to Example Bridge 8, 
under-predicting the actual vulnerability. This illustrates the following points: 
• The additive combination of vulnerability factors can result in major inconsistencies, as 
previously discussed. 
• Prioritization procedures such as the Caltrans procedure underestimate the effect of skew on 
bridges with movement joints, as discussed in Section 11.5. 
• The Caltrans procedure seems to make too great a distinction between movement joints at 
abutments and those within a bridge span, and inappropriately uses an additive combination 
of the two variables for these attributes. (For example, a bridge with 4 movement joints has 
0.165 added to its rating if all of the joints are within the span and 0.245 added to its rating if 
two of the joints are at the abutments, when in reality one would expect little difference in the 
vulnerability of the two structures.) 
Example Bridge 9 
The Tasman District method assigns a vulnerability rating of 5 to this pier-wall structure. This 
reflects the medium to low vulnerability of the bridge. 
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The Caltrans procedure assigns an average rating of 0.35 to Bridge 9. This is may be somewhat 
conservative, considering that several of the more vulnerable example bridges previously discussed are 
given a lower rating. 
The vulnerability of pier-wall bridges is not strongly related to year of construction, as it is for bridges 
with reinforced-concrete columns. The Caltrans procedure does not make such a distinction, and 
applies the same year-of-construction factor to all bridges. The flowchart algorithm used in the 
Tasman District method is more suited to making such distinctions, as discussed in Section l l.5. 
Example Bridge 10 
The Tasman District method applies a vulnerability rating of 4 to Bridge 10, reflecting the low 
vulnerability of the structure. 
The Cal trans procedure over-predicts the vulnerability of this bridge, giving it the highest rating, 0.63, 
of all 12 example bridges. This again illustrates the shortcomings of an additive combination of 
structural vulnerability variables. It also confirms that prioritization procedures often disregard 
important distinctions within the consideration of certain seismic deficiencies (in this case, the 
distinction between vulnerable and non-vulnerable movement-joint details). Such distinctions are 
most easily made in a flowchart algorithm. 
Example Bridges 11 and 12 
The Tasman District method assigns a vulnerability rating of 3 to Bridge ll, and a rating of 2 to 
Bridge 12. These ratings reflect the very low vulnerability of these bridges. 
The Cal trans procedure assigns an average rating of 0. 31 to each of these bridges. This rating seems 
to over-predict the vulnerability of the two bridges. Furthermore, the rating is similar to that assigned 
to a number of the example bridges which the author would judge to be much more vulnerable. This 
reinforces the observation reported in Section 11.5 that additive combinations can be insensitive and 
that it can be difficult to separate a large group of bridges which have average scores [Buckle 199 l]. 
Correlation of Results to Judgement-based Vulnerability 
Figure A4 shows the correlation of the vulnerability rating results with the judgement-based 
vulnerability. As was shown in Figure A2, the correlation plots of Figure A4 show a large 
disagreement between the results of the Tasman District method and those of the Caltrans procedure. 
Figure A4(a) shows the correlation of the Tasman District vulnerability rating with the judgment-
based vulnerability. The correlation is good, with the exception of one bridge - Example 6 - which 
is judged to have a medium-high vulnerability because of its outrigger columns, but is given a rating 
of only 4 in the Tasman District method, as discussed in the previous section. 
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Figure A4 Correlations of structural vulnerability ratings with judgement-based vulnerability. 
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If the level-zero procedure of the Tasman District were modified to account for outrigger columns, as 
shown in Figure A3, then Example Bridge 6 is given-a rating of 8 and the correlation improves. This 
is shown in Figure A4(b). 
The correlation of the Caltrans ratings with the judgement-based vulnerability is shown in Figure 
A4(c). The correlation is poor, and the regression line actually trends in the wrong direction. That is, 
as the judgement-based vulnerability increases, the Caltrans rating (for these 12 bridges) tends to 
decrease. 
A4 Comparison of Seismicity Ratings 
There are major differences between the Tasman District method and the Caltrans procedure in how 
the seismicity at a bridge site is assessed. These differences are explored by considering eight 
seismicity examples. 
Tasman District Method 
The Tasman District method uses a single factor to account for the seismicity at a bridge site. For 
New Zealand, this is taken as proportional to the seismic zone coefficient which ranges from a 
minimum of0.5 to a maximum of 1.2. The seismic zones reflect the expected earthquake acceleration 
levels for a given return period. 
Caltrans Procedure 
The Caltrans procedure uses three seismicity variables as shown in Figure Al. The three variables 
account for peak ground acceleration (on rock), seismic duration, and seismic activity. Presumably 
the seismic duration is assumed to be high when the seismicity at the site is controlled by faults 
capable of generating large-magnitude earthquakes, and presumably the seismic activity is assumed to 
be high when the controlling earthquake faults have a high slip rate. 
The seismic duration and activity factors have a great effect on the priority ratings assigned to bridges. 
It is not clear whether the full range of factors for these two variables can be applied regardless of 
seismic zone. 
For the examples considered below it is assumed that at peak ground acceleration (PGA) levels of 0.3g 
and 0.7g, seismic duration can be either short, intermediate, or long. For example, a site may have a 
0.3g PGA based on a large, long-duration earthquake fault some distance away, or may have a 0.7g 
PGA based on being very close to a smaller, short-duration earthquake fault. 
For seismic activity, it is assumed that there would not be complete independence of this variable with 
PGA. Therefore, in the examples considered below, it is assumed that for a PGA of 0.3g, seismic 
activity can be low, moderate or active, but is unlikely to be high. Similarly, for a PGA of 0.7g, it is 
assumed that seismic activity can be moderate, active, or high, but is unlikely to be low. 
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Seismicity Examples 
Considering the three seismicity variables used by Caltrans, eight examples have been developed by 
the author to cover the range of possible conditions. These eight seismicity examples are shown in 
Table A2. In the examples, the New Zealand zone factor of l.2 is considered to correspond to the 
Caltrans PGA of 0.7g, while the New Zealand zone factor of 0.5 is considered to correspond to the 
Caltrans PGA of0.3g. 
Table A2 Data and multipliers for seismicity examples. 
Seismicity Example: A B 
New Zealand Zone 
Factor 
Tasman District 
Seismicity Multiplier 1 
Caltrans Seismicity Data 
Peak Ground 
Acceleration 
Seismic Duration Long 
Seismic Activity High Mod. 
Caltrans Seismicity "Attributes" 
a22cPGA) 
a23( duration) 
a, 1 (activity) 
Caltrans Seismicity 
Multiplier 2 
1 [Maffei 1994]. 














Comparison of Seismicity Multiplier for Examples 
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0.16 
.0.29 0.145 
0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 
0.34 0.11 0.23 0.076 
Table A2 and Figure A5 show the seismicity multipliers which result for the eight examples. The 
results show large differences between the multipliers of the Tasman District and Caltrans procedures. 
Comparison of Examples E, D, and H. 
The multipliers of the Caltrans procedure are strongly affected by the seismic duration and activity 
factors, which are not considered in the Tasman District method. Depending on the values of these 
two factors, the priority rating of a bridge can be changed by a factor as high as 4.5. This is the most 
extreme case, and is seen in the comparison between Examples E and H. While the Caltrans 
procedure applies such different seismicity multipliers to these two example bridges, the Tasman 
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Figure AS Resulting multipliers for seismicity examples. 
A great difference between the two procedures is also shown in the comparison of Seismicity Example 
D with Example E. In the Tasman District, the seismicity multiplier of site Eis 2.4 times higher than 
that for site D, based directly on the different (PGA-based) seismic zones of each site. In the Caltrans 
procedure, site D is given a higher seismicity multiplier than site E, by a factor of 1.3. Thus in the 
Caltrans procedure, the site with 0.3 PGA is assigned a seismicity multiplier 30% higher than the site 
with 0.7 PGA. 
Comparison of Examples A and H 
The above results rely on the assumption that there is a degree of independence between the three 
Caltrans seismicity variables, ie, that a high PGA factor does not always imply a high duration and a 
high seismic activity. If in fact the variables are not assumed to be independent, then it seems that the 
difference between high and low seismic zones will be over emphasized. This is illustrated by 
comparing Example A with Example H. In the Caltrans procedure Bridge A has a seismicity 
multiplier 8.8 times higher than Bridge H, even though the expected PGA at Bridge A is only 2.4 
times higher. 
Discussion o(Results 
Based on these results, it seems that the Caltrans seismicity multiplier is poorly formulated. The 
multiplicative factors for seismic activity in particular seem to be poorly chosen in that they have too 
great an effect on a bridge's priority rating. The additive variable for seismic duration also seems to 
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have too great an effect. There also seems to be no apparent logic in why the duration variable is 
additive while the activity variable is multiplicative. These points are particularly pertinent 
considering that there are large uncertainties in the typical data which is available on fault locations, 
seismic activity, and expected earthquake duration. 
This illustrates the conclusion made in Section l l.5 that some prioritization procedures seem to use 
poorly chosen multiplicative factors. 
Note that the seismicity results given here for the Caltrans procedure assume that the bridge is not in a 
high-risk soil zone. (Not being in a high-risk zone would be the more common case.) Because the 
Caltrans soil factor is additive with the seismicity factors, the effect of the seismicity factors cannot be 
evaluated without assuming a soil factor. 
AS Soil Factor 
The Tasman District method and the Caltrans procedure differ in the ways in which they consider the 
effect of the soil profile at a bridge site. These differences are explored using additional examples. 
Tasman District Method 
The Tasman District method uses a multiplicative factor to account for soil-profile type and 
liquefaction potential as described in Section 12.3 and Table 12.3. The factor follows the soil-profile 
definitions of the Uniform Building Code (UBC) [ICBO 1994). 
Caltrans Procedure 
The Caltrans procedure uses an additive soil variable which puts all sites into one of two categories, 
either a "high risk zone" or not. The comparison of soil factors applied by the two procedures is 
shown in Table A3. Because the soil variable is additive to seismicity variables, its effect on the 
priority ratings cannot be judged unless values are assumed for the seismicity variables. 
Table A3 Soil Factors 
Soil Profile Type from the Uniform Building IV Ill II I 
Code [ICBO 1994). 
Tasman District Soil Factor [Maffei 1994] 2.0 l.5 1.2 l.O 
Caltrans Additive Soil Attribute [Gilbert 1993) 0.33 0 0 0 
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Soil/Seismicity Examples 
Eight examples of combined soil and seismicity variables are presented in Table A4. The examples 
are intended to cover the widest range of likely combinations of the variables. Four of the seismicity 
examples from Table A2 are used in combination with the two extreme ranges of UBC soil types, type 
I and type IV. 
Table A4 Examples of combined soil and seismicity factors. 
Soil/Seismicity Example A-IV A-I D-IV D-1 E-IV E-1 H-IV H-1 
Seismicity Example (See A D E H 
Table A2) 
UBC Soil Type IV I IV I IV I IV I 
Tasman District 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.84 0.42 0.84 0.42 
Multiplier 
Caltrans Multiplier 1.0 0.67 0.43 0.26 0.59 0.34 0.16 0.076 
Comparison of Combined Soil/Seismicity Multipliers 
The resulting multipliers to the priority ratings are given in Table A4 and illustrated in Figure A6. 
The figure shows large differences between the multipliers of the Tasman District method and 
Caltrans procedures. These differences, however, result mainly from the differences in seismicity 
factors as previously discussed, not from large differences in the effect of the soil type variable. 
The effect of the different soil type in each of the two procedures can be observed by considering the 
difference between Example A-IV and A-1, between Example D-IV and D-1, etc. The Tasman District 
method always results in a multiplier 2.0 times higher for soil type IV, compared to soil type I. The 
Caltrans procedure results in a multiplier between 1.5 and 2. l times higher for soil type IV compared 
to soil type I. The two procedures could be considered to be roughly in agreement in this instance, but 
the Caltrans procedure tends to give somewhat less emphasis to high-risk soil sites than the Tasman 
District. 
In considering the intermediate soil types II and III defined in the UBC [ICBO 1994], some additional 
differences between the two procedures would be likely to emerge. This is because the Caltrans 
procedure does not consider such a gradation of soil types, as is indicated in Table A3. 
Comparison of Bridge Importance Ratings. 
A large part of any prioritization procedure concerns how bridge importance is considered. The 
Tasman District method considers bridge importance in a very different way to the Caltrans 
procedure. The differences are such that it is difficult to make direct comparisons between the two 
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Figure A6 Resulting multipliers for combined soil/seismicity examples. 
procedures. However the effect of two major variables-detour length and traffic volume-on the 
importance ratings of the two procedures can be compared. 
Tasman District Method 
As is discussed in Section 12.7, it is recommended in the Tasman District method that the importance 
of a bridge be assessed by calculating benefit/cost ratios for seismic upgrading. It is noted in Section 
12.8 that it is also possible for the preliminary screening stage to use the following formula instead of 
explicit calculations of benefit/cost ratios: 
where: 
BI C = (v - l5)2[0.1 +-A_D_T_(D_ET_x_K--"Fi'-"'O=RD=-+_5_) l 
500,000 
BIC Approximate Benefit/Cost Ratio for Upgrade. 
V = Seismic Vulnerability Rating, 2-10. 
ADT Average Daily Traffic (Vehicles/Day). 
DET Detour Length (km). 
1 if it is possible to construct a temporary ford or 
other access in place of the bridge; = 5 otherwise 
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In the following sections the results given by this formula are compared to results of the Caltrans 
procedure. 
Caltrans Procedure 
As shown in Figure Al, the Caltrans procedure uses an additive combination of 8 variables to assess 
bridge importance. (The term "importance" is used here rather than the term "impact" or "impact 
criterion" as used by Caltrans and shown in Figure Al.) The bridge importance is combined 
additively with the structural vulnerability rating and then multiplied by the seisrnicity and soil 
multipliers (called activity and hazard by Caltrans), as shown below: 
Priority Rating= Seismicity X (0.6 X Importance+ 0.4 X Vulnerability] 
Comparisons of Importance Rating 
The Tasman District method considers the importance of a bridge to be affected by 3 major variables. 
These are detour length, average daily traffic (ADT), and whether temporary access can be provided in 
place of the bridge. The Caltrans procedure does not consider the temporary access variable; thus 
there are only two importance variables which are common to both procedures: detour length and 
ADT. The effects of these two variables in each of the procedures are considered below. 
Effect of Detour length on the Importance Rating 
The effect of varying detour length on the importance rating of the two procedures has been 
considered for typical examples. The results, shown in Figure A 7, indicate that the Tasman District 
method is much more sensitive to changes in detour length than the Caltrans procedure. 
Figure A 7(a) shows that the Tasman District importance multiplier for a bridge increases significantly 
as detour length increases. This is particularly true if temporary access cannot be provided in place of 
the bridge during the bridge reconstruction. For an increase in detour length from 10 to 50 km, the 
Tasman District importance rating increases by a factor of 2. 9 if temporary access is not possible, and 
by a factor of 1.6 if temporary access is possible. 
Figure A7(b) shows that the Caltrans procedure is relatively insensitive to changes in detour length. 
For a five-fold increase in detour length, from 10 to 50 km, the Caltrans importance rating increases 
by a factor of only 1.09. The effect of this increase will be further diminished by the subsequent 
additive combination of the importance rating with the vulnerability rating. 
The Tasman District example assumes an ADT of 1000, which is typical of bridges in the district. 
The Caltrans example is based on the assumptions shown in Figure A 7(b). Because the Caltrans 
procedure uses an additive combination of importance variables, the effect of one particular variable 
can only be assessed if values are assumed for the other variables. 
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Figure A 7 Effect of detour length on ratings for bridge importance. 
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Effect o(Average Daily Traffic (ADT) on Importance Rating 
The effect of varying traffic volume on the importance rating of the two procedures has also been 
considered. The results are shown in Figure A8. The results indicate that the Tasman District 
method is much more sensitive than the Caltrans procedure to changes in traffic volume. 
Figure A8(a) shows that the Tasman District importance multiplier for a bridge increases significantly 
as ADT increases. As with the detour-length variable, this is particularly true if temporary access 
cannot be provided in place of the bridge during the bridge reconstruction. For an increase in ADT 
from 500 to 2500 vpd, the Tasman District importance rating increases by a factor of 3.0 if temporary 
access is not possible, and by a factor of 1.8 if temporary access is possible. The range of ADT levels 
considered in Figure 8(a)- 0 - 5000 vehicles per day- covers the range of traffic levels on the roads 
in the Tasman District. 
Figure A8{b) shows that the Caltrans procedure is relatively insensitive to changes in ADT. For a 
five-fold increase in ADT - from 20,000 to 100,000 vpd - the Caltrans importance rating increases 
by a factor of only 1.44. The effect of this increase will be further diminished by the subsequent 
additive combination of the importance rating with the vulnerability rating. The range of ADT levels 
considered in Figure 8(b) - 0 - 100,000 vpd- is thought to be typical of California bridges. 
Both the Tasman District and Caltrans example assume a detour length of 20 km. The Caltrans 
example includes the additional assumptions shown in Figure A8(b). 
Effect of Vulnerability Rating on Overall Priority Rating 
As with other aspects of the two prioritization procedures, there are major differences in the 
formulation of overall priority ratings between the Tasman District method and Caltrans procedure. 
Again, direct comparisons are difficult. However, one issue - the effect of structural vulnerability on 
the overall priority rating - can be examined. 
Tasman District Method 
As discussed in Chapter 12, the Tasman District method uses a multiplicative combination of a 
damage function (based on the seismic vulnerability rating) times an importance multiplier to arrive at 
an overall priority rating (which is considered to be an approximate benefit/cost ratio). As shown in 
Figure 12.9, the damage function can be assumed to be parabolic in form. Thus the Tasman District 
priority rating relates to the seismic/structural vulnerability rating (on the zero to ten scale) according 
to the vulnerability multiplier shown in Figure A9(a). 
Caltrans Procedure 
The Caltrans procedure combines the vulnerability rating in a weighted additive manner with the 
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importance rating, as discussed in Sections 11.5 and A6. Assuming an average importance rating of 
0.5, the effect of the vulnerability rating on the overall Caltrans priority rating is shown in Figure 
A9(b). The range of vulnerability ratings is taken from a minimum of 0.1 to a maximum of 0.6. The 
studies in Section Al showed that the Caltrans procedure is unlikely to produce vulnerability ratings 
much outside this range. 
Comparison of Tasman District and Caltrans Results. 
The comparison of Figures A9( a) and A9(b) shows that the Tasman District priority rating of a bridge 
is more heavily affected by structural vulnerability than the Caltrans priority rating. For the Tasman 
District method, if the vulnerability rating increases from an average value of 6 to the maximum value 
of 10, the overall priority rating is increased by a factor of 3.6. For the Caltrans procedure, if the 
vulnerability rating increases from an average value of0.35 to a high value of0.60, the overall priority 
rating is increased only by a factor of 1.23 
Conclusions and Recommendations for the Addendum to Part III 
The comparison studies of this addendum lead to and reinforce several conclusions: 
A. There are great differences between the Tasman District method and the Caltrans procedure 
for the prioritization of bridges for seismic-upgrading. These differences are evident in 
nearly every component of the procedures and lead to a different priority ranking for the same 
bridge examples. 
B. The findings for the Tasman District method reveal no erroneous aspects, and no unintended 
results. The method tends to give conservative structural vulnerability ratings to bridges with 
movement joints and large skew angles, and the level-zero procedure does not consider the 
vulnerability of outrigger columns. These features are intentional, however, and if 
modifications in these areas were desired, they would be easy to incorporate into the 
flowchart procedure. 
C. The flowchart procedure used in the Tasman District is easily modified to account for added 
variables. With additive prioritization procedures such as the Caltrans procedure, it is more 
difficult to add new variables without affecting the ratings given to all other bridges. 
D. There are a number of questionable aspects in the 1993 Caltrans procedure for bridge-retrofit 
prioritization. For example, the multiplicative seismicity factors seem to be poorly chosen, 
the additive combinations make the procedure insensitive to major changes in important 
variables, and bridges with critical seismic deficiencies could be overlooked. Many of the 




For the management and prioritization of bridge-seismic retrofit work, the Tasman District method is 
recommended. The method should be implemented according to Figure 12.2, which recommends an 
initial study and verification before applying the level-zero preliminary screening procedure to a new 
jurisdiction. 
In cases where researchers disagree about the advantages of various prioritization procedures, perhaps 
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